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PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES

OF

PHRENOLOGY.

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1. Phrenology; or, the doctrine of the Mind and its relations to the Body.
2. Outlines of Phrenology.
3. Elementary Principles of Education.
4. Observations on Insanity.
5. Examination of the Objections made in Great Britain against Phrenology.

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1. View of the Anatomy of the Brain.
2. Outlines of his Lectures on Phrenology.
3. A Philosophical Catechism on Man.

A VIEW

OF THE

PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES

OF

PHRENOLOGY.

BY

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PREFACE.

WHOEVER wishes for truth is a philosopher; and of philosophers there are as many varieties as there are departments of knowledge as well physical as metaphysical. The title, however, is more particularly given to him who looks for exact notions and positive knowledge founded on principles dependant on the relations between cause and effect.

It is unfortunate for humanity, that those who assume distinctive titles do not act up to them. From this cause it is that the most noble appellations fall into discredit. Pretended patriots have sometimes been more dangerous than declared enemies; pretended Christians worse than heathens. Who would not be styled philosopher, or friend, or lover, of wisdom? Yet is this name often applied to decry individuals and their manner of thinking. Let us only observe that all who call themselves philosophers deserve not the title any more than do all their's who are called noble.

The ancient philosophers were, in general, metaphysicians, that is, they examined objects, without the reach of observation; for instance, the primitive

cause of the universe, the origin of beings, the cause of life, the nature of the soul, its immortality, *&c.* I incessantly repeat, that the aim of Phrenology is never to attempt pointing out what the mind is in itself. Phrenologists are observers of nature, and as such they examine only the manifestations of the mind and the circumstances under which these take place. In my work, entitled "Phrenology," a great mass of incontestable facts is collected. This volume will contain philosophical reflections, and inferences only. It will be divided into seven sections. In the first I shall examine the modes of action of the fundamental powers of the mind, and the necessity of rectifying by Phrenology all the systems of philosophy which have ever been given to the world; in the second, give a new nomenclature of the fundamental powers of the mind, state their aim, the disorders which may result from them, and the consequences of their inactivity; in the third, discuss their origin; in the fourth, the conditions of their manifestations; in the fifth, the moral nature of man; in the sixth, make some practical reflections; and, in the seventh, explain several philosophical expressions, according to the fundamental powers of the mind.

The contents of this volume made a part of the two first editions of the Physiognomical System. The subjects, however, are here treated more in detail; new expositions are added, and the arrangement of the whole is undoubtedly improved.

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PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES

OF

PHRENOLOGY.

SECTION I.

Of the Fundamental Powers of the Mind.

General View.

In order to prosecute advantageously the study of the mental functions, a capital error must be avoided,—an error which prevails in the systems of all philosophers; it consists in their having been satisfied with general ideas, and not, like naturalists, having admitted three sorts of notions: general, common, and special. This distinction is essential to the classification of beings into kingdoms, classes, orders, genera, and species. In knowing the general qualities of inanimate objects, such as extension, configuration, consistency, colour,—even in knowing the common qualities of metals, earths, or acids; we are not yet made acquainted with iron, copper, chalk, or vinegar. To indicate a determinate body, its specific qualities must be exposed. In natural history it is not sufficient to say that we possess a stone, a plant, an animal, a bird, &c., it is indispensable to mention the species of each possessed, and if varieties exist, to state even their distinctive characters.

In the study of the human body, general and common notions are also distinguished and separated from those which are particular; the body is divided into several systems, such as the muscular, osseous, nervous, glandular, &c.; determinate functions, too, are specified, as the secretion of saliva, of bile, tears, &c. But this distinction between general, common, and special notions is entirely neglected in the study of the mind, and even in that of the functions which in animals take place with consciousness.

Zoologists divide and subdivide the organization of the beings they study, and determine the structure of each particularly, but they consider their animal life, in a manner, quite general. Whatever is done with consciousness is explained by means of the word instinct. Animals eat and drink, and construct habitations by instinct; the nightingale sings, the swallow migrates, the field-mouse makes provisions for the winter, the chamois places sentinels, sheep live in society, &c., and all by instinct. This is certainly a very easy manner of explaining facts; instinct is the talisman which produces every variety in the actions of animals. The knowledge conveyed, however, is general, and therefore completely vague. What is instinct? Is it a personified being, an entity, a principle? or does the word, according to its Latin etymology, signify only an internal impulse to act in a certain way in ignorance of the cause? I take it in the latter signification; thus the word *instinct* denotes every inclination to act arising from within.

Instincts, moreover, are merely effects, and do not express peculiar causes producing determinate inclinations. In stating

that one animal sings and that another migrates, we specify some sorts of instincts, but leave their individual causes undetermined. The term instinct may be compared with that of motion. Planets turn round the sun; the moon round the earth; the magnetic needle towards the north; rivers fall into the ocean; animals walk, run, or fly; the blood circulates; and all these phenomena are conjoined with the idea of motion. Motion certainly attends on all, just as the actions of animals are always joined with instinct, but the causes of the various motions and of the different instincts are not alike, and must, therefore, be looked for and specified.

Finally, it is an error to say that animals act solely by instinct. It is true that some of their doings, such as the labours of insects, are the result of mere instinctive powers, but many animals modify their actions according to external circumstances, they even select one among different motives, and often resist their internal impulsions or instincts. A dog may be hungry, but with the opportunity he will not eat, because he remembers the blows which he has received for having done so under similar circumstances. If, in following his master, he is separated from him by a carriage, he does not throw himself under the feet of the horses or its wheels, but waits till it has passed, and then by increasing his speed he overtakes his master.

This shews that some animals act with understanding. On the other hand, though new-born children cry, and suck the finger, they certainly do not act from understanding. And, if men of great genius manifest talents without knowing that such faculties exis if they calculate, sing, or draw, without any

tuition, do they not so by some internal impulse or instinct, as well as the animals which sing, build, migrate, and gather provisions? Instinct, then, is not confined to animals, and understanding is not a prerogative of mankind.

The above reflections on instinct elucidate the ideas entertained by philosophers generally in regard to the mind and its faculties. Many of them reduce all the mind's operations to *sensation*, and all its faculties to sensibility; others call this general faculty *understanding*, or *intellect*.

Here we must make reflections on understanding similar to those already made on instinct. There are, in the first place, different sorts of understanding, which may exist independent of each other. Great painters cannot always become great musicians; profound mathematicians may be without any talent for poetry; and excellent generals may be miserable legislators. Hence, in the study of man, it is necessary to specify the different kinds of understanding or sensation. For, if we say, with Destut de Tracy, that memory, judgment, and imagination, are only modifications of sensation and the effects of unknown causes, it is still necessary to specify the kinds of sensation, since sensations of hunger, friendship, hatred, anger, or compassion, and knowledge of forms, colours, localities, &c., cannot be of one and the same sort, any more than the senses of feeling, smelling, tasting, hearing, and seeing. Thus, then, it is necessary to specify the various internal, as well as the external senses.

Moreover, the causes of the different kinds of understanding must also be pointed out, and new observations in consequence become necessary. Finally, I repeat, that man does not al-

ways act with understanding. Suddenly threatened by any danger, the limbs are drawn back before there has been time to think of the means of escape. All the gestures and peculiar sounds which accompany the rather energetic expression of the sentiments, are as involuntary as the feelings themselves, and by no means the effect of understanding. Who can say that he always acts with understanding? We too often choose the worse even in knowing the better.

The greater number of philosophers explain the actions of man upon the supposition of two fundamental powers: understanding and will. They, however, merit the same reproach as the zoologists who consider the actions of animals as effects of instinct, and those of man as effects of understanding alone. They attach themselves to generalities, and neglect particulars; they ought, however, to specify the kinds of will as well as those of understanding. For it cannot be the same faculty which makes us love ourselves and our neighbours, which is fond of destroying and of preserving, which feels self-esteem or seeks others' approbation. Moreover, the causes of the different kinds of love and of will, which are taken at one time in a good, at another in a bad acceptation, must be laid open. Every special faculty of the mind, therefore, is to be determined individually.

Though many philosophers have considered understanding and will as the fundamental powers of the mind, they have conceived particular modes of action in each of them. Understanding may act as perception, conception, memory, judgment, imagination, and as attention,—one of the most important of these modified operations. The will may produce

sensuality, selfishness, vanity, ambition, and the love of arts and sciences, in proportion as understanding is enlightened and external circumstances modified.

From this it appears that philosophical considerations on the mind have hitherto been general; and whilst the study of the understanding has especially engaged one class of thinkers, another has devoted itself to that of the will, principally as embracing the doctrine of our duties. Yet neither of them has determined any special faculty. They have always taken effects for causes, and confounded modes of action, in quantity or quality, with fundamental faculties. They have also overlooked one of the most important conditions to the exhibition of affective and intellectual powers, viz., the organization of the brain.

The first of these classes of philosophers is styled *Idealogians*, the second *Moralists*. This separation, and the consequent destruction of that harmony which ought to reign between the two, are to be lamented. Idealogians and moralists differ not only in their pursuits, but each criminates the other, and endeavours to confine it within certain limits. Idealogians deride the studies of Moralists, and these often decry Idealogians as the greatest enemies of mankind.

Many ponderous volumes are filled with their several opinions. As, however, it is easier to look for truth alone than to detect it when rapt up in error, I shall make only a few summary remarks; first, on the notions of Idealogians, and then on the doctrines of Moralists, and endeavour to put Phrenology in harmony with both branches of philosophy.

CHAPTER I.

On the Opinions of Idealogians; or, on the Modes of Action of the Intellectual Faculties.

The mind considered as the power which knows was the object treated of in all the ancient, as it is still in all the modern, philosophical systems. The Greek philosophers paid great attention to this subject. The Romans made no improvement in it; they only learned from the Greeks.—The earliest philosophers made no distinction between considerations or thoughts, and objects considered or thought of; they particularly studied cosmogony, God, and the soul. Later philosophers began to distinguish the considerations of the mind from the objects which are considered. Two classes of philosophers, therefore, arose. Some admitted the senses as particular means of acquiring knowledge; others regarded their testimony as illusive, and confided in the understanding alone. Democritus admitted both kinds of knowledge, but considered that obtained by the senses as changeable and not to be depended on; and therefore gave the preference to knowledge obtained by the understanding. In their philosophical examinations, both classes of philosophers, generally, considered external objects much more than the nature of man.

Socrates gave a particular direction to philosophical investigation. He thought it more reasonable to examine things in relation to man, and the principles of his moral conduct, than such as lie beyond the sphere and reach of the human

mind, and consequently do not relate to it. The philosophy of Socrates was in general practical.

Plato also distinguished the knowledge obtained by the senses from that obtained from within; and observed that the former is individual and simple, while the latter is general. He admitted, moreover, certain considerations, in regard to the mind, though destitute of all experience, as necessary and positive.

After the restoration of the sciences, Bacon, Descartes, and Leibnitz, were eminent in philosophy, in different ways. Bacon established his philosophy upon the basis of observation and induction. The essentials of Descartes' philosophy were thought and the knowledge obtained by thought. Like Plato, Leibnitz never arranged his philosophy methodically, but it admits two kinds of perceptions, one without and the other with consciousness; it considers the knowledge procured by the senses as individual, accidental, and changeable; but that obtained by thinking and reasoning, as general, necessary, and positive. According to this system, the reasoning power is endowed with principles, and all phenomena are intellectual.

Locke maintained that all knowledge springs from experience, and that all conceptions are founded on sensations, but that our mind never acquires any knowledge of objects themselves. Condillac, and the French philosophers, agree with Locke about the origin of our knowledge, and never examine things in themselves, but only judge of their relations to each other. Hume not only confines all knowledge to mere experience, but denies the necessity of causality. Berkeley, so far from examining objects in themselves, even

denies the possibility of proving the existence of external objects.

The principal modern schools of philosophy in Germany, are the critical philosophy, the transcendental idealism, and the philosophy of nature. Kant, the founder of the critical philosophy, distinguished two kinds of knowledge, one experimental (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*), and another founded on belief (*Kritik der practischen Vernunft*). He maintained that the first kind is only relative, subjective, or phenomenal, or that we know only the relation of the subject to the object; that we do not know either the subject or the object in itself, but both in their mutual relations only, and that this relation constitutes their reality to us. The subject he conceived endowed with particular categories which are applied to the object; whatever is general and necessary in knowledge belonged to the subject, while the particular and variable is the attribute of the object. Hence all experimental knowledge is founded upon dualism; upon the union of the subject and object; for, even the categories, though inherent in the subject, and conceived by the mind from within, acquire objective reality only by their application to the object. Kant, though he considered both subject and object, had, however, the subject more in mind than the object. He reduced all categories or forms, according to which the mind acquires experimental knowledge, to four kinds—to quantity, quality, relation, and modality; of these the two first concern objects in general, and the two last the relations of objects to each other, and to our understanding. Thus Kant admits notions independent of experience, as conceptions of space, time,

cause, and others; and considers these conceptions, not as the result of external impressions, but of the faculties of the subject: they exist *à priori*, and by their means we are acquainted with the objects. Our notions of morality, of God, and of immortality, are not experimental, but belong to the practical understanding, and originate *à priori*. Liberty is a postulatum.

Fichte went farther, and taught the system of transcendental idealism, according to which all certainty and reality is confined to the subject, who has knowledge only of his own modifications, and by means of abstraction and reflection, arrives at intellectual intuition.

The philosophy of nature rejects subject and object, makes no abstraction or reflection, but begins with intellectual intuition, and professes to know objects immediately in themselves. It does not consider the objects as existing but as originating; it constructs them speculatively *à priori*. Absolute liberty and existence without qualities, are the basis of this system.

My mind can never rise to similar conceptions: it is confined to analysis. Following the principle of Bacon, I wish to collect as many facts as possible, to compare them, and to draw conclusions, or form inductions.

As the system of Locke is the basis of the greater number of philosophic opinions in England and France, I shall compare its principles with my philosophy, and shew how far I agree with him, and wherein our opinions differ. Like Locke, I think that truth is to be placed above all other considerations; with him, too, I think we cannot examine the nature of the

mind, but only observe its faculties; Dr. Gall and I, therefore, study the organs by means of which these are manifested. With Locke, I admit innate capacities, but not innate ideas or innate principles. He, however, denies the innateness of ideas and principles on a ground different from mine, *viz.*, because certain children and adults, and even nations, are without them, or possess them variously modified. Granting the fact is so, Locke's position is not proved thereby, because inactivity of the faculties is explained by insufficient development of their appropriate organs; and modifications of ideas and principles result from different and dissimilar combinations of the faculties; a subject which I shall treat particularly by-and-by.

Locke admits only one primitive source of the activity of the mind—external impressions on the senses; whilst, if I speak of the mind generally, I still admit a second, which is internal. According to Locke, the mind begins with external sensations, and then by means of its perception, contemplation, retention, comparison, and its faculties of composing and abstracting, it executes all the particular operations of thinking and volition: the feelings also, in his system, primitively result from external impressions, and mediately from the understanding. I, on the contrary, separate the propensities and sentiments of the mind from its understanding; independently of which they exist, and to which they bear no proportion; they are internal faculties, which, it is true, may be excited by external impressions, but which are often active by their own inherent power alone. They are innate as particular faculties, and are inseparable from the nature of man, though their determinate actions be not so. According to Locke, moral principles must

be proved; but I think they must be felt: reasoning does not produce them any more than it produces the perception of colours, or of musical tones.

In regard to the understanding, Locke thinks that it is by means of the five senses and their impressions alone, that it conceives the existence of external objects, their separable or sensible and their inseparable or original qualities, such as extent, figure, and mobility. I am of opinion that the mind conceives very few ideas by the senses alone, and that peculiar parts of the brain are commonly necessary. In my physiological work entitled *Phrenology*, I treat of the immediate and mediate functions of the five senses; to the latter of which belong our conceptions of the existence of bodies, of their form, size, weight, colour, order, and number. The understanding as a reflective power acts, in my opinion, not only upon the sensations and conceptions of external objects, but also upon the propensities and sentiments, the sources of which are internal; these, as well as external sensations and perceptions, it knows, compares, considers in different ways, and determines in their various relations. Moreover, I do not only admit an internal activity of mind independent of external experience as the propensities and sentiments are concerned, but also with Kant, as understanding and experimental knowledge, even as the reflective powers are implicated. The conception of dimension, that the whole for instance is greater than the half, does not result from experience, but from an internal faculty. The conception that there is nothing without a cause, is also internal. These general conceptions are the attributes of the internal faculties of the understanding, just as the particular feelings are of the

propensities and sentiments. The general conceptions of experimental knowledge which arise from within, and the primitive feelings, are calculated for the external world; and the general conceptions of the reflective powers of the mind are calculated for experimental and sentimental knowledge. This second knowledge, then, is as positive as the first; for we know our feelings as well as we do our sensations and perceptions by the five senses. Every determinate action of any faculty whatever depends on two conditions, the faculty and its object. The activity of every feeling and the general conceptions of the perceptive faculties are merely applied to the external world; whilst the general conceptions of the reflective faculties are applied to experimental knowledge and to the feelings. In a perfect state of mind, all conditions must agree and harmonize with each other. If, for instance, external impressions do not agree with the ordinary state of man, and with the respective internal faculties, they are illusive; and if internal faculties suppose in external objects something which experience does not confirm, they also err: each condition must correspond with another, and all be conformable to the conceptions of reflection; and these again apply to the actions of the particular faculties.

Thus, in a perfect system of the knowledge of man, every particular faculty must be pointed out and considered in its concordance with every other. I recognise internal powers and external faculties, by whose intermedium the mind and the external world are brought into communication, and made mutually influencient. The internal faculties differ essentially in their nature, and may either act by their own

power, or be excited by appropriate impressions from without. Some of them make man act, while others modify, assist, and direct his actions. Some procure a relative knowledge of external objects, and others bring all the faculties into harmony, in order to constitute unity. If such a system be practical, it requires first a knowledge of particulars, and if these be capable of useful application, they must be reduced to generals, and even to unity. All modern idealogians admit several mental operations, which they ascribe to various faculties, or to particular laws or categories, according to which the mind acts. Their opinions differ only in as far as the number of faculties, or the modes in which the mind acts, are concerned. Nevertheless, it is certain that they have considered general operations and modes of action or effects only, and have discovered none of the fundamental faculties of the mind. Let us examine the particulars.

1. *Attention.*

Almost all philosophers speak of attention as a primitive power of the mind, active throughout all its varied operations, and the basis on which observation and reflection repose. "It is attention," says Helvetius*, "more or less active, which fixes objects more or less in the memory." According to Vicq d' Azyr, apes and monkeys are turbulent, because they have no attention. Dr. Reid† makes a distinction between attention and consciousness, calling the first a voluntary, the second

* De l'esprit, Chap. de l'inégale capacité de l'attention.

† Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 60.

an involuntary act; while other philosophers, with Locke, confound these two mental operations.

To all that has been said upon attention as a faculty of the mind, I reply, that *attention*, in none of its acceptations, is a single faculty; for if it were, he who possesses it in a particular sense should be able to apply it universally. But how does it happen that an individual animal or man pays great attention to one object, and very little or none to another? Sheep never attend to philosophy or theology; and while the squirrel and ring-dove see a hare pass with indifference, the fox and eagle eye it with attention. The instinct to live on plants or flesh produces unlike sorts of attention. In the human kind, individuals are influenced in their attention to different objects, even by sex and age: little girls prefer dolls, ribands, *&c.*, as play things; boys like horses, whips, and drums. One man is pleased with philosophic discussion, another with witty conversation; one with the recital of events which touch the heart, and another with accounts of sanguinary battles, and so on.

The word *attention* denotes no more than the active state of any intellectual faculty; or, in other terms, attention is the effect of the intellectual faculties, acting either from their proper force, or from being excited by external impressions, or by one or several affective faculties. Hence there are as many species of attention as fundamental faculties of the mind. He who has an active faculty of configuration, of locality, or of colouring, pays attention to the objects respectively suited to gratify it. In this manner we conceive why attention is so different, and also why it is impossible to succeed in any pursuit or undertaking without attention. It is, indeed, absurd to expect

success in an art or science, when the individual power on which its comprehension depends is inactive. Again, the more active the power is, the more it is attentive. The affective faculties, though they have no clear consciousness, yet excite the intellectual faculties, and thereby produce attention. The love of approbation, for instance, may stimulate the faculty of artificial language; boys who are fond of applause will be apt to study with more attention and perseverance than those who are without such a motive.

ii. *Consciousness or Perception.*

Speculative philosophers have incessantly spoken of the singleness of consciousness, and of there being nothing but consciousness or sensation in animal life. Now, though it be true, in a general way, that all operations of the mind are accompanied with consciousness, it by no means follows that perception, or consciousness of the impressions, is one of its fundamental faculties. Consciousness, in fact, is a general term, and is an effect of the activity of one or several of the intellectual faculties. There are, further, various kinds of perception or consciousness, one of which, and not another, may be possessed, and which, reciprocally, are in no proportion to each other. It is, therefore, incumbent on philosophers to specify each individual kind of perception, or consciousness. These are, in fact, as numerous as the fundamental powers of the mind.

Here two important questions fall to be considered: first, whether all the impressions which produce consciousness, or

sensation, come from without through the external senses; and secondly, whether all fundamental powers of the mind are perceptive, or have consciousness of their peculiar and respective impressions, or whether some of them procure impressions, the consciousness of which is only obtained by the medium of other faculties?

The majority of modern philosophers have investigated the perceptions of external impressions only, which they consider as the first and single cause of every varied mental function. The mind, say they, is excited by external impressions, and then performs various intellectual or voluntary acts. Some thinkers, however, have recognised many perceptions as dependent on merely internal impressions. Of this kind are the instinctive dispositions of animals, and all the affective powers of man. Those who would consider this subject in detail, may examine, in the *Phrenology*, my ideas on the external senses and on the affective faculties. There it will be seen that I admit two kinds of perceptions, or two sources of mental activity: one external and the other internal.

An answer to the second question is given with more difficulty than to the first. Dr. Gall thinks that each external sense and each internal organ has its peculiar consciousness or perception, its memory, judgment, and imagination; in short, that the modes of action are alike in each external sense and in each organ of the brain. To me, however, the individual faculties of the mind do not seem to have the same modes of action; I conceive that the functions of several faculties are confined to the procuring of impressions which are perceived by other faculties. The nerves of hunger and

thirst propagate their peculiar impressions to the brain, there to produce sensation or perception; and I believe the fundamental faculties, which I call affective, destined only to produce impressions, which being perceived, are then called inclinations, wants, or sentiments. The affective functions are blind and involuntary, and have no knowledge of the objects respectively suited to satisfy their activity; the nerves of hunger do not know aliments, nor circumspection, the object of fear, nor veneration, the object deserving its application, &c., &c. Even supposing the affective powers had an obscure consciousness of their own existence, a point which, by-the-by, is not proved, it is still certain that the intellectual faculties alone procure clear consciousness. The internal sense of *Eventuality*, combined with those of comparison and causality, determines the species of both internal and external perceptions. As it is, however, much more difficult to specify the internal than the external sensations, the species of the former have remained almost entirely unknown to philosophers.

Thus, perception, or consciousness, is an essential constituent in the nature of the intellectual faculties generally; yet it is no special faculty of the mind; it is a mere effect of activity in the perceptive powers. It may be distinguished from attention (though both are modes of action), as perception denotes knowledge of the external or internal impressions, while attention indicates activity of the intellectual powers, and their application to their respective objects.

From the preceding considerations, it is evident that every fundamental faculty of the mind is not *perceptive*, and that I make a distinction between perceptive powers and kinds of

perception. These latter, indeed, inhere in the whole of the affective and intellectual faculties.

iii. *Memory.*

Memory is another mental operation which has, at all times, occupied speculative philosophers. Those, too, who have written on education, have given it much consideration. It is treated of as a faculty which collects the individual perceptions, and recals them when wanted; and is further considered as being assisted by the faculties of attention and association. Now memory varies more in its kind than any other of the intellectual faculties recognised by philosophers. It is notorious that some children occasionally learn long passages of books by heart with great facility, who cannot recollect the persons they have seen before, nor the places they have visited. Others, again, remember facts or events, while they cannot recal the dates at which they happened; and, on the contrary, this latter sort of knowledge gives great pleasure to others. The Jesuits, observing nature, consequently admitted a memory of facts, a local memory, a verbal memory, and so on. Even the causes of these differences in memory were looked for. Mallebranche supposed some peculiar and modified state of the cerebral organization to explain the facts, such as softness and flexibility of the cerebral fibres in youth, their hardness and stiffness in old age, &c.

Is memory, then, a fundamental power of the mind? Dr. Gall thinks not; he considers it as the second degree of

activity of every organ and faculty; and therefore admits as many memories as fundamental faculties.

My opinion also is, that memory is not a fundamental faculty, but the repetition of some previous perception, and a *quantitive* mode of action. However, as I think the affective powers are blind, and without clear consciousness, I do not believe they have any memory. I, consequently, confine the mode of action under discussion to the intellectual faculties, and further, distinguish between the faculties which have memory and the species of notions remembered: the perceptive faculties have memory, and all kinds of perceptions are remembered. Now, as the intellectual faculties do not all act with the same energy, memory necessarily varies in kind and strength in each and in every individual. No one has an equally strong memory for every branch of knowledge. Attention too, being another name for activity of the intellectual faculties applied to their respective objects, naturally strengthens memory: it facilitates repetition. Exercise of the faculties, it is further evident, must invigorate memory: repetition is made more easy.

Reminiscence.

Reminiscence is often taken for a fundamental faculty of the mind; sometimes, also, it is considered as a modification of memory. We have reminiscence, if we remember how certain perceptions have been acquired, while memory consists in their perfect re-production.

I neither consider reminiscence as a fundamental faculty,

nor as a modification of memory, but as the peculiar memory or repetition of the functions of *Eventuality*, that faculty which takes cognizance of the functions of all the others.

This view shews how we may have reminiscence, but no memory of the functions of our affective faculties. And also, how we may remember having had a sensation which we cannot re-produce, and repeat a perception without remembering how it had been acquired. Thus we may recollect that we know the name of a person without being able to utter it, and also repeat a song without remembering where we learned it The special intellectual faculties, in general, repeat their individual perceptions and produce memory, while that of eventuality, in particular, recollects, or has reminiscence. Reminiscence, then, is to eventuality that which each kind of memory is to the other intellectual faculties.

iv. *Imagination.*

This expression has several significations: it is employed to indicate at one time a fundamental power, called also the faculty of invention, and in this sense it is said to invent machinery, to compose music and poetry, and in general to produce every new conception. Imagination, again, is sometimes taken for the faculty of recalling previously-acquired notions of objects. This signification even corresponds to the etymology of the word: the images exist interiorly. At another time imagination indicates a lively manner of feeling and acting. Imagination, in fine, is a title given to facility of combining previous perceptions, and of producing new compositions.

To the preceding considerations I answer, that imagination is in no case a fundamental faculty. There can be no single faculty of invention, or else he who displays it in one ought to shew it in all arts and sciences. And it is notorious that powers of invention are very different in the same as well as in different persons. A mechanician who invents machines of stupendous powers, may be almost without musical talent, and a great geometrician may be perfectly insensible to the harmony of tones; whilst the poet who can describe the most pathetic situations and arouse the feelings powerfully, may be quite incapable of inventing mathematical problems. Man, it is certain, can only invent, or perfect, according to the sphere of activity of the peculiar faculties he possesses; and therefore there can be no fundamental power of invention. Each primitive faculty has its laws, and he who is particularly endowed in a high degree, often finds effects unknown before; and this is called invention. Imagination is, consequently, no more than a quantitive mode of action of the primitive faculties, combined particularly with those of causality and comparison. Inventions are, probably, never made by individual faculties; several commonly act together in establishing the necessary relations between effects and causes.

The fundamental faculties sometimes act spontaneously, or by their internal power, and this degree of activity is then called imagination also. In this sense imagination is as various in its kinds as the primitive faculties. Birds build their nests, or sing, without having been taught, and men of great minds do acts which they had never either seen or heard of. In calling the degree of activity of the faculties which produces

these effects *imagination*, it is still a mere result of existing individual powers. All that has been said of imagination, as the faculty of recalling impressions, is referable to the mode of action styled memory of the intellectual facuties, and is not an effect of any single power.

Finally, imagination, used synonymously with exaltation, or poetic fire, results from activity of the fundamental faculty which I call ideality, and to the consideration of which mental power in the *Phrenology*, I refer my reader for farther information.

From the preceding reflections on perception, attention, memory, and imagination, it follows, that they are *quantitive* modes of action of the fundamental faculties, each of which may act spontaneously, or be roused by external impressions. The intellectual faculties alone perceive or know impressions, and being directed towards the objects of which respectively they have cognizance, produce attention; repeating notions already perceived, they exert memory; and being so active as to cause effects as yet unknown, they may be said to elicit imagination.

v. *Judgment.*

Judgment is commonly believed to be a fundamental power of the mind. It is said to have been given to counterbalance imagination and the passions, and to rectify the errors of intellect. Memory and judgment are sometimes also maintained to exclude each other. Experience, however, shows this opinion to be erroneous, for some persons possess excellent memory as well as great judgment. These two kinds of manifestations, however, also exist separately; and the conclu-

sion then follows, that they are neither the same faculty nor the same mode of action. But let us now see whether judgment be a fundamental power or not.

Dr. Gall, observing that the same person may possess excellent judgment of one kind, and have little or none of another, that a great judge of mathematics, for instance, may have almost no capacity to judge of colours or of tones, considers judgment as the third degree of activity of every fundamental faculty; and admitting as many kinds of judgment as special faculties, denies it the prerogative of being looked on as a primitive power. In his opinion, every fundamental faculty has four degrees of activity: the first is perception; the second, memory; the third, judgment; and the fourth, imagination.

I, myself, neither consider judgment as a fundamental faculty, nor with Dr. Gall, as a degree of activity, or as a mode of action to every faculty. Judgment cannot be a quantitive mode, and certainly not the third in degree, for some individuals judge very accurately of impressions as soon as perceived, without possessing the memory of them to a great extent; and others, with an excellent memory of particular kinds of impressions, judge very indifferently of the same. It even happens that certain faculties are in the highest degree, or spontaneously, active, while the judgment in relation to these very powers is bad. In other cases, the faculties are exceedingly active, and also judge with perfect propriety. Moreover, judgment cannot be an attribute of every fundamental faculty of the mind. The affective powers are blind, and neither recollect nor judge their actions. What judgments have physical love, pride, circumspection, and all the other feel-

ings? They require to be enlightened by the understanding, or intellectual faculties; and on this account it is, that when left to themselves they occasion so many disorders. And not only does this remark apply to the inferior but also to the superior affective powers; to hope and veneration, as well as to the love of approbation and circumspection; we may fear things innocent or noxious, and venerate idols as well as the God of the true Christian.

I conceive, then, that judgment is a mode of action of the intellectual faculties only; and not a mode of quantity but of quality. The better to understand this my meaning, let us observe, that there is a relation between external objects themselves, and also between external objects and the affective and intellectual faculties of man and animals. These relations are even determinate, and in their essence invariable; they admit modifications only. Hunger and aliment, this and digestion have a mutual relation. Now, if these relations are seen to be perfect and to exist as they are usually found, we say the function is good or healthy. If the sense of taste approve of aliments which man commonly employs and digests, the taste is good and perfect; but if it select articles generally esteemed filthy or unfit for food, such as chalk, charcoal, tallow, *&c.*, the taste is disordered.—There is disorder or aberration whenever the functions depart from their ordinary modes of manifesting themselves.

The intellectual faculties are in relation with the affective powers and with external objects, and their functions are subject to determinate laws. The faculties of colouring and of melody cannot arbitrarily be pleased, the one with every dis-

position of colours, and the other with every combination of tones. Now, the functions of the intellectual faculties may be perfect or imperfect, that is, be in harmony, or the contrary, with their innate laws, and the product of these two states announced is judgment; for the intellectual faculties alone know their own and the relations of the affective powers with the external world. The expression judgment, however, it must be observed, is used to indicate as well the power of perceiving the relations that subsist between impressions themselves, as the manner in which this power is affected by these. We distinguish different savours from each other, and we feel the different impressions they make. In both these operations we judge. The same thing holds in regard to all the perceptive faculties: they perceive the relations of their appropriate and peculiar impressions, and recognise the effect this act of perception produces. The faculty of colouring, for instance, perceives several colours, and is then affected agreeably or disagreeably; in consequence, it approves or disapproves of their arrangement. The operation, however, is the same in regard to each individual colour as to many together. The perception of any relation whatever is the essence of judgment.

The judgment of the faculties which perceive the physical qualities of external objects, even of tones or melody, is also called *taste*. We are said to have a good or a bad taste or judgment, in colouring, drawing, and music.

Each perceptive faculty feels impressions and relations of one kind only; that of configuration knows forms; that of colouring colours; and that of melody tones. The judgment

of each is in like manner confined to its special function. There are consequently as many kinds of judgment as perceptive faculities. The regular and perfect manifestation of the functions of the two reflective powers, however, examining the relations of all the intellectual and affective faculties to their respective objects, and the relations of the various powers among themselves, particularly deserves the name judgment; it essentially constitutes the philosophic judgment, which is applicable to every sort of notion. It is synonymous with reasoning.

The different kinds of judgment must not be confounded with one another; each may exist separately, and is important in the same proportion as is the faculty on which it depends. Causality is the highest intellectual power, and an essential and necessary part of a reasonable being; its perfect action or good judgment is consequently above all other kinds of judgment.

vi. *Association.*

Several philosophers in Great Britain, and especially Mr. Dugald Stewart, have lately spoken much of a peculiar faculty of association. They have examined the laws of its activity, and ascribed to it a great influence on our manner of thinking and feeling; they have even considered it as the cause of the sublime and beautiful.

These propositions I conceive are erroneous; association, in my opinion, being but an effect of the mutual influence of the fundamental faculties. One being active, excites another, or several, and the phenomenon is association, which occurs

not only among the intellectual faculties, when what is called association of ideas results, but also among the affective and intellectual together, and, indeed, among all the fundamental faculties. The sight of a rose may recal one we love; ambition may excite courage, or an intellectual faculty; artificial signs may arouse the perceptive faculties; and these, in their turn, make us remember arbitrary signs.

Association is a phenomenon of some importance in the practical part of anthropology; and when I come to speak of the modifications of the mental functions, I shall enter into its consideration at some length.

The principles of association are the same as those of sympathy. Faculties whose organs are situated near each other, or which act at the same time, will readily excite one another. Faculties also, which contribute to the same peculiar function, will be apt to exert a mutual influence. The strongest of the faculties will further excite and overwhelm the weaker with ease.

The mutual influence or association of the fundamental faculties explains the principles of Mnemonics, or the science of artificial memory, and shows its importance. To enable us to recal ideas or words, we may call in any of our other faculties which acts with great energy to assist. If that of locality, for instance, be vigorous, ideas will be easily recollected through the assistance of localities; that is, by associating ideas with localities.—Local memory will remember the peculiar ideas associated with particular places. The same means or faculties, however, it must be understood, will not serve in every case. Individuals must severally make use of their strongest

to excite their weakest powers; one will employ form, a second colour, a third places, and others numbers, analogies of sounds, causes, and so on, with success.

This consideration in its whole extent may be kept in view with advantage in education. No intellectual faculty is ever to be tutored singly, but all which are necessary to the perfect understanding of a subject are to be exercised together. Geography will aid the memory of events, and the reverse; and so on with the rest.

Association also elucidates the common saying, We think in our mother tongue. The meaning of this phrase is not determined; if language be supposed primitively to produce thought, a grave error is committed; for we think in no language; the feelings and ideas existed before the signs which express them, and we may have feelings and thoughts without a term to make them known. Language is only associated with the feelings and thoughts; but as this is done very frequently and with extreme rapidity, even in conformity with the succession of thoughts, we are said to think in our native language. The fact, however, is interesting in itself, and proves the importance of the mutual influence of the faculties. Several of the modern languages, it is true, have a determinate structure, and do not admit of inversions, and ideas consequently follow regularly in a certain order; but ideas are not therefore results of the signs by which they are expressed. It is obvious, however, that the structure of a language must give a peculiar direction to the mental operations; and again, that the prevailing spirit or general mental constitution of every nation may be known by its language. The French directs the mind especially to

individual objects and their qualities; the German, on the contrary, forces it to combine, at once, all particular notions. Notwithstanding these admitted effects of language, signs must never be confounded with ideas, nor simultaneous action mistaken for identity.

The second idea which Mr. Alison and others entertain of association as the source of the beautiful and of the pleasure that flows from it, is also unsupported by observation. Pleasure does not derive from association only. Every faculty is in relation to certain impressions; these, being either in harmony with it, or the reverse, produce pleasure or pain.—The power of configuration is pleased with certain forms, and displeased with others. The faculty of colouring likes certain colours, and dislikes others. In the same way impressions of tones are immediately pronounced agreeable or disagreeable.

But it is also certain that association may increase or diminish the absolute pleasure or pain. Pleased with a rose in itself, we may call it beautiful; but the pleasure and the beauty may still be heightened by recollections of the person who planted or presented it. Impressions, little agreeable in themselves, may gain by association. A national air may rank very low as a musical composition, and even offend a scientific ear, and yet delight him, the scenes of whose boyhood, and of whose home, the remembrances of whose relations and friends, it recals.

I shall conclude this chapter by stating that even those who recognise certain laws, or categories, according to which the mind operates, have never carried their considerations beyond general views If Kant, in his treatise on Experimental

Knowledge, admits a category of quality, his conception is still general. We know, it is true, the qualities of natural objects, but there are various kinds of these, and none of them is either specified in Kant's philosophy, or considered as a fundamental faculty of the mind.

Idealogians have therefore recognised certain effects and modes of action of the mental powers, and certain laws according to which the mind acts, but none of the fundamental faculties of the understanding. Their conceptions exist in nature, but they are defective, and need rectification, that is, the faculties must be specified; in this way alone will philosophy become applicable to man in his social relations.

CHAPTER II.

On the Opinions of Moralists; or on the Modes of Action of the Feelings.

Man must soon have felt that every kind of mental operation could not be called intellectual. Philosophers have accordingly acknowledged a second, and a different sort, which they name *Will*.

Living in society, man is in relation with his parents, his friends, his enemies, with those who are inferior or superior, and by an innate power he examines his actions in a moral point of view. In conceiving supernatural beings, and admitting their influence on his situation, he also contrived means to render himself agreeable to them.

Those philosophers, then, who examine the moral conduct of man, and its rules, viz. Moralists, are particularly interested in the knowledge, not only of the intellectual faculties and their modes of action, but also of the inclinations and sentiments, of the affections and passions, of the motives of our actions, of the aim of our faculties, and of the means of arriving at it. The study of moralists, however, is not more exact than that of idealogians. Like them, ignorant of the fundamental powers of the mind, they confound modes of action with the faculties themselves, disagree about the origin of morality, its nature, and the means of advancing it. I shall first, for clearness' sake, inquire into the motives of our actions, then into the origin of morality and its nature. The examination of the motives of our actions includes the philosophic doctrines of the Will, affections and passions, and of the influence of religion on mankind.

Will.

Many philosophers understand by the expression *Will*, all sorts and all degrees of inclinations, desires, and sentiments. Moralists commonly say that the will alone is the cause of our actions and omissions, and even that mankind is degraded by any other explanation than this. The will is styled weak or strong, good or bad. These terms, however, are vague, and require consideration.

In the common acceptation of the word, Will is no more a fundamental power than the instinct of animals, it is only the effect of every primitive faculty of the mind; for each

each of them being active produces an inclination, a desire, or a kind of will; and there are consequently as many species of will as fundamental faculties; the strength of each, too, is in proportion to the activity of the individual faculties, and exists involuntarily. Such a sweeping and general acceptation of the term Will, then, is evidently defective. That desire again, which overwhelms the others is also called will. Now, in this sense, every faculty in its turn may become will. A dog, for instance, is hungry, but having been punished for eating the meat he found upon the table, he, without ceasing to feel appetite, for fear of a repetition of the blows, does not indulge; he desires to eat, but he will not. Will, therefore, in this acceptation, cannot be any fundamental power, it is only an effect.

Let us here ask whether man in his healthy state of mind is compelled by nature to consider certain desires as superior and others as inferior? The answer is affirmative. I shall detail this point later, in speaking of the moral nature of man; meanwhile I adopt it as quite positive, and only add that the preference given is founded on intelligence which knows the different desires, and determines the election which is made. By calling the mental operation will, which appreciates the value of the desires, and chooses among them, it is evident that it depends on, and is proportionate to, intellect; hence, that it is not a fundamental faculty.

It is of the utmost importance to be aware that there is no will without intelligence, though this does not constitute will, and that will is no fundamental power, but the effect of the reflecting faculties applied to the affective and perceptive powers of the mind.

Legislation, in general, recognises intelligence as an indispensable condition of will. Idiots, and the insane, therefore, are not answerable for their actions. All the affective faculties, indeed, are blind, and dispose us to act according to pleasure, not according to will, which may frequently be opposed to pleasure. The moral code of Christianity distinguishes between desires and will. Let us for a moment suppose that will is a fundamental power, and of a higher order than intellect; but, on this hypothesis, how can will act at one time in this and at another in the opposite direction? How happens it, that in one the will looks only for selfish gratifications, and in another for general happiness? Can will take a determinate direction without any cause? Is it different in itself, or is it influenced by other causes—may it, for instance, be excited by the feelings? In this case, however, it would become dependent and exposed to aberrations.

The Christian law commands the will to resist inferior temptations, and to follow the inspirations of the spirit. Pious persons, also, in their addresses to the Great Guiding Power, pray that their will may be directed towards certain actions, and turned away from others. This proves that they consider will as susceptible of being influenced, and by no means as independent, and acting without any cause. Such an independent will would, indeed, be a principle, and could have only one, never opposite tendencies.

Thus, in the world, will has been separated from mere desires, or from the affective faculties; and intelligence been considered a condition necessary to its manifestations. Yet intelligence does not constitute will; for a person with an ex-

cellent intellect may take very little interest in the welfare of other beings. He may acknowledge the better, and still incline and even yield to his inclination to pursue the worse. Two conditions then, the feelings and intellect, are necessary to will; in other terms, will consists in the application of reason to the affective and perceptive faculties.

The greater number of persons take their individual inclinations and pleasures for will, forgetting that these give motives blindly and involuntarily. We may, indeed, say, that the exhibition of true will is very rare; it is too generally in opposition to our inclinations. This state has been noticed by several moralists "The spirit," it is said, "is willing, but the flesh is weak*." "For that which I do," says the Apostle Paul, "I allow not: for what I would that do I not; but what I hate that do I†".

I shall afterwards show that will, properly so called, is the basis of liberty. Here it is sufficient to know that it can neither be confounded with the individual inclinations nor with intellect; and that it is no special faculty, but the application of reason, or the reflective powers, to our desires and notions.

Affections.

There is a great confusion of ideas in the works which treat of the affections. The name affection is sometimes given to fundamental powers, as to physical love, to self-love, to the love of approbation, and to hope. Affections are also confounded with passions. Moreover, affections are occasionally put for

* Matt. xxvi. 41. † Rom. vii. 15.

the pathognomical signs, which indicate different states of satisfaction or discontent of the fundamental powers; for instance, smiling, laughing, sighing, yawning, shedding tears, *&c.*

I employ the word in none of the preceding significations, but solely according to its etymology, to indicate the different states of being affected of the fundamental powers. The sense of feeling, for instance, may convey tickling, itching, burning, or lancinating pain; its various modes of sensation are affections. In the same way the internal faculties may be differently affected.

The affections of the fundamental faculties may be divided into qualitive and quantitive. The former may again be subdivided into five sorts: 1st, general, which exist in each fundamental power; 2d, common, which inhere in several faculties; 3d, special, which belong to individual powers; 4th, simple or compound: finally, 5th, which are common to man and animals, and which are proper and peculiar to man.

The *quantitive* affections may be subdivided into two sorts: 1st, the fundamental powers and their qualitive affections may be active in very different degrees, from indolence to passion; and 2d, they may act with more or less quickness and uration.

Among the qualitive and quantitive, and among the simple and compound affections, we may also distinguish those which appear in the state of health from those which occur in disease. Let us now quote examples of each kind.

A general mode of action or affection is *desire:* each faculty being active desires; hence, there are as many sorts of desire as fundamental faculties. The sensations of pleasure and pain

are other sorts of general affections; they are effects, and happen, the former if any faculty be satisfied, the latter if its desire be not complied with. There are consequently as many kinds of pleasure and of pain as individual faculties.

The mode of being affected, called *sentiment*, is common to several affective faculties. That known under the name of *memory*, belongs to the intellectual faculties. *Fury* is common to combativity and destructiveness. *Anger*, in my opinion, is a special affection of combativeness; *fear*, of circumspection; compassion, of benevolence; and repentance or remorse, of conscientiousness.

Simple affections take place in individual faculties. *Jealousy*, again, is a compound affection. Egotism is its essence, and it is modified according to the peculiar faculties which desire; for instance, physical love, friendship, love of approbation. *Envy* is another compound affection: it is jealousy without benevolence; it increases by the want of the superior feelings. An envious person covets for himself alone; he would possess all enjoyments, to the entire exclusion of others; while a jealous man is more especially careful not to lose possession of the pleasure he enjoys.

The affections common to man and animals, and those proper to man, depend on the respective faculties. Anger, fear, jealousy, envy, appear in man and animals, as the faculties to which these affections belong inhere in both; while adoration, repentance, admiration, and shame, pertain, like the faculties from which they arise, to man alone.

Let us now remark that the fundamental powers and their qualitive affections may be more or less active or strong. The

different degrees of activity are called velleity, desire, ardent desire, passion; of the agreeable affections, pleasure, joy, and ecstacy; and of the disagreeable affections, pain, grief, and misery.

The nervous irritability, which is styled sentimentality in friendship, irascibility in courage, sensibility in benevolence, indicates only a higher degree of excitability or activity of the fundamental powers, and irregularity of application.

The affections may, further, be sudden and transitory, or slow and durable. Finally, the difference of the affections in the healthy and diseased state is easily understood. The complete absence of a faculty may be called *imbecility*, if it never existed, and *fatuity*, if it have been destroyed by disease. Fury, melancholy, despair, and irresistibility of any inclination, are diseased affections. But this subject is treated of at greater length in my work on Insanity, and I shall not dwell longer on it here.

Physicians, as well as moralists, must study the doctrine of the affections, on account of their influence on the vital functions and on man's actions in society. The same may be said in regard to the following article on

Passions.

This word Passion is commonly confounded with affection. What I have stated upon the affections, however, being known, the signification which I attach to the term *passion* will be easily understood; I use it to indicate only the highest degree of activity of any faculty. Passions, therefore, are not funda-

mental powers, but quantitive modes of action, and effects; there are, consequently, as many sorts of passions as of faculties.

Physicians, idealogians, and moralists, incessantly complain of the influence of the passions. They ruin health and often occasion insanity; they disorder judgment, cloud reason, and are causes of many errors and criminal actions.

Passions being the highest degree of activity of every faculty, we easily conceive why great results, whether good or bad, follow from them; why they advance the arts and sciences, and why they may be excessively dangerous. This depends on the nature of the faculties which act with the utmost degree of energy. The lower feelings, however, let me remark, are commonly the most active; and in speaking of passions, we are apt to think of them. Still, the superior sentiments and the reflecting powers also act with passion in some, that is, they act with the greatest possible energy. Two feelings, selfishness and the love of glory, have been considered by Helvetius as the greatest, or principal passions, and the cause of all our actions. There is no doubt that these two feelings are very active in the majority of individuals, and excite and employ the other faculties to procure their satisfaction. But certain it is, also, that they cannot produce talents. There are ambitious people eager for distinction, who labour hard, and who notwithstanding all, never excel in any one particular.

As there reigns a natural harmony among the fundamental powers, those faculties which are too energetic, or which act with passion, must obviously disturb this balance or order. In complaining of the passions, we do not, however, stigmatize

the fundamental powers themselves, but only their too great energy. This remark applies to the religious and moral feelings, as well as to the most brutal propensities. Selfishness, though it undermines morality, is still necessary to self-preservation. The love of approbation, though the main cause of political slavery, has a useful destination in private life. And religion, though the source of incalculable misery, procures the greatest consolation to humanity.

I shall make one observation more upon passions: the factitious passions, spoken of in books, do not exist. The primitive powers, on which they depend, are innate; their applications alone may be called factitious. Love of approbation is inherent in human nature; its satisfaction by external marks, titles, &c., is artificial.

Influence of Religion on our Actions.

In examining the motives of human actions, it is indispensable to consider religion. Among ancient nations, all systems of morality were intimately connected with religious opinions; moral rules of conduct were always represented as divine revelations, and governments were mostly theocratical.

Philosophers in all ages have disputed—and the discussion still lasts, whether or not there be a moral sense inherent in human nature. Some believe that there is, others deny it, and ascribe all morality of conduct to revelation. In considering morality, therefore, we must examine what belongs to nature and what to revelation. But let us previously see whether religion and morality are inseparable, or whether they exist independently of each other.

On Religion in general.

The same spirit has always guided those who call themselves the ministers or confidants of God, and there is something common to all the religious creeds both of ancient and modern times. Every religion has its miracles, mysteries, and martyrs. Each boasts of the most irrefragable testimonies, the most respectable authorities, and the most plausible reasons; each is proposed as true, and requires unbounded belief and blind obedience. The Indians who rub themselves with cow's-dung; the Jews who eat no pork; the Mahometans who neither drink wine nor eat pork, but make, at least, one pilgrimage to Mecca during their lives; the inhabitants of New England, who consider long hair as an abomination; and the believers in the infinite number of other religious creeds scattered over the world, have all received special revelations. Diametrically opposite and even immoral opinions, have been defended even to death, and always in the persuasion that God was rather to be obeyed than man. If any article of faith be found irrational, it is called a mystery, and belief in it is not at all less obligatory. Who does not know that it is the will of God, and necessary to salvation, to make war, or to maintain peace, to immolate victims, or to preserve that which God has created, to sing kneeling or standing upright, the head covered or uncovered, to repeat certain prayers in a foreign language, to eat certain dishes on certain days, to eat them cold or warm, to burn perfumes, &c., &c.? However dissimilar religious doctrines may be in regard to the attributes of

God, to his influence on us, to the nature of the soul and its future state, belief is always supported by revelation; it is always God who has spoken either immediately or by means of his messengers.

Religious belief has its advantages and disadvantages. It is a powerful motive of action among men. The reasonable and noble-minded, therefore, will never object to revealed laws; they will, however, pay more attention to their nature than to the time when, the place where, and the means by which they were revealed. The merits of Christian morality have been and will always be the same, independently of time or place, for it is universally adapted to human nature. I consider it my duty to admit every revelation or cognition of any immutable law, whether physical or moral, and to submit to it as the will of God. Truth has its own intrinsic value; it does not acquire its worth from those who teach it. It is therefore essential to point out means of distinguishing truth from error, true from false prophets, and voluntary from involuntary deceivers. Such is the course which reason indicates. The ignorant, on the contrary, are satisfied with faith. They obey every commandment which is proposed as divine. They attach themselves more to the legislator and to the manner of communicating his will, than to the excellency of his precepts. They look for miracles from those who announce the law. It is obvious, therefore, why pretended ministers of God have always been, and are still interested in representing ignorance as a virtue, and in preventing thinking people from communicating their opinions freely. As their religious interpretations do not always agree with the innate laws of intellect, it is

rather convenient to interdict the exercise of reason. Ignorance can alone excuse those who forget that the superior qualities called *Theological* are given for the general welfare, and not to gratify the selfish ends of individuals, nor to entail misery upon mankind. Ignorance is the sole plea for pardon to those also who impose duties on others which they themselves neglect, and who have too often compassed their personal views by confounding their own with the cause of the Supreme Being. Unfortunately, the number of persons who reason and discriminate is small; hypocrites succeed even too easily. In my opinion no one ought to arrogate the right of commanding in the name of God. History furnishes examples, too numerous to be cited here, of disorders consequent on such presumptuous conduct. It is of consummate importance ever to bear in mind, that the pretended ministers of God are men, and are therefore liable to be deceived themselves, as well as likely to deceive others; and never to forget that contradictions of a necessity give a death blow to all assumed prerogatives of infallibility.

It is not my intention to examine the various systems of religion which have governed mankind at different times or in different countries. I shall, however, say a few words on the doctrines of Christianity. This moral code seems to me the most pure, the most noble, and the most salutary, of all which are mentioned in history. Its laws alone are universal and invariable. It alone appeals to reasoning and to the consequences of its knowledge as the best proofs of its excellency; alone it is forbearing; alone it invites examination, and asks the inquirer to hold by that which is true; it alone is

founded on the faculties proper to man, alone places general happiness above patrial love and personal interest, and alone agrees with the natural law of morality. I do not hesitate to say that, in my opinion, true Christianity is little understood. Many, many changes must take place before it can be re-established in its primitive purity.

Theocracy, in the common signification of the word, I do not think exists in the nations of Europe now; though in some countries, the terms *irreligious* and *immoral* are still forced to be taken as synonymous, and many in consequence hypocrites. The only means of seeing clearly, and of uniting philosophy, and religion, seems to me to depend on separating strictly religious ideas from ideas of morality, that is, ideas relative to God, from such as implicate our duties as social beings.

The power of priesthood has gradually diminished, and civil governments have established a moral code independently of religious faith, so that now-a-days we distinguish between civil laws and the rules of religious legislators. Formerly the priesthood laid down all the moral precepts, but civil governments now decide even on the value of religious systems. They declare one preferable and dominant, and merely tolerate every other. Extremes in all cases do harm, and extremes and mischief will be unavoidable so long as religion and morality are under the direction of two distinct classes of governors. Sacerdotal supremacy must terminate; meanwhile it is upheld by civil rulers, who appreciating its influence duly, have united with priests for their mutual advantage. Civil governments, however, begin to feel their rights and their duties.

They endeavour to promote general happiness and order in society. They already separate duties towards the administration and our neighbours from those which are, strictly speaking, religious. The enactments of civil powers are now generally much wiser than the interpretations of revealed legislation; they are also more forbearing than the statutes of the priesthood. History, indeed, proves that religious governments have done more mischief to mankind than civil ones, which have in fact been faulty and injurious in the ratio of their interference with religion. The contest between the civil and religious powers is not yet at an end, and it is impossible to prevent the disorders which result from it. I sincerely wish that governments would abstain from meddling with any religious belief which is not inconsistent with the general order. There should be no exception in the civil code. It should be the same for every member of the community it governs; for those who sing to the glory of God, and for those who do not sing; for those who eat flesh as for those who eat vegetables; for the rich and the poor; for the gay and the gloomy. It should have only one aim,—general happiness. Whatever does not concern this ought to be out of its province.

Obstacles of every description have been opposed to the examination of this subject, and the knowledge of man's moral and religious nature is little advanced. Its progress indeed must be slow, so long as the investigation is trammelled, and so long as it is not admitted that no religious nor moral opinion can be true unless it be in harmony with the nature of man. It is very unfortunate, that more attention is given to the marvellous conceptions and dogmas of religion than to its moral

part. This indeed is rarely, if ever, viewed as the main object of true religion.

I have already said that Socrates, among the ancient philosophers, directed his views particularly towards morality and man's relations in society. His ideas, and those of Plato, seem to me very interesting. Socrates was just, noble-minded, and firm in his resolves. Possessed with strong love of practical knowledge, he despised all useless and metaphysical study, neglecting even geometry, astronomy, and the physical sciences, inasmuch as they are inapplicable to the interests of society. He also maintained that knowing and acting ought to be inseparable from each other. He believed in the existence of God, and said he felt his influence through an internal voice, which dictated to him all that he was to do or to omit. He thought himself specially called to teach virtue, and considered the moral law as innate, and destined to promote the happiness of individuals and of the community. The principal virtues, according to him, were temperance, strength, and justice. He thought that the man who endeavours to be morally good alone deserves the name of *wise*. Morality and happiness he regarded as synonymous. Socrates, however, it is to be observed, recognised an exclusive morality, by admitting it just to injure enemies. Finally, he believed in the immortality of the soul, its reward for good works, and its punishment for the evil it had done.

Plato, though he was on his guard not to offend the religion of the state, may still be considered as the founder of rationalism in moral philosophy. He rejected every conception that was not in harmony with the laws of reason. He looked everywhere for concord. In his opinion, God could not be the

cause of evil. Evil therefore has another cause, or is only apparent. God acts according to invariable laws, and neither prayers nor offerings can change his decrees. Plato does not develope his ideas on the duties of man sufficiently; he was the first, however, who opposed the propriety of doing injuries or injustices to enemies.

Various opinions of moralists might here be examined, but I shall confine myself to some remarks on the origin of morality. I have stated, that some philosophers consider the moral sense as innate, and that others derive it from revelation. I now add, that there are others still who ascribe it to intelligence, and even to personal interest.

The origin of morality must be elucidated in the same way as the origin of every faculty. I therefore refer the reader to the special treatise on the moral powers in the *Phrenology*. There I have shown that the feelings exist independent of intellect, and that this can only excite and appreciate the impressions of the affective powers. I have then only to consider personal interest as the cause of morality.

Man, say the partisans of selfishness, acts by interest; he does that which gives him the greatest pleasure, or seems the most advantageous. Egotism, continue they, is not confined to the search after the pleasures of the body or of sense, but extends over all internal sensations, and all moral and intellectual enjoyments. To act, in order to experience pleasure in the moment of action, or to obtain reward either in this life or in that which is to come, is still to act from self-interest.

Such a basis of morality is unworthy, ignoble, and uncertain at the same time. Wherever it prevails man will be unhappy;

and agreement, in regard to that which is morally good, impossible. Individual inclinations of legislators will determine the laws; and their self-satisfaction be the principal motive of their regulations. This is the law of the strongest, assisted by intelligence. It advises governments to treat subjects with benevolence and justice, because in this they find their own advantage; to keep the community in ignorance, as it is easier to persuade and arbitrarily to guide ignorant people than to convince those with cultivated understandings; and to foster superstition, since it is an excellent means of effecting whatever seems convenient.

The insufficiency of this morality has been felt, and therefore it has been deemed necessary to add, that every one has a title to satisfy his selfish desires, provided he does not trench on the rights of others. This is the doctrine which moralists of modern times endeavour to establish. It is certainly far superior to the vile system founded on the right of the strongest, which, for so many centuries, has desolated the world. Self-love, which undoubtedly exists in man, is here combined with love of others,—also an inherent principle in human nature.

This doctrine, if followed, will put an end to many abuses, and prevent numerous disorders; in many respects it will also promote general happiness. Whoever loves humanity must therefore desire to see it propagated. Nevertheless, the doctrine is founded on the inferior motive of personal interest; and in the fourth Section of this volume I shall show that it is neither what Nature nor Christianity teaches.

Other philosophers, still considering self-interest and intelli-

gence as the cause of morality, say that the strong govern the weak; and that if the weak occasionally become the strong, they throw off the yoke, and impose their own will in turn. Thus it is always the strong who govern. In these circumstances one fears another, and then both agree upon what shall be considered as law. This system, therefore, is founded on convention or agreement between the governors and the governed, for their common advantage.

I repeat, that no sentiment results from any other, nor from intelligence. Fear then cannot produce the moral sense. Animals are sensible to fear, and yet are ruled by the right of the strongest. Fear, it is true, may become a motive to act and to make laws; but it neither conceives the necessity nor the justice of making laws. And further, as I shall prove in the fourth Section of this volume, the human kind will never be happy so long as the faculties common to man and animals dictate laws to society. Those powers which are peculiar to man, and constitute his moral nature, ought to determine what is to be done or to be avoided.

Positive facts then, and reasoning, prove, that the basis of morality is inherent in human nature. Let us consider in what it has been deemed to consist by various philosophers who admit its innateness.

All moralists treat of justice and virtue, but all do not attach the same meaning to these expressions; both are taken at one time for faculties, and atanother for actions; and then, in each sense, they are general terms. In the first, we speak even of the virtues of plants. In considering virtues, too, as good actions, and in maintaining that every good action which has required an inward struggle is virtuous, the meaning of

the word virtue, in this way applied, is still very variable. The same thing happens with the terms *vice*, *immoral* or *unjust*, and *sin*, in the language of religion. Did virtue depend on circumstances, it might be contradictory, and could never be absolute.

We may say, that religious and civil governments have hitherto decided on what they desired should be called virtue or vice. The same action has, according to circumstances, been declared on one occasion a virtue, and on another a vice. Courage is virtuous in conquerors as well as in those who defend themselves against aggressors. The church of Rome commands celibacy as a virtue, while other governments reward those who bring up a family. It is remarkable, that all codes, revealed or profane, with one exception, have declared the *amor patriæ*, or love of country, a principal virtue. The Christian doctrine alone acknowledges no exclusionary patriotism; it alone commands universal love.

The ancient philosophers spoke of *cardinal* virtues, but these are only the just employment of certain fundamental powers. *Temperance*, for instance, is the right use of the pleasures of sense; *prudence*, of circumspection and intelligence; *force*, of courage and firmness; *justice*, of conscientiousness, benevolence, and self-love, together.

The virtues styled *theological* result from three fundamental faculties: *hope* and *charity* belong to primitive sentiments, *faith* depends on hope and marvellousness.

From the preceding considerations, I infer, that neither idealogians nor moralists are sufficiently acquainted with the nature of man; that they have considered modes of action as faculties, and that they require to study the fundamental

powers of the mind, their origin, their modes of action, the effects of their mutual influence, the conditions of their manifestations, and the laws of their improvement.

It is a pity that man is so much inclined to run into extremes. Idealogists have commonly too much confidence in their reasoning powers; they neglect observation, consider religion and morality as mere means of leading mankind, and assume their own manner of thinking and of feeling as a type of the human race; while moralists demand blind and unbounded confidence in their assertions as emanating from a superior authority, and discountenance or interdict reasoning. In this way, idealogians and moralists wage continual warfare, mutually disparage their subjects, and retard the knowledge of the nature of man. If they love truth, let both parties examine, without prejudice. Philosophers will find that man is naturally inclined to religious and moral considerations; and the interpreters of the will of God, if they do not act from selfish motives, will not reject the light of reason; they will soon be convinced that the feelings are blind, and must be guided by reflection, which can alone establish harmony among the fundamental powers and their functions.

Conclusion.

I have had in view, in this Section, to prove that idealogians and moralists do not know the fundamental powers of man; that they have taken effects for causes, and confounded modes of action with primitive powers; and that Phrenology alone can rectify their errors, and furnish a basis for a practical philosophy of mind.

SECTION II.

Fundamental Faculties of the Mind, and their Classification.

ORDER I.

Affective Faculties or Feelings.

The essential nature of the affective faculties is to feel emotions. I shall indicate their nature, the aim of their existence, the disorders to which they dispose, and the consequences of their inactivity.

GENUS I.—*Feelings common to Man and Animals.*

Hunger and thirst are desires felt and known by means of the brain, but I do not think that there is a special organ in which these impressions inhere. They reach the brain by the intermedium of peculiar nerves. The aim of hunger and thirst is nutrition; their disorders are gluttony and drunkenness.

PHYSICAL LOVE—(*Amativeness.*)

Aim: The propagation of the species.

Disorders: Fornication, adultery, incest, and other illegitimate modes of satisfaction.

Its inactivity predisposes to passive continency.

LOVE OF OFFSPRING—(*Philoprogenitiveness.*)

Aim: The preservation of the offspring.

Disorders: Too active; it spoils children, or causes their loss to be felt as an insupportable calamity.

Its inactivity disposes to neglect, or to abandon the progeny.

Inhabitiveness.

Animals have peculiar instincts to dwell in determinate localities. Nature destined all places to be inhabited.

Attachment—(*Adhesiveness.*)

Aim: Attachment to all around us. It appears variously modified, and produces friendship, marriage, society, habit, and general attachment.

Disorders: Nostalgia: Inconsolable grief for the loss of a friend.

Its inactivity predisposes to carelessness about others.

Courage—(*Combativeness.*)

Aim: Intrepidity and defence.

Disorders: Quarrelsomeness, disputation, attack, anger.

Its inactivity predisposes to cowardice, timidity, and fear.

Destructiveness.

Aim: Destruction, and the violent death of animals, for the sake of living on their flesh.

Disorders: Murder, cruelty.

Its inactivity prevents destruction.

Secretiveness.

Aim: To conceal.

Disorders: Cunning, duplicity, falsehood, hypocrisy, dissimulation, intriguing, lying.

Its inactivity predisposes to be deceived by others.

Acquisitiveness.

Aim: To acquire that which is necessary to our preservation.

Disorders: Theft, fraud, usury, corruptibility.

Its inactivity makes one's own interest be neglected.

Constructiveness.

Aim: Construction in general.

Self-esteem.

Aim: Self-esteem.

Disorders: Pride, haughtiness, disdain, arrogance, insolence.

Its inactivity predisposes to humility.

Love of Approbation.

Aim: Love of approbation and distinction.

Disorders: Vain glory, vanity, ambition, titles, distinctions.

Its inactivity predisposes to indifference about the opinion of others.

Cautiousness.

Aim: To be cautious and circumspect.

Disorders: Uncertainty, irresolution, anxiety, fear, melancholy.

Its inactivity predisposes to levity.

Genus II.—*Affective Faculties proper to Man*.*

Benevolence.

Aim: Benevolence in general.

Disorders: Benevolence to the undeserving, or at the expense of others.

Its inactivity predisposes to selfishness, and not to regard others.

Veneration.

Aim: To respect what is venerable.

Disorders: Idolatry, bigotry.

Its inactivity predisposes to irreverence.

Firmness.

Aim: Firmness.

Disorders: Stubbornness, obstinacy, and disobedience.

Its inactivity predisposes to inconstancy and changeableness.

Conscientiousness.

Aim: Justice, conscientiousness, and duty.

Disorders: Remorse for actions which are innocent, or of no importance.

Its inactivity predisposes to forgetfulness of duty.

Hope.

Aim: Hope.

Disorders: Love of scheming.

Its inactivity predisposes to despair.

* The rudiments of some of them exist also in animals; but they are much stronger and more extensive in their sphere of application in man.

MARVELLOUSNESS.

Aim: Admiration, and belief in supernaturality.

Disorders: Sorcery, astrology, the belief in demons.

Its inactivity predisposes to incredulity in revealed ideas.

IDEALITY.

Aim: Perfection.

Disorders: Too great exaltation, eccentricity.

Its inactivity predisposes to taking things as they are.

MIRTHFULNESS, OR GAYNESS.

Aim: Glee, mirth, laughter.

Disorders: Raillery, mockery, irony, satire.

Its inactivity predisposes to seriousness.

IMITATION.

Aim: Imitation, expression in the arts.

Disorders: Buffoonery, grimaces.

Its inactivity hinders expression in the arts, and imitation in general.

ORDER II.

Intellectual Faculties.

The essential nature of the intellectual faculties is to procure knowledge.

GENUS I. External senses.

GENUS II. Internal senses which procure knowledge of external objects and their qualities.

Individuality.

Configuration.

Size.

Weight and resistance.

Colouring.

Genus III. Internal senses which procure knowledge of the relations of objects.

Locality.

Calculation.

Order.

Eventuality.

Time.

Melody.

Language.

Genus IV. *Reflective Faculties.*

Comparison.

Causality.

SECTION III.

Origin of the Mental Faculties.

Not the nature of the mental powers only, but their origin, or the cause of their existence also, has constantly been an object of investigation. Philosophers have never differed in opinion upon the vegetative qualities of man. His digestion, circulation, respiration, and various secretions and excretions, are natural functions, and cannot be acquired by will nor intelligence; but, in regard to the origin of the mental powers, many, and different opinions, have been, and are still, entertained. According to some, man is every thing by nature; to others, there are a few general fundamental faculties which produce all particular manifestations; whilst others, again, hold that man is born without any determinate disposition, a *tabula rasa*, or blank sheet, and that his faculties are the result of external impressions both natural and artificial. Let us examine these different opinions, and see how far each is exaggerated.

CHAPTER I.

Man is every thing by Nature, or, all is innate in Man.

According to the philosphers of antiquity, we look in vain for qualities in man which are not given to him from birth.

This language was used both by profane and religious writers. Plato, in his Republic, considers philosophical and mathematical talents, memory, and the sentiments of pride, ambition, courage, sensuality, &c., as innate. Hippocrates, in treating of the qualities necessary for a physician, speaks of natural and innate dispositions. Aristotle, in his work on Political Science, adopts the principle, that some are born to govern and others to obey. Quintilian said, "If precepts could produce eloquence, who would not be eloquent?" Cicero, Seneca, &c., were of opinion that religion is innate; so thought Lavater also. Herder* considered man's sociability, his benevolence, his inclination to venerate a superior being, his love of religion, &c., as innate. Condillac† says, "Man does not know what he can do, till experience has shown what he is capable of doing by the force of nature alone; therefore, he never does any thing purposely till he has once done it instinctively. I think this observation will be found to be permanent and general. I think also that, if it had been duly considered, philosophers would have reasoned better than they have done. Man makes analyses only after having observed that he has analyzed. He makes a language after having observed that he had been understood. In this manner poets and orators began before they thought of their peculiar talents. In one word, all that man does he did at first from nature alone. Nature commences, and always commences well. This is a truth that cannot be repeated too frequently."

* Ideen zur Geschichte der Philosophie der Menscheit. Th. 1. S. 252.

† Œuv. Compl. 8vo. T. III. p. 115.

"When the laws," says he in another passage*, "are conventions, they are arbitrary. This may be the case; and, indeed, there are too many arbitrary laws; but those which determine the morality of our actions cannot be arbitrary. They are our work in as far as they are conventional; but we alone did not make them; nature dictated them to us, and it was not in our power to make them otherwise than they are. The wants and faculties of man being given, laws are given also; and, though we make them, God, who created us with such wants and such faculties, is, in fact, our sole legislator. In following these laws conformably to nature we obey God; and this is the completion of the morality of our actions."

The ancient institution of castes, or tribes, in eastern countries, shows that endeavours were made to preserve the purity of the races. The prejudice of nobility in certain families can be explained only by admitting the innateness of dispositions.

The religion of Christ also recognises the innateness of the faculties. According to it, all is given from above. "A man can receive nothing, except it be given to him from Heaven†." "No one can come unto me except it were given to him by my Father‡." "Who hath ears to hear, let him hear§." "All men cannot receive this saying, save they to whom it is given‖." St. Paul says, "When the Gentiles which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: which show the word of the law written in their hearts, their con-

* Loc. cit. p. 55. † John, iii. 27. ‡ John, vi. 65.
§ Matt. xiii. 9. ‖ Matt. xix. 11.

science also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another*."

The doctrine of predestination is also conformable to the opinion that every thing is innate. Pious persons implore the influence of God and of various spirits. The doctrine of divine grace also agrees with the principle that man has natural gifts.

Thus the principle of innateness is obvious, and has been admitted from the remotest antiquity; but what it is that is innate, and how it is so, are points not sufficiently known. Before I examine them, however, I shall rectify the two other notions, already mentioned, in regard to the origin of the faculties of the mind.

CHAPTER II.

A few general Faculties produce all particular Dispositions

In the first section of this volume, I have spoken of the fondness of philosophers for general conceptions. The same liking prevails in their explanation of the causes of our actions. A certain activity of the mind is commonly admitted as necessary to profit being made of external impressions; but some general modes of action have seemed sufficient to account for all the particulars.

* Rom. ii. 14, 15.

i. *Wants and Passions produce our Faculties.*

The expression Want is here taken as synonymous with desire, and from what I have said in the first section, it results, that this general term designates no determinate faculty, but the effect of each power being active; that there are as many wants, or desires, as fundamental faculties, and that these wants are proportionate to the activity of the faculties. Those, therefore, who speak of wants, in this sense, must specify them, and point out their individual causes. For it cannot be the same cause which finds pleasure in construction and in demolition; in benevolence and in cruelty; in righteousness and in sensual enjoyments; in the study of history and of mathematics; in poetry and in ascetic contemplations, &c. Thus the general proposition of philosophers, that desire of pleasure and aversion to pain produce our actions, must be rectified. Pleasures are different, and are effects of individual active faculties. These must therefore be made known, and the objects of their satisfaction indicated. But there is neither desire nor pleasure without the special faculties. My ideas on the passions are explained in the first section of this volume, and they who know them can rectify the erroneous opinion which considers them as the cause of man's special mental faculties.

ii. *Attention is the cause of our Faculties.*

Attention is very commonly considered as the cause of all internal faculties. Helvetius even said, that each well-organised

person might exercise his faculties by means of his attention, with such success, as to arrive at the first rank in society.

I have already shown* that the word attention has two acceptations: that it denotes consciousness in general; and consequently, in this sense, accompanies the activity of every faculty; and that it explains why one animal or man pays great attention to one object, and very little or none to another; why individuals are attentive to different objects, even according to sex and age; and why attention is proportionate to the activity of the respective faculty, so that, if the senses be not exercised, much stronger impressions are required to arouse their attention. The attention, therefore, of every faculty may be cultivated and improved by its exercise; but attention, as a general quality, cannot be the appanage of any particular power.

Moreover, as attention also denotes a distinct consciousness, a reflection on sensations and actions, the aptitudes and instincts of animals cannot certainly be its effect in this signification. No one will maintain, that the rabbit, badger, mole, marmot, or hamster, make burrows, because they have examined with attention the advantages of such dwellings; or that the beaver builds a cottage, because it has studied the laws of mechanics. Among men, geniuses also burst forth quite unconscious of their talents. This kind of attention then may excite, but can never produce, the particular faculties.

* Page 14.

iii. *Understanding is the cause of our Faculties.*

This proposition is also cleared up by Phrenology. The affective powers must be separated from the intellectual faculties, and there are several sorts of understanding.

iv. *The Will is the cause of our Faculties.*

In answer to this opinion, I again refer to what has been already said in this vol. p. 32, *et sequent.* of will.

It is, however, objected, that as his will is their only cause, man is degraded by having his actions explained. Those who use such language seem to me to speak without attaching any meaning to their words. Is man degraded by having it said that he must submit to the laws of the creation? Can he change the laws of his organization, of his senses, of his understanding, or alter the principles of music, algebra, &c.? Were man degraded by a determinate nature, all beings are so, even God himself, seeing that, by his nature, he cannot will evil, nor do an injustice. Now, if God act according to his nature, man cannot be degraded by laws dictated to him by the Creator, or by his will not being absolute.

Let us see further, whether man is degraded by our saying that he cannot produce the talents and feelings he desires. I suppose that every dreamer in philosophy has occasionally felt the limits of his faculties, and has done things disapproved of by reason. What had then become of his will? My manner of thinking here is also conformable to Chris-

tianity, which renders man answerable only for the gifts he has received.

Thus, the doctrine of the will is not sufficient to explain the mental functions of man; all our considerations, indeed, lead us to see more and more clearly that no single condition is adequate to account for all the actions of mankind. Several united constantly determine them.

CHAPTER III.

Man's Faculties are the result of Education.

The doctrine of innate ideas and of innate moral principles lost its authority by degrees, and it was easy to combat it, as it is not conformable to nature. That so many errors on this point should have prevailed during centuries is almost inconceivable; for every day observation belies the principle. How could philosophers maintain that man is every thing from birth, with the fact before them of the difference in so many particulars between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, occasioned by the dissimilarity of the laws which governed each nation? And is it not obvious too, that several modern nations neglect the arts and sciences only because their religious creeds interdict such pursuits? And further, is not every one of us aware that his notions and his actions are modified by external circumstances, and by the education he has received? The doctrine of universal innateness has been examined and re-

futed by Locke, Condillac, and others, and I find it superfluous to say more on the subject here. But these authors and their followers fell into the opposite extreme, and conceived men and animals born indifferent — *tabulæ rasæ*, or blank sheets, and maintained all the instincts of animals, from the insect to the dog and elephant, to be the consequences of instruction. Helvetius is the great champion of this opinion. According to him, foxes hunt because they have learnt hunting from their parents; birds sing and build nests in consequence of instruction; and man becomes man by education.

The brief answer to these positions is, that education produces no faculty whatever either in man or animals. The opinion of Helvetius and his school, being still much accredited, and many institutions being founded on it, deserves a particular examination. According to their hypothesis, arts and sciences ought to improve in proportion as they are taught, and mankind ought to become perfect under the care of moral and religious preachers. Why then is the progress of the arts and sciences so slow? Why are we forced to allow that men of genius are born? Why has every one of us certain faculties stronger than others? Truth lies at neither of the extremes, but between the two, and this is what I shall endeavour to prove. I shall consider, under three separate heads, the ideas according to which man acquires his affective and intellectual faculties by education. The first concerns the external senses; the second fortuitous circumstances; and the third, instruction and the external circumstances which are voluntarily prepared.

i. *Of the external Senses as cause of the mental Faculties.*

The external senses, it is certain, are indispensable to the acquiring of knowledge of the internal world, and to the fulfilment of social duties; it is also certain that they are given by nature. Now it is only because they are absolutely necessary to our actions that they have been considered as their cause.

This subject has already been particularly examined*, and I shall only repeat that the external faculties are not in proportion to the internal senses, and that these are mere intermedia. The hands may be used to take food, to write to a friend, to draw, to play on a musical instrument, &c.; but they do not produce hunger, friendship, drawing, music, &c. Let us observe instead of supposing, and we shall find that the internal faculties are only manifested by means of the external senses and of voluntary motion.

ii. *Of fortuitous or accidental Circumstances as the cause of our Faculties.*

The following language is very common:—Necessity makes man act and invent; occasions produce talents; revolutions bring forth great men; danger gives courage; society causes the passions, and these are the principal motives of our actions; climate and food beget powers, &c.; in short, circumstances produce the mental faculties.

Whatever has been said of fortuitous circumstances as the

* Vide Phrenology, page 216 et sequent.

cause of faculties, may be reduced to two considerations: they present the faculties with opportunities necessary to the exhibition of their activity; or they excite the faculties, without, however, originating them.

"Demosthenes," says Helvetius, "became eloquent because the eloquence of Callistratus made so deep an impression on his mind that he aspired only to this talent." According to the same author, "Vaucanson became famous in mechanics, because, being left alone in the waiting-room of his mother's confessor, when a child, he chanced to find a clock, and after examining its wheels, endeavouring, with a bad knife, to make a similar machine of wood. He succeeded, and therefore constructed his surprising machines, the automatons. Milton would not have written his Paradise Lost, had he not lost his place of secretary to Cromwell. Shakspeare composed his plays because he was an actor; and he beeame an actor because he was forced to leave his native county on account of some juvenile errors. Corneille fell in love, and made verses to the object of his passion, and therefore became famous in poetry. Newton saw an apple falling, and this revealed to him the law of gravitation, &c."

In this manner of reasoning the origin of the faculties is confounded either with the opportunity necessary for their manifestation, or with some external excitement. Now it is evident that external circumstances must permit the internal faculties to act; opportunities, however, do not, therefore produce faculties. Without food I cannot eat; but I am not hungry because food exists. A dog cannot hunt if it be shut up, but its desire of hunting is not produced by leading it

into the fields. Many millions are often placed in the same circumstances, and, perhaps, a single individual alone takes advantage of them. Revolutions make great men, not because they produce faculties, but because they offer opportunities necessary to their display. Circumstances often favour the attainment of distinction and the acquisition of celebrity, but every individual does not reach an eminent place. It is not certainly enough to be an actor in order to compose such plays as those of Shakspeare. How many children are exposed to similar influences without manifesting the same energy of faculties, while, on the contrary, some individuals not only make use of occasions present, but prepare and produce others which permit their faculties a still greater sphere of activity !

On the other hand, it is true that our faculties are often excited by events, and that without external excitement they would remain inactive. However useful, therefore, the study of excellent models may be in the arts, I am still convinced that the principles of every science, art, and profession, are readily conceived by those who possess the faculties each requires in a high degree. This is the case with moral principles and religion also, which are easily developed if the innate conditions on which they depend be possessed.

Society.

Many authors treat of the natural state of man in opposition to his social condition, and consider numerous qualities as the result of society. According to their hypothesis, man is made for solitude; the social state is contrary to his nature; and many of his virtues and vices would never have existed, had he not abandoned his state of isolation.

Excepting certain idiots, however, where, and at what time, has man lived a solitary being? History, so far as it goes, shows that he has always lived in society; in families, at least; and families, though scattered through the woods, form communities. As we find man everywhere united in societies, then, is it not natural to conclude that he is a social being? Animals, it is necessary to recollect, in regard to the instinct of sociability, are divided into two classes: several species are destined to live in society, as sheep, monkies, crows, *&c.*; others to live solitary, as the fox, hare, magpie, *&c.* Man belongs to the social class. Now we may easily conceive that the social animals are endowed with faculties destined for society, and that these cannot act without it. And every individual is, in fact, generally calculated for society; all his faculties are in harmony with this aim. Bustards and cranes place sentinels; a flock of wild geese forms a triangle in flying; a herd of chamois is led by a female; bees act in concert, *&c.*; and all these peculiarities inhere in animals along with the social instinct. Consequently society is itself a natural institution;—a law established by creation, and the faculties of social animals are not the result of society. This proposition is also proved by the fact of social animals having different and often opposite faculties; which if society produced any of them could never happen.

Misery.

Want, that is, some disagreeable sensation, misery, poverty, or painful situation, is often considered as the source of the instincts, propensities, sentiments, and intellectual faculties of man and animals.

Want, in this signification, certainly excites the internal faculties, but it is not true that it produces them; or else the same external wants ought to create the same faculties in animals and in man: yet we observe that not merely every kind of animal, but even every individual, acts differently under like impressions from without. The partridge dies of hunger and cold during sharp winters, and the sparrow falls benumbed from the house-top, while the nightingale and quail take wing to temperate climes before the season of want arrives. The cuckoo requires a nest to lay its eggs in as well as the wagtail or the redbreast, and yet builds none. The idiot makes no effort to defend himself from the inclemencies of the weather, while the reasonable man covers himself with clothing. Moreover, the faculties of animals and man are active, without any necessity from external circumstances. The beaver, though shut up and protected against the weather, builds its hut; and the weaver bird, though in a cage, makes its tissue. It consequently follows, that external wants excite the activity of the internal faculties, but do not produce them; and in this respect their influence is important. The faculties of the poor, for instance, are more active than those of the affluent; when the faculties, however, have not been given by nature, external wants cannot excite them.

I have already shown that the expression Want, taken as synonymous with inclination or desire, is the effect and not the cause of the internal faculties; that there are as many wants as different faculties; and that wants are proportionate to the activity of these.

Climate and Mode of Living.

Several philosophers have supposed that climate, mode of living, and even the nurse's milk, might be the cause of man's faculties:

In this manner of thinking, the modifications are confounded with the origin of our faculties. The opinion, however, must be considered. The arguments adduced in support of it only prove that manifestation of the faculties depends on the organization; for climate, eating, drinking, *&c.*, have a powerful influence upon the body. Instead, therefore, of denying the influence of climate, food, air, light, *&c.*, I consider it as of great importance, in as far as the activity of the faculties is concerned. The milk of nurses certainly contributes to the growth and organic constitution of children, and consequently to the manifestation of the affective and intellectual faculties, inasmuch as the body is necessary to this. All these external influences, however, cannot, it is evident, produce any faculty. If parents were right in attributing the inferior propensities of their children to the nourishment they had received, why should not grown-up people, who live on beef, veal, mutton, pork, *&c.*, accuse the ox, calf, sheep, and pig, for their want of intelligence and their peculiar character? The activity of our faculties varies with the modifications of our organization, just as the milk and butter of cows vary according to the food they live on; or as the flesh and fat of animals are modified according to the articles with which they are fattened. The activity of men fed on game differs much from the activity of men living upon potatoes and other vegetables; and it seems

possible to show the influence of different aliments upon certain systems in the healthy state, just as it may be shown that some medicines act more upon one than upon another. From the same reason we may also conceive the utility of certain rules of fasting in subduing sensual appetites. Particular degrees of excitement suppress the activity of certain faculties, while they increase that of others.

Climate certainly exerts a great influence upon the organization, and it is natural to suppose that one contributes more than another to develop certain faculties. The influence of climate is not, however, so powerful on man as on animals; for man, by means of his intellectual faculties, opposes its effects. The Jews are a proof of this. They are dispersed over the whole world, and though somewhat modified in different countries, their primitive and characteristic organization is still everywhere the same. The effects of innateness and of the laws of propagation are much more potent than those of any thing external. In saying, therefore, that climate and food influence the activity of the faculties, this is not to be confounded with their primitive origin.

iii. *Of prepared Circumstances, and Instruction as the cause of our Faculties.*

Having once considered external circumstances as cause of the mental faculties, men naturally thought that to teach arts and sciences, and moral and religious principles, to found academies and schools, to pay large sums to masters,

and to study the works of great men, might be sufficient to produce superior talents.

This opinion must be opposed, by observing:—

i. *The Constancy of the Nature of Animals and Man.*

Were animals susceptible of change from every impression and not endowed with determinate natures, how comes it that every species always preserves the same characters? Why do not fowls coo when they are reared with pigeons? Why do not female nightingales sing like males? Why do birds of one kind, hatched by those of another, display the habits and instincts of their parents? Why does the duck, hatched by a hen, run towards the water? Why does not the cuckoo sing like the bird that reared it? Why do squirrels, when pursued, climb trees, and rabbits hide themselves in burrows? Why are dogs attached in despite of the unkind blows they receive, *&c.*? It is true that animals are not confined in their actions solely to such as are required for their preservation. They vary their manners according to the circumstances in which they live; and are susceptible of an education beyond their wants. Horses, monkeys, dogs, *&c.*, may be taught to play various tricks. This power, however, of modifying their actions is still limited, and is always conformable to their nature.

The same reasoning applies to man. If his faculties be the result of external influences, why does he never manifest any other nature but his own? Children pass most of their time with mothers and nurses; yet boys and girls, from the earliest infancy, shew the distinctive characters which continue and mark them through life.

ii. *The Occurrence of Geniuses among Animals and Men.*

Did animals and men learn all from others, why should individuals, similarly circumstanced in regard to manner of living and instruction, excel the rest? Why should one nightingale sing better than another living in the same wood? Why, amongst a drove of oxen, or horses, is one individual good-tempered and meek, and another ill-natured and savage? M. Dupont de Nemours had a cow which singly knew how to open the gates of an enclosure; none of the herd ever learned to imitate its procedure, but waited impatiently near the entrance for their leader. I have the history of a pointer, which, when kept out of a place near the fire by the other dogs of the family, used to go into the yard and bark; all immediately came and did the same; meanwhile he ran in, and secured the best place. Though his companions were often deceived, none of them ever imitated his stratagem. I also knew of a little dog, which, when eating with large ones, behaved in the same manner, in order to secure his portion, or to catch some good bits. These are instances of genius among animals which are by no means the result of instruction.

Children often show particular dispositions and talents before they have received any kind of education. Almost every great man has, in infancy, given earnests of future eminence. Achilles, hidden in Pyrrha's clothes, took the sword from among the presents of Ulysses. Themistocles, when a child, said that he knew how to aggrandize and render a state powerful. Alexander would not dispute any prize at the Olympic

games, unless his rivals were kings. At fourteen years of age, Cato of Utica shewed the greatest aversion to tyranny. Nero was cruel from his cradle. Pascal, when twelve years old, published his treatise on Conic Sections. Voltaire made verses when only seven years of age. The number of such instances is very great, and it is unnecessary to mention more here, as they must be within the scope of every one's knowledge.

iii. *Individualities among Animals and Men.*

Individual animals of every species have universally something particular in their mental constitution; every bird of the same brood does not acquire its song with equal facility; one horse is fitter for the race than another; and sportsmen know very well that there is a great difference among dogs. It is the same with the human kind. Children of the same parents differ in talents and disposition, though their education has been the same. How then should the same education possibly produce the peculiarities of different children? Or why have not teachers yet found means to confer understanding, judgment, and all other good qualities? Why are we not all geniuses? Why cannot moral and satirical discourses keep us from abusing our faculties? And why must we lament so many errors and crimes?

To prove that man acquires his affective and intellectual faculties by education, some assert that the savages who have been found in the woods, and destitute of all human faculties, resemble beasts only because they have not received any education.

This presumption is refuted as soon as the condition of these unfortunate beings is known. They may be referred to two classes; being ordinarily defective in organization, with large dropsical heads, or brains too small and deformed. They are almost always scrofulous, have hanging lips, a thick tongue, swollen neck, bad general constitution, and an unsteady gait; they are more or less completely idiots, and have commonly been exposed and left to the care of Providence, having been found burthens by their parents. In some countries, the lower classes consider such unhappily-constituted creatures as bewitched, and take no care of them. Idiots too have sometimes a determinate propensity to live alone, and consequently escape to the woods. At Haina, near Marbourg, where there is a great hospital, Dr. Gall and I were told, that on sending people to search for some idiots who had escaped, others were found who had fled from different places. We saw a mad woman near Augsburg, who had been found in a wood. At Brunswick we saw a woman also found in a forest, who was incapable of pronouncing a single word. The pretended savage of Aveyron, kept in the Institution of the Deaf and Dumb at Paris, is an idiot in a high degree. His forehead is very small, and much compressed in the superior part; his eyes are small, and lie deep in the orbits, and we could not convince ourselves that he hears; for he paid no attention to our calls, nor to the sound of a glass struck behind him. He stands and sits decently, but moves his head and body incessantly from side to side. He knows several written signs and words, and points out the objects noted by them. His most remarkable instinct, however, is love of order; for, as soon as any thing is displaced in the room, he goes and puts it to rights.

Such unfortunate beings, then, are idiots, not because they are uneducated, but because their imbecility unfits them to receive education. It is difficult to conceive a well-organized person long wandering about like a savage in our populous countries without being discovered. Were such an individual, however, to escape in infancy, and be afterwards discovered in a forest, though he could not be acquainted with our manners, and the sciences we teach, he would still manifest the essential and characteristic faculties of the human kind, and would soon imitate our customs and receive our instructions. The girl of Champaigne proves this assertion.

Thus, education produces no faculty either in man or in animals; but let us not conclude that education is superfluous. My ideas on education are published in a separate volume, and I only remark here that it excites, exercises, determines the application, and prevents the abuses of the innate faculties; and that on this account it is of the highest importance. Mechanics and peasants, confined to their laborious occupations, are frequently ignorant; but many of them, with a good education, might surpass thousands of those who have enjoyed its advantages.

From the preceding considerations on external circumstances, it results, that they either present opportunities which favour the activity of the faculties, or excite and guide, but do not in any wise produce them.

I shall now consider the share Nature has in originating the powers of man and animals, in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

On the Innateness of the Mental Faculties.

The fundamental powers of the mind, as well as the organization, are given to man by Nature. The constancy of human nature affords the first proof of this position. The human kind, in as far as its history is known, has ever been the same, not only as regards organic, but also as concerns animal life. The skeletons of ancient mummies are the very same as those of the men at the present day; and all ages have exhibited virtues and vices essentially similar. Thus, the special faculties of man have ever been the same; the only difference observable at different times, is, that they have been more or less active, and variously modified in individuals. Here one has unjustly seized a piece of ground, there a place of distinction; here mistresses have been celebrated on an oaten-reed, there on a harp; conquerors in one quarter have been decorated with feathers, in another with purple and crowns, and so on; these modifications are, however, all grounded upon primitive faculties essentially the same. And man, though endowed with proper and peculiar faculties, still receives them from creation; the truly human nature is as determinate as the nature of every other being. Though man compares his sensations and ideas, inquires into the causes of phenomena, draws consequences, discovers laws and general principles, measures immense distances and times, and circumnavigates the globe; though he acknowledges culpability and worthiness,

bears a monitor in his interior, and raises his mind to conceive and to adore a God,—yet none of the faculties which cause these acts results either from accidental external influences or from his own will. How indeed could the Creator abandon and give man up to chance in the noblest and most important of all his doings? Impossible! Here, as in all besides, he has prescribed laws to man, and guided his steps in a determinate path. He has secured the continuance of the same essential faculties in the human kind,—faculties whose existence we should never have conceived had nature not bestowed them upon us.

The uniformity of the essential faculties of mankind, notwithstanding the influence of society, climate, modes of living, laws, religion, education, and fortuitous events, affords another great proof that nothing can change the institutions of nature. We everywhere find the same species; whether man clothe himself or go naked, fight with slings or artillery, stain his skin, or powder his hair, dance to the sound of a drum or the music of a concert, adore the sun, moon, and stars, or in his religion be guided by Christian principles, his special faculties are universally the same.

I have also spoken of genius, in order to prove that education does not produce our faculties, and mentioned that children often show peculiar faculties before they have received any kind of instruction. External circumstances are sometimes very unfavourable to the exhibition of genius; but gifted individuals do not always wait for opportunities, they even make them, and leave parents, professions, and all behind, to be at liberty to follow their natural inclinations.

Moses, David, Tamerlane, and Pope Sixtus the Fifth, were shepherds; Socrates, Pythagoras, Theophrastus, Demosthenes, Molière, Rousseau, and a thousand others, who have lived to adorn the world, were the sons of artificers. Geniuses sometimes surmount great difficulties, and vanquish innumerable impediments before their character prevails, and they assume their natural place. Such individuals, prevented by circumstances from following their natural bent, still find their favourite amusement in pursuing it. Hence peasants, shepherds, and artisans, have become astronomers, poets, and philosophers; and, on the other hand, kings, and prime ministers, employed themselves in the mechanical arts; all, indeed, unites to prove the innateness of the primitive mental faculties.

Men of genius, however, have been said to form a particular class, and to be incomparable with persons whose faculties are of middling excellence.

This, however, is the same as saying that hunger and circulation do not depend on organization, because all have not immoderate appetite and fever; or that the mole does not see with its eyes, because the stag sees better; or that man has no smell, since the dog's is superior. But, if we admit that organization causes the highest degree of activity of the different faculties, the lowest degree must also depend on it. Moreover, the greatest genius in one particular is often very weak in others. William Crotch, at six years of age, astonished all who heard him by his musical talents; but in every other respect he was a child. Cæsar could never have become a Horace or a Virgil, nor Alexander a Homer. Newton could not have been changed into so great a poet as he was an

astronomer; nor Milton into so great an astronomer as he was a poet. Nay, Michael Angelo could not have composed the pictures of Raphael, or the contrary; nor Albano those of Titian, and so on.

The mental faculties again must be innate, since, although essentially the same in both sexes, they present modifications in each. Some are more energetic in women, others in men. The feelings are, in general, stronger in women, the intellectual faculties more active in men. These modifications inhere naturally, and it is impossible to give to one sex the dispositions of the other.

We may add, that in every nation, notwithstanding the uniformity of its opinions, customs, professions, arts, sciences, laws, religion, and all its positive institutions, each individual composing it differs from every other by some peculiarity of character. Each has greater capacity and inclination in one than in another direction, and even in childhood manifests his own manner of thinking and feeling. Every one excuses his frailties by saying, It is my nature; it is stronger than I; I cannot help it, &c. Even brothers and sisters often differ extremely, though their education is uniform. The cause of difference, must, therefore, be internal.

The innateness of the faculties must also be admitted, because there is a direct relation between their manifestations and a certain organic apparatus.

Finally, if we believe that man is a being of creation, it is only rational to suppose that his faculties are determinate and ordained. I consequently, with all these considerations in view, contend for the innateness of every faculty of the mind. But

here it is of importance to notice an observation of Locke upon innateness. He, to shew that ideas are innate, stated that children do not manifest certain qualities, and that different nations have different, nay, opposite principles of morality. This position, however, in relation to the innateness of ideas and moral principles, must not be confounded with the innateness of the faculties. No sensation, no idea, no principle, is innate. Sensations and ideas of external objects follow from external impressions, and these being accidental, ideas of them cannot be innate; but the faculties which perceive impressions, and conceive ideas, are innate. Thus the idea of a stone, plant, or animal, is not innate; but these objects make impressions on the senses, which produce sensations or ideas in the mind, and both the senses and the mental faculties are innate. In the same manner, sensations and ideas of external and accidental events, and, in general, determinate actions of the faculties, are not innate. The propensity to love, and not the object of love; the faculty of speaking, not the peculiar language; the faculty of comparing and judging, not the determinate judgment; the faculty of poetry, not the particular poem, &c., is innate. There is, therefore, a great difference between innate faculties and innate ideas and sensations.

It is also true that children do not manifest all the faculties, but we cannot from this conclude that these are not innate. Birds do not make nests, the hamster and marmot do not collect provisions, the swallow does not migrate immediately after birth; neither do animals propagate, nor females give suck, when they come into the world; yet all these qualities are innate. This difficulty is easily explained. Every faculty

has its own organ, in proportion to whose development are its manifestations. Now in childhood several organs are very little, and in adult age very greatly developed; and while some are proportionately larger in children than in the grown-up, others are fully developed in both. The manifestations of the faculties being, as I have stated, always proportionate to the development and activity of their organs, it becomes evident why some of them do not appear in infancy.

Why moral principles differ in different nations is also obvious. I agree with Locke that they are not innate, but maintain that the faculties which form them are. I shall afterwards show that moral principles depend on several faculties, and vary in nations in consequence of different combinations of their organs; the justice of a libertine without benevolence and veneration must differ entirely from that of a charitable, modest, and continent person. The same fundamental faculties exist everywhere, but their manifestations are universally modified. Men everywhere adore a Supreme Being; they everywhere have marks of honour and of infamy; there are everywhere masters and servants; all nations make war, whether with clubs and arrows, or with muskets and artillery; and everywhere the dead are lamented, and their remembrance cherished, whether it be by embalming their bodies, by putting their ashes into an urn, or by depositing their remains in the tomb. Hence, though the functions of the faculties in general are modified in different nations, and of those consequently which determine the moral principles also, the same fundamental powers still appear in the customs, manners, and laws of all.

An essential part of the study of man, therefore, is to show that his nature is determinate, that all his faculties are innate, and that nature's first prerogative is to maintain the number and the essence of his special powers, whilst she permits many modifications of the functions of all, in the same way precisely as she preserves species, but continually sacrifices individuals.

The second right of nature is to allow more or less activity to individual faculties in different persons; that is, she endows all with the same faculties, but gives them in very different degrees. Some few are geniuses, but the majority are middling in all respects. Nature then produces genius, and the individual dispositions of every one.

Finally, nature has stamped a difference upon the sexes: some faculties are more active in women, others in men. Men will never feel like women, and women will never think like men.

These are facts which observation proves. Philosophers, therefore, can only examine how nature produces such phenomena, and see whether it is possible to imitate and to assist her.

Thus, the second principle of Phrenology—the faculties of the mind are innate—is also indubitable.

SECTION IV.

The Brain is indispensable to the Manifestations of the affective and intellectual Faculties of Man.

After having seen what nature does in man, let us inquire into the means by which she effects it. Religious people commonly believe in a mere supernatural dispensation of gifts; but there cannot be a doubt of natural causes also contributing to produce the phenomena spoken of in the preceding section. These are the organic conditions necessary to the manifestations of mind.

I may follow the example of other natural philosophers, and confine myself to proving a relation between the body and the manifestations of the mind, or, I may endeavour to determine it exactly. This latter task has been accomplished in my book entitled *Phrenology*. Here I shall only shew, in a summary way, how reasoning coincides with observation. It is important duly to appreciate my expressions upon this subject: I do not say that the organization produces the affective and intellectual faculties of man's mind, as a tree brings forth fruit, or an animal procreates its kind; I only say that organic conditions are necessary to every manifestation of mind.

I never venture beyond experience; and therefore consider the faculties of the mind only in as far as they become apparent by the organization. Neither denying nor affirming any thing which cannot be verified by experiment, I make no

researches on the lifeless body nor on the soul alone, but on man as a living agent. I never question what the affective and intellectual faculties may be in themselves, do not attempt to explain how the body and soul are united and exercise a mutual influence, nor examine what the soul can effect without the body. The soul may be united to the body at the moment of conception or afterwards; it may be different in every individual, or be of the same kind in all; it may be an emanation from God, or something else. Whatever metaphysicians and theologians may decide in regard to these various points, the position, that manifestation of the faculties of the mind depend, in this life, on organization, cannot be shaken. Let us then consider the proofs which reasoning affords of this third principle of Phrenology.

i. *Difference of the Sexes.*

The faculties of the mind are modified in the sexes: some are more energetic in men, others in women. Do then the souls of men and women differ, or is it more probable, that the faculties are modified because their organs or instruments vary? I have already mentioned that Malebranche* ascribes the different manners of thinking and feeling in the sexes, to the difference of delicacy of the cerebral fibres, in the male and female. Phrenology shews that certain parts of the brain are more developed in men, others more in women; and thus renders the peculiarities in the mental manifestations of each.

* T. i. 5me. Edit. p. 155.

easily explicable. There are, however, many instances in which the intellectual faculties of women resemble those of men, and the contrary.

ii. *Individuality of every Person.*

The mental faculties are modified in every individual. Now, is it probable that the soul differs universally, or is it more likely, that as the whole human kind has descended from an original pair, all modifications of the faculties may be explained by differences in the organs on which each respectively depends? Like species of animals, and man also, have essentially the same corporeal structure; there is merely difference of proportion and development in the various parts of which the body is composed; and these differences in the organs produce corresponding varieties in the functions attached to them.

iii. *Ages.*

Mental manifestations are modified by age. Either the soul, or its instruments, therefore, must produce these modified manifestations. It is ascertained that certain faculties appear early in life, or at a later period, according as the peculiar organs of each are developed.

The same law holds in both affective and intellectual faculties: the manifestations of all are not simultaneous. Several of both orders appear in infancy, others not before maturer years; several, too, disappear earlier, whilst others endure till the end of life. Now as we know that manifestations of the mental powers always accord with certain organic conditions, it is impossible to overlook their dependence on organization.

iv. *Influence of Physical Conditions.*

All that disorders, weakens, or excites the organization of the nervous system, influences especially the manifestation of the mental faculties also. It is generally observed that organs are enfeebled if their growth be very rapid; their functions too, are, in consequence, less energetic. This is chiefly remarkable in the climacteric years, or periods of increase; a knowledge of which is so very important in practical medicine. Vegetables are known to increase particularly at two periods; in the spring, and in the middle of summer. The growth of the human body is also more rapid at certain times than at others. Now rapid growth weakens the organs, both of vegetative and animal life, and consequently the functions they perform respectively. Girls who grow too suddenly turn pale, chlorotic, and consumptive, &c. Individuals, therefore, during the periods of growth, are not fit for active business, and ought not to exercise their intellectual faculties much. Rest is necessary till the organs acquire maturity, when all the faculties of the mind and body will resume their energy. Organs of particular faculties are occasionally too soon developed, and are then apt to be exercised overmuch. Incurable exhaustion often results from this, and early genius is nipt in the bud.

Adult men and animals are still subjected to variable degrees of excitement from seasons, temperature, food, and especially from particular laws to which the organization is subjected. We see animals resume and abandon at different periods, their instinct to sing, to build, to gather provisions, to live solitarily or in society, to migrate, &c.; and the

faculties of man do not always act with the same degree of energy. Who can overlook the influence of such evacuations as the catamena, hemorrhoids, &c.; or of pregnancy, digestion, fasting, and whatever exhausts the corporeal powers? Who can deny the effects of disease upon the manifestation of our faculties; or of external and internal excitements, as of agreeable impressions, fine weather, music, dancing, conversation, &c.? Now all these act upon the organization only; manifestation of the mental faculties consequently depends on the organization.

Exceedingly defective mental powers have been known to grow very active when excited by external or internal causes. Haller relates the case of an idiot, who happening to be wounded on the head, manifested great understanding so long as the wound remained open, but who, as soon as this healed up, fell into his former stupidity. He speaks of another patient whose eye being inflamed, saw perfectly during the night whilst the inflammation lasted. Father Mabillon, in his infancy, gave little promise of superior abilities; but, having received a blow on his head, he, from that moment, displayed talents. I have heard of a boy who, at the age of fourteen, seemed incapable of improvement; having fallen down stairs one day, however, and got several wounds in his head, he afterwards began to excel in his studies. I have seen a girl, nine years old, whose right arm grew gradually weak and almost paralytic, in consequence of a blow on the same side of the head; her lower jaw trembled incessantly, and she was often convulsed; but her intellectual faculties had acquired great energy and perfection; her whole deportment indeed, was exceedingly imposing. I shall mention only one

other case of this kind from the Edinburgh Review*, in an article upon the Retreat, an institution near York for insane persons of the Society of Friends: "A young woman, who was employed as a domestic servant by the father of the relater when he was a boy, became insane, and, at length, sunk into a state of perfect idiocy. In this condition she remained for many years, when she was attacked by a typhus fever; and my friend, having then practised some time, attended her. He was surprised to observe, as the fever advanced, a development of the mental powers. During that period of the fever when others are delirious, this patient was entirely rational. She recognised, in the face of her medical attendant, the son of her old master, whom she had known so many years before, and she related many circumstances respecting his family and others, which had happened to herself in her earlier days. But, alas! it was only the gleam of reason: as the fever abated, clouds again enveloped the mind; she sunk into her former deplorable state, and remained in it until her death, which happened a few years afterwards." These facts are positive, and there can be no doubt of similar causes influencing the faculties of the mind surprisingly; yet they can only act immediately upon the organization. We must perforce conclude, that when physical and organic causes excite the most impudent lasciviousness, the most arrogant pride, despair which rejects all consolation, and so on, these various manifestations depend on the organization.

v. *Sleeping and Dreaming.*

The states of watching, sleeping, and dreaming, also prove

* No. XLV. p. 197.

the manifestations of the mind dependent on organization; for corporeal organs can alone be fatigued and exhausted. Now it is known that mental operations cannot be continued incessantly, that rest is indispensable, and that a regular recurrence of that inactive state of the mental faculties called sleep, is necessary to enable them to display their perfect energies.

If single organs be by any cause excited, and enter into action while the others are inactive, partial sensations and ideas, or *dreams*, arise. Dreams, then, are almost always the result of certain material causes, and are conformable to the age and organic constitution of the dreamer. Men and women of an irritable habit of body, find difficulties and endless impediments in their dreams, and generally suffer pain, and feel anxiety and alarm. This constant relation between dreams and bodily frame, which has been verified by an infinity of observations, proves further that the mental manifestations depend on organization.

vi. *Exercise.*

The possibility of exercising and of training the faculties of the mind, also shews their dependence on the organization; for that an immaterial being can be exercised is inconceivable.

vii. *Relation between the Brain and the manifestations of the Mind.*

The preceding arguments are founded on reasoning, and prove that all manifestations of the mind depend on organic conditions. In my physiological work on Phre-

nology, it is demonstrated that individual faculties manifest themselves by means of particular cerebral parts, and that the faculties appear, increase in strength, and diminish in vigour, in proportion as the organs on which they depend are developed, increase in size, and shrink again. The brain of the new-born child scarcely shows any traces of fibres; these appear, become firmer by degrees, and attain perfection between the twentieth and fortieth year. As years accumulate, its convolutions, which had been plump, become flabby, and are less closely packed together.

In conformity with the state of the brain at birth, animal life is confined to spontaneous motions, to the perception of hunger and thirst, to some obscure sensation of pain and pleasure, and to an imperfect state of the external senses. By degrees the number and energy of the affective and intellectual faculties augment, and the child begins to acquire knowledge and determinate ideas of external objects. Through the periods of boyhood and adolescence the faculties gradually gain strength; and, in manhood, they at length manifest the greatest degree of energy. From this state of perfection, however, they soon begin to decline; and, in extreme old age, the propensities are blunted, the sentiments weakened, and the intellectual faculties almost or entirely annihilated.

If the organs of the faculties, however, do not follow the usual order of increase, but be either precocious or tardy, their respective functions are also manifested with corresponding variations. If the intellectual faculties are often more energetic in rickety children than beseems their age, their brain will also be found extraordinarily developed or irritable. Inde-

pendently of all disease, however, particular portions of the brain are occasionally developed at too early a period, and then their functions likewise appear prematurely.

On the other hand, when parts of the brain or its whole mass arrives very late at maturity, the mental imperfections of childhood remain longer than usual, sometimes till about the tenth or twelfth year, so that parents despair of the rationality of their children. After this age, however, the cerebral organs will often take on a particular growth, and the faculties then appear with great vigour. One of the most distinguished physicians at Berlin, when ten years old, could not use his organs of speech, and Gessner, at the same age, had made such slender progress in his studies, that his preceptor declared him half an idiot; yet it is known how famous he became afterwards.

If the growth of the cerebral organs be incomplete, the faculties of the mind are equally defective. It is impossible to determine with exactness the degree of organic development necessary to the due manifestation of the mental powers; for this depends not on the size of the organs alone, but on their peculiar constitution also. A very small brain, however, is always accompanied with imbecility.

Children have sometimes the same organic constitution of brain as their parents, and then manifest precisely similar affective and intellectual faculties. Characteristic forms of head are often transmitted from generation to generation; and thus are mental faculties propagated in families during centuries. It is an acknowledged fact that children who resemble each other or their parents, manifest similar faculties, making allowances for difference of age and sex. I have seen

twin-boys so like each other that it was almost impossible to distinguish them; their inclinations and talents were also strikingly similar. Two others, twin-sisters, are very different: the muscular system in the one being most developed, the nervous in the other; and while the first has little understanding, the second is eminently talented.

To conclude this point, I say, that as the peculiar organs of the affective and intellectual faculties can positively be demonstrated, it is impossible to deny their dependence on the organization.

The third principle of Phrenology, therefore,—the manifestations of the affective and intellectual faculties depend on the brain—is also ascertained.

SECTION V.

The Moral Character of Man.

It is my intention to show that "there is a much more exact correspondence between the natural and moral world than we are apt to take notice of*"; and that truth and the knowledge of nature are neither dangerous nor in opposition to morality and true religion. It is proved by incontestible facts, that the affective and intellectual faculties are inherent in the nature of man, and that their manifestations depend on the cerebral organization; but ignorance, and hypocrisy, and envy, have taken part in the discussion. The basis of Phrenology is not now attacked: it seems more convenient to blame its consequences, and without knowing why or explaining how, to cry out that it is dangerous. This, in all ages, has been the reception of every discovery. The disciples of the various philosophical schools of Greece inveighed against each other, and made reciprocal accusations of impiety and perjury. The people, in their turn, detested the philosophers, and accused those who investigated the causes of things of presumptuously invading the rights of the Divinity. Pythagoras was driven from Athens, and Anaxagoras was imprisoned, on account of their novel opinions; Democritus was treated as insane by the Abderites, for his attempts to find out the cause of madness by

* Bishop Butler, Sermon vi.

dissections; and Socrates, for having demonstrated the unity of God, was forced to drink the juice of the hemlock. Several of those who excelled in physics in the fourteenth century were punished with death as sorcerers or magicians. Galileo, when seventy years of age, was cast into prison for having proved the motion of the earth. Vesalius, Varolius, and Harvey, were persecuted on account of their discoveries. Those who first maintained the influence of climate upon the intellectual faculties of man were suspected of materialism. The pious philosopher Bonnet, Linnæus, Buffon, the virtuous Lavater, and many others, have been treated as materialists and fatalists.

The instances of Aristotle and Descartes may be quoted, to show the good and bad fortune of new doctrines. The ancient antagonists of Aristotle caused his books to be burned; but in the time of Francis I. the writings of Ramus against Aristotle were similarly treated, his adversaries were declared heretics, and under pain of being sent to the galleys, philosophers were prohibited from combating his opinions. At the present day, the philosophy of Aristotle is no longer spoken of. Descartes was persecuted for teaching the doctrine of innate ideas; he was accused of atheism, though he had written on the existence of God; and his books were burnt by order of the university of Paris. Shortly afterwards, however, the same learned body adopted the doctrine of innate ideas, and when Locke and Condillac attacked it, the cry of materialism and fatalism was turned against them. Thus the same opinions have been considered at one time as dangerous because they were new, and at

another as useful because they were ancient. What is to be inferred from this, but that man deserves to be pitied; that the opinions of contemporaries on the truth or falsehood, the good or bad consequences of a new doctrine are always to be suspected; and that the only object of an author ought to be to point out the truth. Ancillon is therefore right in saying with Bonnet: *Reason does not know any useless or dangerous truth.* That which is, is. This is the proper answer for those who, valuing things only by the advantage they themselves may reap, are incessantly asking, *Cui bono—what is this good for?* and for those also who anxiously ask, *To what does this lead?* Jesus, the son of Sirach, long ago said, "We ought not to demand what is this good for; the usefulness of every thing will be known in its due time."

Dr. Gall and I never doubted that ignorance and knavery would attack our doctrine with abuse; what does not man abuse? Tell him that he ought to expiate his sins, and in his superstition he will immolate his children. Have not Lucretius and his disciples bent all their powers to prove, that belief in the immortality of the soul inspires fear of death, and poisons every enjoyment of life? while Christians consider it as the basis of order, of happiness, of morality, and the chief and best solace amid all the calamities that assail them. Establishments for vaccination, and conductors for lightning upon buildings, are, in the opinion of some, laudable and beneficial to humanity; but, in the eyes of others, they are offences against Divine Providence. In one word, man finds some cause of complaint in all; but we may say with St. Bernard, "We ought to judge

differently the complaints of the ignorant and those of the hypocritical. The former complain from ignorance, the latter from malice; the first because they do not know the truth, the second because they hate it."

Malebranche has very well painted the enemies of new truths. "Persons of solid and true piety," says he, "never condemn what they do not understand; but the ignorant, the superstitious, and the hypocritical do. The superstitious by a slavish fear are enraged when they see an ingenious and penetrating man. If he assign the natural causes of thunder and its effects, they deem him an atheist. Hypocrites, on the contrary, though led by particular motives, make use of notions generally venerated, and combat new truths under the mask of some other truth; sometimes they secretly deride what every one respects, and produce in the minds of others a reputation which is the more to be feared, in proportion as the things which they abuse are more sacred."

Maintaining that the manifestations of the mind depend on the brain, it is objected that Phrenology establishes materialism; and contending that all the faculties of man are inherent in his nature, it is said that it leads to fatalism. I shall divide this Section into three chapters. In the first, I shall answer the objection on the score of Materialism; in the second, on that of Fatalism; and in the third, I shall treat of Moral Liberty, and of Morality in general.

CHAPTER I.

Materialism.

If the manifestation of the faculties of the mind depend on the organization, materialism, it is said, will be established. Materialism, let us set out by observing, is a word that has two different significations. One class of materialists maintain that there is no Creator; that matter has always existed; and that all the phenomena of the world are effects of matter. The ancient Romish church used materialism in this sense, and, at the present day, the word is often taken as synonymous with atheism. The position, that mental manifestations depend on the organization, has nothing in common with this sort of materialism. He who inquires into the laws of phenomena, cannot be an atheist; he cannot consider the admirable and wise concatenation of all things in nature, and their mutual relations, as existing without a primitive cause. He is obliged, by the very laws of thought, to admit such a cause,—a supreme understanding, an all-wise Creator.

Another kind of materialism is taught by those who admit a Creator, but maintain that man does not consist of two different entities—body and soul; and that all phenomena, ordinarily attributed to the soul, result only from forms and combinations of matter. The soul, in their opinion, is a fluid of extreme tenuity distributed over all things, and enlivening the whole organization. Neither has Phrenology any thing in common with this opinion. Nor Dr. Gall nor myself have ever endeavoured

to explain final causes; we have always declared, that we make no inquiry into the nature of the soul, nor into that of the body; that we are led solely by experiment. Now we have seen that every faculty is manifested by means of the organization. When our antagonists, however, maintain that we are materialists, they ought to shew where we teach that there is nothing but matter. The entire falsehood of the accusation is made obvious by a review of the following considerations: The expression *organ* designates an instrument by means of which some faculty proclaims itself; the muscles, for example, are the organs of voluntary motion, but they are not the moving power; the eyes are the organ of sight, but they are not the faculty of seeing. We separate the faculties of the soul or of the mind from the organs, and consider the cerebral parts as the instruments by means of which they manifest themselves. Now, even the adversaries of Phrenology must, to a certain extent, admit the dependence of the soul on the body. In the very same passage in which Professor Walter of Berlin imputes materialism to our physiology of the brain, he says: "The brain of children is pulpy, and in decrepit old age it is hard. It must have a certain degree of firmness and elasticity, that the soul may manifest itself with great splendour. But this consideration does not lead to materialism, it shows only the mutual union of the body and soul."

We are therefore no more materialists than our predecessors, whether anatomists, physiologists, or physicians, or the great number of philosophers and moralists who have admitted the dependence of the soul on the body. For the materialism is essentially the same, whether the faculties of the mind be said

to depend on the whole body, on the whole brain, or individual powers on particular parts of the brain: the faculties still depend on organization for their exhibition.

To show that all ancient and modern philosophers and the fathers of the Christian church agree with us that the manifestations of the mind depend on the body, I shall quote a few of their opinions. Plato considered the body as a prison of the soul. Seneca says: "*Corpus hoc animi pœna ac pondus est*, (Epist. 66.) The Cartesians, by their doctrine of the tracts which they suppose in the brain, admit the influence of organization on the intellectual operations. Malebranche, when explaining the difference in the faculties of the sexes, and the various and peculiar tastes of nations and individuals, by the firmness and softness, dryness and moisture of the cerebral fibres, remarks, that our time cannot be better employed than in investigating the material causes of human phenomena. Charles Bonnet said, "That mankind can only be known and penetrated by their physical nature." St. Thomas* said, "Though the spirit is no corporeal faculty, the spiritual functions, as memory, imagination, cannot take place without the bodily organization. Therefore, if the organs cannot exercise their activity, the spiritual functions are disturbed. For the same reason a happy organization of the human body is always accompanied with excellent intellectual faculties." St. Gregorius Nyssenus† compared the body of man to a musical instrument. "It sometimes happens," says he, "that excellent musicians cannot show their talent because their instrument is

* Contra Gentiles, c 12. n. 9. † De hominis opificio, c. 12.

in a bad state. It is the same with the functions of the soul; they are disturbed or suspended according to the changes which take place in the organs; for it is the nature of the spirit, that it cannot exercise conveniently its functions but by sound organs." St. Augustine*, St. Cyprian †, St. Ambrose‡, St. Chrysostom§, Eusebius, and many other religious and profane writers, consider the body or even the brain, as the instrument of the soul, and distinctly teach that the mind is regulated to the state of the body.

CHAPTER II.

Fatalism.

Objections are also taken to Phrenology on the score of its tendency to fatalism. The exact meaning of this term must be determined. Certain writers understand by fatalism, every thing in the world and the world itself as existing by necessity; and all events as results of change, and not of supreme and guiding intelligence. This fatalism involves atheism; and is evidently very different from a doctrine according to which man has received faculties, and a determinate nature from creation.

Another kind of fatalism teaches that all physical, intellectual, and moral laws are created and fixed; that there is no

* De lib. arbit.
† De operibus Christi.
‡ De Offic.
§ Homil. II. III. super Epist. ad Heb.

liberty of action; that man does good or evil according to his faculties; that he cannot change his character; that his acts are irresistible; consequently, that he cannot be rewarded or punished for them.

Now we must here make an important distinction. It is quite certain that the faculties of the mind are not equally distributed; individuals are deaf, blind, stupid, idiotic, and intelligent from birth. Bishop Butler* says, "If, in considering our state of trial, we go on to observe how mankind behave under it, we shall find that some have so little sense of it, that they scarce look beyond the passing day; they are so taken up with present gratifications as to have in a manner no feeling of consequences, no regard to their future ease or fortune in this life, any more than to their happiness in another. Some appear to be blinded and deceived by inordinate passion in their worldly concerns as well as in religion; others are not deceived, but, as it were, forcibly carried away by the little passions, against their better judgment and feeble resolutions, too, of acting better; and there are men, and truly there are not a few, who shamelessly avow, not their interest, but their mere will and pleasure to be their law of life, and who, in open defiance of every thing that is reasonable, will go on in a course of vicious extravagance, foreseeing with no remorse and little fear that it will be their temporal ruin; and some of them under the apprehension of the consequences of wickedness in another state. And to speak in the most moderate way, human creatures are not only continually liable to go wrong voluntarily,

* Analogy of Religion, p. 92.

but we see likewise that they often actually do so with respect to their temporal interests as well as with respect to religion." Daily experience, indeed, shows, that in different persons the various feelings of the mind are active in different degrees, and hence these phenomena.

It is also certain that the faculties of mankind and the laws of nature in general are fixed by creation. All the faculties are given, and their laws are determinate in vegetative and in animal life. Who, for example, has called himself into being? Does it depend on the will of any one to be born in this or in that country? of these or those parents? under this or that system of government, or of religion? Who has determined his sex? Who can say: I am the eldest or youngest because it was my choice? Who has chosen the circumstances surrounded by which he sees the light, the capacities of teachers, the mental frame of those about him from earliest infancy, and the thousand other accidents that influence him through future life? The organs of vegetative life perform their determinate functions without our will; the liver can never perform digestion; the kidneys can never secrete bile; what is poison can never become wholesome aliment, and so on. It is the same with animal life. The existence of the five external senses and their laws are an effect of creation. It does not depend on our will to have the power of seeing, hearing, feeling, smelling, and tasting; we can never hear or see with our fingers, nor smell with our lips, &c. It is impossible to see as red that which is blue, or to see as great that which is small. The determinateness of these faculties may doubtless be termed fatalism. Dr. Gall and I, in the same manner, maintain, that

all propensities, sentiments, and intellectual faculties, their mutual influence, and their various relations to each other, are innate, and determined by creation. There is, however, a great difference between admitting the innateness of faculties and irresistibility of actions. The faculties are given, and without them no action is possible; but have we, therefore, no liberty? Are the actions of man and animals necessarily irresistible?

Neither in animals nor in the human kind are all the faculties active at the same moment and irresistible. It often happens, that one acts whilst the others are quiescent; and that one deed rather than another is done. If this were not so, it would be the height of cruelty to punish animals to prevent peculiar actions. If a dog be punished for having eaten under certain circumstances, do we not see, that though hungry, he will not touch a bit under the same on another occasion? And is it not precisely thus with man? He has a great number of faculties; are they always active, are they irresistible? We can walk, dance, and sing, but are we forced to do so? Who does not often feel within himself a wish for something, or an inclination to do some act, which he combats by other motives? Indubitably, then, neither animals nor man are irresistibly forced to act.

The faculties which constitute, and the motives which determine the will, it is true, are given and innate. And fatalism, in this sense, must be admitted not only in man, but even in the Supreme Being; for perfection and infinite goodness inhere in the nature of God, and he cannot desire evil. So also the superior faculties of man's nature, called his divine part, must

desire the true good of all. Hence a certain fatalism is founded in nature; and therefore the philosophers of China, Hindostan, and Greece, the eastern and western Christians, and the followers of Mahomet, have blended it with their religious opinions. Indeed, it cannot be dangerous to insist on such a fatalism in so far as it exists. Christ, his apostles, and the fathers of the church have done so. A proverb of Solomon is, "The Lord gives wisdom;"—according to Christianity, "The tree is known by its fruit*;"—St. Paul says, "And we know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose. For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son; that he might be the first-born among many brethren. Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified, them he also glorified†."—And again: "Who maketh thee to differ from another? and what hast thou that thou didst not receive‡?" St. Augustine taught openly and distinctly our dependance on God, and commanded the preaching of this truth. "As no one," says he, "can give to himself life, so nobody can give to himself understanding§." He calls gifts of God, all good qualities, as the fear of God, charity, faith, obedience, justice, veracity.—He says‖, that God has not distributed in an equal manner noble sentiments any more than temporal good, as health, strength, riches, honours, the gifts of arts and sciences. It is positive, then, that the faculties are innate; but I must also say with

* Matt. xii. 33. † Rom. viii. 28—30. ‡ 1 Cor. iv. 7.
§ Lib. de Fide, c. 1. ‖ Lib. de Coreptione et Gratia.

St. Augustine*, "God in giving the power does not inflict the necessity." Thus, I do not see that admission of the innateness of the faculties implies irresistibility of action; nor do I fear any physical truth as dangerous. The whole constitution of man is determined by creation; but this axiom does not exclude deliberation, choice, preference, and action from certain principles and to certain ends; because all this is matter of experience universally acknowledged, and is that of which every man must every moment be conscious. I recognise one sole Creator, who has rendered physical and moral truths universally consistent.

CHAPTER III.

Liberty.

BEING free is the reverse of being forced; liberty is the opposite of irresistibility. As Dr. Gall and I maintain that all faculties are innate, our adversaries object that all actions must therefore be unavoidable, necessary, and irresistible. I have already said, that with St. Augustine we think, that God, in giving power, (faculty) does not impose necessity. Let us then ask in what liberty consists, and what faculties produce it? Some philosophers attribute unbounded liberty to man; according to them he creates, so to say, his own nature; he is

* Lib. de Litera et Spiritu, c. 31.

independent of every natural law, and his will is the sole cause of his actions. *Such* liberty in a *created* being is contradictory; hence all that can be said in favour of it must be destitute of signification.

Others maintain that the liberty of man is absolute, and that he acts without any motive. This is the same as saying, there is an effect without a cause; and such an assertion is against the law of understanding. Moreover, liberty without motives would be contradictory in itself; for one would act reasonably or unreasonably, justly or unjustly, well or ill, and always without any motive. Finally, in this supposition, all institutions which implicate the happiness of mankind would be useless. Education, morality, religion, punishment, and reward, would all be inefficient, man being determined by no motive. And we might expect from every one hatred and perfidy as well as friendship and fidelity, virtue as well as vice. Such notions of liberty are merely speculative. We can admit that liberty alone which harmonizes with the general laws of nature, and with the constitution of humanity. If we admit that man acts by motives, he, like the rest of nature, will then be subjected to the law of cause and effect. This kind of liberty alone has been professed by ancient philosophers and legislators, and supposed by morality and religion, which furnish powerful and noble motives to direct man in his actions. *Liberty consists in the possibility of doing or of not doing any thing, and in the faculty of knowing motives and of determining one's-self according to them.* Three things then must be considered in liberty; Will, the plurality of motives, and the influence of the will upon actions.

The first object to be considered is that in which Will consists. Many authors confound it with the propensities, inclinations, or concupiscences, and deny the existence of free-will. Internal satisfaction and free-will are, indeed, very different things. Satisfaction accompanies the fulfilling of every desire. The sheep and tiger do not act freely because they are pleased, the one with grazing, and the other with tearing his prey in pieces. Each faculty of animal life being active, gives a desire or an inclination which man and animals experience involuntarily. They are forced to feel hunger if the nerves of the stomach act in a certain manner; they must see if the light strikes the retina of their eyes, &c. Man, then, has neither any power upon accidental external impressions, nor over the existence of internal feelings. He must feel an inclination if its appropriate organ be excited; and not master of this, he cannot be answerable for it. But inclinations, propensities, or desires, are not *will*, because man and animals often have these, and yet *will* not. A hungry dog, for example, which has been beaten, occasionally refuses the food offered to him;—he is hungry, he wants, but *wills* not to eat.—It is the same with man. How often are we all obliged to act against our inclinations? Thus, experience proves not only that the faculties do not act irresistibly either in man or in animals, or, in other words, that there exists *liberty* or *freedom*, but also that inclinations are not yet *will*. Freedom, however, presupposes *will*. How then is *will* originated?

To have *will*, to decide *for* or *against*, I must evidently know what is to happen or has passed; I must compare: hence, *will* begins with the perceptive and reflective faculties, *i. e.* with un-

derstanding; the will of every animal is therefore proportionate to its understanding. Man has the greatest freedom, because his will has the widest range; and this because he has the most understanding. He knows more than any animal; compares the present with the past; foresees future events; and discovers the relation between cause and effect. It is even to be observed that not only *will*, but also our participation and accountableness, begin with the perceptive faculties. Idiots have sometimes inclinations, but they are neither free nor answerable. It is the same with children before a certain age; they are said not to be capable of distinguishing good from evil. A man of great understanding and good education is also more blameable for a fault than an uncultivated and stupid individual.

The faculties that *will*, however, are not given up to chance, but subjected to certain rules; for the laws of the understanding are as determinate by creation as are those of nutrition. Man cannot will any thing which does not seem good to him.

The first condition to freedom is *will*, an effect of knowledge and reflection; the second concerns what is to be known and compared, viz. motives. Will is the decision of the understanding, but is adopted according to motives. These result principally from the propensities and sentiments, and sometimes from the perceptive faculties; hence they are as numerous and energetic as these, and the animal which has many and powerful faculties, has many and vigorous motives, and freedom in proportion. The plurality of motives, then, is the second condition to liberty. An animal endowed with only one faculty could

act but in one way, and cease from action only when this became inactive. If, on the contrary, it were endowed with several faculties, it would be susceptible of different motives, and a choice would become possible. Yet a plurality of motives is not alone sufficient to freedom of action; for, in that case, the stronger faculty would occasion the deed. If you offer food to a hungry dog, and at the same moment make a hare run before him, he will eat, or follow the hare, according to his strongest propensity. This is not freedom; the strongest propensity only prevails. If, on the contrary, the dog, endowed with the faculty of knowing and comparing, has been punished for following hares, he may tremble and have palpitations without pursuing; he chooses between different motives, he desires, but he remembers the chastisement, and he *will* not. Thus liberty is founded on will and a plurality of motives. It, however, demands still a third condition, *viz.*, the influence of the will upon actions.

In cases of disease, it sometimes happens that different motives are known, and that the will has no influence upon actions. It is remarkable, too, that the will may put certain faculties into action, while others are abstracted from its influence. It cannot excite the affective faculties, nor prevent their activity, and therefore we are not answerable for our feelings; but it has greater power on the intellectual faculties, and can reproduce their actions in thinking of their functions. It also influences the external senses by means of voluntary motion, and thus has power over the instruments of action. This is the reason why man is accountable for actions proceeding from

feelings, though these themselves are involuntary. As soon as voluntary motion is withdrawn from the government of the will, liberty, responsibility, and guilt, are no more.

Thus true liberty is founded on three conditions united, and ceases as soon as any one of them is wanting. Such liberty, however, has not yet a moral character, for many animals exhibit it in different degrees. We must, consequently, examine where the morality of actions begins.

Moral Liberty.

Whatever may be said against the plurality of the faculties and their peculiar organs, they must be admitted. Both vegetative and animal life is, in fact, more or less complicated in the different orders of animals. The vegetative is exceedingly simple in the lowest tribes of all. Nutrition is limited to mere intussusception, absorption, and assimilation. It becomes complicated by degrees, and in the mammalia includes mastication, deglutition, digestion, chylification, sanguification, respiration, circulation, assimilation, and a great number of secondary and auxiliary functions, as the secretion of bile, of pancreatic juice, of urine, &c. Even the particular functions which aid in reproducing the organization, as intussusception, digestion, respiration, circulation, &c., are performed by a greater or less quantity of apparatus. Yet in the most complex, as in the most simple animals, the end is the same, viz., the preservation of the individual.

Animal life is also very simple in the most inferior classes of living beings. It begins with the sense of feeling, is com-

plicated by the addition of taste, smell, hearing, and seeing; by various instincts or propensities, sentiments, and intellectual faculties; and, finally, attains its utmost complexity in man. He alone unites all the faculties which are dispersed among different animals; and, further, is endowed with several in peculiar. The faculties of man, then, are multiplied. Let us now examine whether there be any subordination among them or not;—let us see if they be all equally important. Neither in vegetative nor in animal life is every function of like excellence. Mastication, and the mixture of saliva with the food, are less important than digestion, circulation, and assimilation. The secretion of certain glands is less necessary than respiration, &c. The same law holds in animal life. Of the external senses, every one would rather lose the sense of smell than of sight. Who would not rather give up some talent, as drawing, music, painting, than the faculty of reflection and reason? Every one is offended if we call him stupid; not if we say that he wants such or such a talent. If we further examine the influence of different faculties of animal life upon the happiness and preservation of mankind, we shall be convinced that several are much more important than others. The love of approbation is of far less consequence than benevolence; the Christian religion, indeed, ranks charity above all the other virtues. It must, therefore, be granted that the faculties of animal life are important in different degrees. A great line of distinction between them may at once be drawn by separating such as are common to animals and man, from such as are proper to man. A double nature of man was long ago remarked, and has been designated by different expressions; as

the flesh and the spirit; the animal and the man, or the carnal and spiritual part of man.

Now, whether are the faculties common to animals and man, or those proper to humanity, to have the superiority? The answer is obvious. The general law of nature is, that inferior are subordinate to superior faculties. Physical are subject to chemical laws; gravity, for instance, is modified by chemical affinity: the particles of a salt attract each other in opposition to their gravity, and form crystals. Again, physical and chemical laws, though existing in organic beings, are modified by those of organization. Plants do not increase by juxtaposition; nor do they assimilate mere homogeneous substances. In the muscular and circulatory systems, the physical laws of motion and hydraulics are preserved, but they are influenced by the laws of life. Chemical laws remain in digestion, but swayed by organic laws. Physical, chemical, and vegetative laws exist in living creatures, but modified by those of phrenomatic life. Animals take food, so do plants; but animals choose it, guided by the sense of taste. Plants propagate their species automatically; animals feel a propensity to do so. The propensities, sentiments, and intellectual faculties of animals, consequently modify the properties of their organization extremely.

The same principle must be applied in regard to the distinguishing part of human nature: all inferior laws, physical, chemical, organic, and animal, are subordinate to those of the peculiarly human faculties. These, therefore, compose the moral character of man. Thus, as the faculties are not equally important, and as some must be subordinate to others, I divide them, in relation to actions, into three orders: one excites man

and animals to determinate actions, as hunger, physical love, the propensity to fight, to build, to gather provision, &c.; I style these *faculties of action;* another, because they assist and modify those of the first kind, I call *auxiliary;* and another, which ought to direct, I term *directing faculties.*

The faculties proper to man are obviously superior to those common to him and animals, since, by means of his peculiar nature he is master of all that breathes, and, therefore, ought to be master of his own animal nature also. I, consequently, lay down the following principle:—The faculties proper to man constitute his moral nature and his absolute conscience, that is, all actions conformable to them are absolutely good. And now, moral liberty appears, or liberty assumes a moral character, if the will produce actions flowing from motives which are proper to man. Man, then, has not only the largest share of liberty, from his superior will and great number of motives, but he alone possesses *moral* liberty. The feeling of conscientiousness is to morality, that which will or the perceptive and reflective faculties are to liberty. As long as actions spring from motives common to man and animals, they are not primitively moral, though they may be conformable to morality. Inferior motives, however, must still be employed in guiding mankind, and must frequently supply the place of such as are moral. Purely moral motives have, unfortunately, but little influence in the world.

From what I have said on moral liberty, it follows that there is no accountableness without liberty, that liberty begins with the understanding, or with the faculties which know and choose among motives, that man has the greatest liberty of any being, and alone has moral liberty.

Of Morality.

The natural law of the subordination of the faculties leads us immediately to take a view of the morality of our actions, or to consider moral good and moral evil. The first step will be to inquire whether evil exists or not. Having settled this point, I shall then discuss its nature and examine its origin.

Two kinds of evil are commonly spoken of; the one physical, the other moral. There is an evident opposition throughout all nature. Earth, water, and air, present a perpetual scene of destruction and reproduction, of pain and pleasure. And even as temporal good is often distributed unequally and without personal desert, so physical evil is frequently inflicted without any fault on the part of the sufferer, and this both among animals and the human kind. Why should domestic animals so often be ill fed and harshly treated in reward for their services? Why should all suffer by contagious diseases? Wherefore must the children begotten in debauchery, expiate the sins of their parents? Why, when the hail-storm ravages the wide-spread harvest of the indolent and rich man, does it not spare the little garden of the laborious poor? Such melancholy queries have been put at all times. The preacher says, "There is a just man that perisheth in his righteousness, and there is a wicked man that prolongeth his life in his wickedness*." "All things," says he, "come alike to all: there is one event to the righteous and to the wicked; to the good, and to the clean, and to the

* Eccles. vii. 15.

unclean; to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not: as is the good, so is the sinner; and he that sweareth, as he that feareth an oath. This is an evil among all things that are done under the sun, that there is one event unto all: yea, also the heart of the sons of men is full of evil, and madness is in their heart while they live, and after that they go to the dead*." In another passage he continues: "I returned, and saw under the sun, that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill: but time and chance happeneth to them all†." Physical evil, indeed, does not merely exist, it even invades all according to the established laws of creation.

Moral, no less than physical evil, occurs in the world. Even in thinking himself abased by his wickedness and imperfection, man must acknowledge its existence. Moses said, "God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually‡." David thought, that "there is none that doeth good, no not one§." Christ taught, that "out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witnessing, blasphemies‖." St. Paul speaks of men being filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness, envy, murder, debate, deceit, malignity; and of whisperers, backbiters, haters of God, despiteful, proud, boastful, inventors of evil things, dis-

* Eccles. ix. 2, 3. † Eccles. ix. 11, 12. ‡ Gen. vi. 5.
§ Ps. xiv. 3. ‖ Matt. xv. 19.

obedient to parents, without understanding, covenant breakers, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful; who knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them. Moral, as well as physical evil, then, has always existed, and the time when it will be rooted out seems yet to be far off.

Let us now examine the nature of moral evil. Some actions in the Christian doctrine are styled good, and others bad or sinful; and whilst the first are commanded, the last are forbidden. Good actions are further stated to be done after the spirit, and sins after the flesh, though the flesh is allowed not to be evil in itself. If actions, however, be not specified, how can we know which are good and which are bad? Is there no standard according to which they may be judged universally?

In every branch of natural science, positive and exact knowledge is sought after. I think that the same ought to be done in regard to the moral nature of man. Mere faith will no longer suffice, the reign of positive truth should begin. The moral nature of man ought to be examined with observation as a guide, and reduced to principles capable of general application. Invention cannot now be permitted, and arbitrary interpretations must give place to invariable laws; actions, done in conformity with which will be declared as good, and not in conformity, as bad.

It is of the highest importance to be convinced that human nature is governed by moral laws, very different from superstitions and prejudices. The nature of every being is regu-

lated by laws; the human body is so evidently. The child born of disorderly parents suffers for their faults; and, as the laws of organization cannot be changed, we may, from analogy, conclude, that the moral nature of man is not left to the guidance of chance. But in what do the moral laws consist, or how are they to be determined? shall it be by force, by a majority of votes, or are they to be sought for among the works of the Creator?

I have already stated that, in my opinion, the faculties proper to man (though not all equally important), constitute his moral nature. This is the basis,—what then is the aim of natural morality? Man alone raises his mind to a Creator, conceives relations between himself and the Deity, and considers his actions in the point of duty. The superior faculties, from which these results flow, reveal the existence and the necessity of moral laws. These may, therefore, be divided into two orders; one concerns our relationship with God, and another regulates our conduct towards ourselves, our fellow men, and the other beings of creation. The first are religious, the second moral. It is understood that I speak neither of positive religious creeds, nor of positive civil legislative codes, but solely of natural religion and natural morality.

Dr. Gall admits a fundamental faculty of God and religion. In my opinion, the faculty of causality searches for a cause of every thing, and of every event. Individuality personifies the Supreme cause it arrives at; another faculty inspires admiration and wonder; and another induces respect and veneration. Religion is founded on these faculties, and is strengthened by

those of hope, conscientiousness, and circumspection. Moreover, the religion which promises most, and flatters the feelings of man to the greatest amount, will be apt to be the most readily admitted.

Natural religion, as well as all the systems which have been announced as revealed, is destined to make us acquainted with our duties to God, or with what we must do to render ourselves agreeable to him. Now reason tells us, that the Supreme Being is all perfection, and can neither gain nor lose in felicity by the terrestrial creation. If his happiness depended on his creatures, on their respect to him or on their regulations, his nature were imperfect. "The giving glory to God," says Bishop Taylor*, "and doing homage to him, are nothing for his advantage, but only for our's; and God created us, not that we can increase his felicity, but that he might have a subject receptive of felicity from him." It seems, on the other hand, reasonable to admit that all sentient beings have been created for their own happiness, and that to secure this the Creator has traced them determinate laws. The end of natural religion, then, is an entire submission to the Will of the Creator, be it accomplished by love or by fear; "For this is the love of God," says St. John†, "that we keep his commandments." We may suppose that he prefers the motive of love to that of fear, which, however, is also reasonable, since he makes no exceptions, but applies his laws invariably. Thus, if we can do nothing for the sake of God, nothing to promote his happiness, it follows that all our

* Sermon xii. † First Epistle, v. 3.

doings concern ourselves, our like, and the other beings of creation, or that in this life religion consists in morality. All religious regulations, therefore, are only auxiliary means of rendering mankind morally good. Hence it is presumptuous and pitiful to perform ceremonies by way of rendering service to God. The ceremonies destined to glorify God are often ridiculous, and rather calculated to amuse children than to edify reasonable beings. Their aim, which may be laudable and respectable, ought never to be disguised, nor obscured by absurdities or immoral proceedings. It is edifying to assemble and to sing together the greatness of God's perfections, but it is ridiculous to attribute to him qualities for which we despise each other in society; let us reflect on the benevolence and justice of the Supreme being, but let us not debase him by low passions; particularly, let us never lose sight of the principal object of religion, viz., the moral improvement of man. In regard to morality, the first question concerns its extent. Is man the only aim of the terrestrial creation, that is, is all the rest made for his sake? An affirmative answer can only be the result of too much self-esteem; the contrary appears evident, since nature produces poisons for man as well as for other animals. Geology also proves that many beings existed before man. It is, however, a natural law that superior employ inferior beings to their advantage, and, in consequence of his superiority, man, as he is their master, may make use of all the other creatures upon earth. Still this does not prove that every thing exists merely for the sake of man. The human kind may govern all animals, but it has also certain duties towards them, and I cannot believe that

man has any right to torment animals for his gratification or amusement.

Man's duties towards his like form the principal object of morality. We must, therefore, examine the destination of man. It is commonly stated that he is created to be happy. This proposition, however, is vague, and individual happiness is too often confounded with the general weal: the former results from the satisfaction of the faculties each person is more particularly endowed with, but it varies, since individual gifts differ widely; hence it can never become the universal standard of moral actions: actions which are evidently bad may be accompanied with pleasure. Mere pleasure, therefore, is not the aim of man's existence any more than individual happiness; these, indeed, are synonymous expressions.

I am of opinion, that the Creator viewed general happiness as superior to that of individuals, and that he intended to produce the second by the first. All nature seems to prove this idea. In considering the immense system of the celestial bodies, it is probable that the earth might rather perish than the universe be destroyed. Geology teaches that our globe has continued to exist while many kinds of animals have disappeared from its surface. Species are preserved while individuals die. The totality of living bodies exists, but particular parts perish. Again, nature has established a law of violent death, and of the sacrifice of individuals, for the sake of general preservation. All animate beings exist at the expense of each other, and all are thereby preserved.

Man makes no exception from this general arrangement, and it is, therefore, quite certain that the happiness of all man-

kind is preferable to that of nations; this to that of families, and this again to that of individuals. Personal interests, it is allowed, must be neglected sooner than those of our country, or than family affections. But the same reasons that lead to this conclusion, prove also that the species is more worthy of our love than our native country.

The superiority of general happiness is also confirmed by the essential difference of the two natures of man. The greater number of animals find their enjoyments in selfishness; some, however, live in society, are attached to each other, and feel a kind of love for the country of their birth; but man alone is susceptible of exercising good-will towards the whole of his own species, and every other being of creation. I am confirmed in my opinion, that general happiness is the aim of man's existence, since I see the truth of what afflicts many amiable minds, that the just perishes in his righteousness, while the unjust prospers in his wickedness. This happens under the government of the animal nature, which feels no pleasure in general happiness, nor pain in the commission of injustice. It shows the predominance of the animal nature, then, but is it not probable that the Creator intended the satisfaction of those faculties which are proper to man as well as of those he holds in common with the brutes? There can be no doubt he did. I think that both natures are to be gratified, that no faculty is made in vain, and that all that stamps superiority upon man is not merely bestowed to make him unhappy. Now, as the more noble powers are not satisfied in the actual state of things, religious people hope that they will be ministered to in another life, and this is con-

sidered as a conclusive argument in favour of the immortality of the soul. As the peculiarly human nature, however, is preferable to the animal, it must follow that even in this life, its satisfaction is superior to that of the other. I entertain this opinion the rather because the animal part may be satisfied under the dominion of the human, which leads to the recognition of duty universally; while the brute nature has no feelings of obligation, and looks for mere selfish enjoyments only.

Thus, I do not believe that in the eye of God, the unjust who thrives is worth the just who perishes; I rank the unjust among animals; like them he is pleased with what flatters himself alone; he is even more dangerous than they, on account of his superior understanding.

The proposition (it is one which troubles many minds)—moral errors are unavoidably punished in this life—finds its solution also, in the superiority of general happiness. The strong and able-bodied man may not seem to suffer from excesses and sensuality; but his descendants have often to pay the penalty. The love of domination is ministered to by the ignorance and servility of nations; these, however, must bear its blighting influence. He who begins by subjecting his countrymen to his will, and finishes by aiming at the empire of the world, must injure, and make thousands and millions wretched. The few who amass riches do so at the expense of the many who remain poor, and so on. Thus the evil which results from any infraction of the natural laws, is not always felt by him who is its first cause; it is, however, certainly experienced sooner or later

Finally, as I perceive that, in the kingdom of justice, and of general happiness, the individual is never forgotten, whilst individuals enjoying happiness so easily forget their neighbours, and the general weal, I most anxiously wish the kingdom of individual happiness at an end.

Thus, general happiness appears to me the principal aim of animal life, as the preservation of the species is the chief end of vegetative life. General happiness is the touch-stone for all natural morality, for all social institutions, and for all the actions of man. Every deed which favours the general weal is good, and the more this is opposed the worse is the act.

Here we may ask, whether there are certain races of men in civilized society, or certain classes, who deserve the lot of mere animals? These, on account of their inferiority, are employed by man for his pleasures and purposes; are the superiorly gifted among the human kind also permitted to use for their advantage those who are less favoured by nature? Or, are there individuals who may arrogate privileges, and claim immunities?

To reply in the affirmative would be against natural morality. This declares God to be the impartial parent of all, and permits man only to do good to his fellow man; it does not exclude the agency of self-love, but makes it, along with all other faculties common to man and animals, subordinate to those proper to man. Indeed, I know of nothing more important than it is to prove the existence of natural morality, and to specify its laws. For, as mankind must be governed, a true legislation is extremely desirable.

It is well known that the most ancient governments were

theocratical; and that both religious and civil regiments have done immense injury to mankind, and this in proportion as the inferior faculties, such as self-love, love of approbation, courage, destructiveness, and even attachment and circumspection, have dictated their positive laws. The animal is the enemy of man, it justifies absolute power, the right of the strongest, the spirit of party and of sect, national pride and hatred, and every kind of personal design. It looks only for convenience. Religion itself is employed as a tool in its purposes. The misery of man will certainly endure so long as the faculties common to him and animals determine that which is to be done or omitted.

Attempts have been made, with more or less success, to improve legislation, but all the means have been derived from inferior faculties. Evils, therefore, may have been mitigated, but they could not be entirely abolished. Final success depends altogether on the sacrifice of personal interest, or of individual to general happiness.

All positive laws are imposed, hence the obligation of bowing to them is no proof of their being what they ought to be. Indeed, the most opposite rules of conduct have, at different times, been enjoined even as divine and infallible, and it has not generally appeared singular that divine laws have varied according to persons, localities, and circumstances. I cannot, however, help saying, that my esteem is not great for a legislator, who is constantly in contradiction with himself, who desires moral good, but who, notwithstanding his omnipotence, corrects only by exterminating; who punishes the innocent on account of the guilty, &c. My intention in this

is only to show that belief, or the necessity of obeying, does not prove the perfection of positive laws.

The case is very different in regard to natural laws. Their basis is the same, at all times and in all countries; they are independent of personal and of local circumstances. Were it not presumptuous, even absurd, in naturalists to endeavour to create physical and chemical laws, and in gardeners to change the laws of vegetation? Those who breed and rear animals must treat them according to their nature; they will never feed parrots with bitter almonds or parsley. The organization of man is also allowed to be subject to natural laws, though several are unknown or neglected in social life.

That the five senses, in their healthy state, propagate external impressions according to determinate laws, is further admitted. No one can see as great that which is small; taste as sweet that which is sour; nor see as blue that which is scarlet. Without perfect regularity in the functions of the senses, it were altogether impossible to acquire any positive knowledge of the physical qualities of external objects.

Now, why should not the same determinateness pervade the affective and intellectual faculties? It is, indeed, commonly admitted in as far as the intellectual operations are concerned. The principles of the arts and sciences are always pointed out. Who doubts of the mechanical laws? They are the same now as they were in ancient times. The mechanician never attempts to warp or change them in constructing machines; in inventing, he only makes new applications of laws that are invariable. Mathematical laws, also, have not changed with ages; every mathematician, whether aware of them or not,

applies them in his calculations. A great musical genius produces harmonious tones, and a great painter agreement of colours, according to natural principles, and without previous study. The laws of all arts exist in nature, and are only discovered, not created. A deep thinker needs no logical precepts to enable him to perceive sound from false reasoning. Thus the intellectual operations of the mind are governed by natural laws which can neither be changed by revelation nor by human enactments, neither by praying, by fasting, nor by offerings. They who are born gifted with great talents discover the laws of their faculties, make these known to the less favoured in capacities, who then learn and apply them in their mental operations.

And now we may ask whether the religious and moral laws are not equally inherent in the nature of man? It is remarkable, that hitherto all nations have adopted some sort of revelation from which they derive their moral and religious laws. We may readily conceive, then, that the priesthood will still continue to estimate their services highly, and to make their own interpretations pass as religion and Christianity. It therefore becomes of the utmost importance to separate the pretended ministers of God and their versions from the Creator and his eternal decrees.

Many philosophers have acknowledged the existence of natural laws of morality as well as of organization. In the opinion of Confucius, "law is that which is conformable to nature." Cicero thinks that the law cannot vary, but that it is the same for every nation, and that no injustice, whatever name is given to it, can be considered as law, though a whole

nation may submit to its infliction. Bacon calls the laws of nature the laws of laws. Cherron says that wise men conduct themselves, that nature is their guide, and that the laws are at the bottom of their hearts. Montesquieu observes, that to say there is neither justice nor injustice except that which is so declared by positive laws, is to say that the radii of a circle are not equal before it is traced. Nevertheless, this writer allowed governments the power of determining or making the law; his comparison, however, proves that this exists prior to governments, which are established merely to watch over its execution; the number of governors is here a secondary point, the object remains invariably the same; *viz.*, the enforcement of the natural law. St. Paul speaks in the most decisive manner of natural morality, in stating that some persons without the law, do things ordered by the law, since this is written in their hearts.

They, indeed, whose peculiarly human faculties hold such as are common to man and animals in subordination, act in a moral way without precept, and even with pleasure; nay, if constrained to do evil, they would feel positive pain, precisely as does the great musician from bad music. Moral precepts are necessary to those only who do not possess them in their interior. When, therefore, will man cease to invent laws, and begin to study those the Creator has traced for his guidance? And when will he be wise enough to submit to the immutable laws of nature?

Unluckily, the majority of every existing community require to be conducted by regulations, which must even be imposed on them in a dogmatic way, or as articles of faith.

A very few only are capable of understanding the concatenation of causes and effects, the natural laws are therefore incomprehensible dogmas to the great mass of mankind. Belief in, and submission to, these laws are quite indispensable to the well-being of man, and hence, obligatory upon all, but especially upon those who know them.

From the great influence of the natural laws upon the condition of mankind, it follows that it is exceedingly important not to err in their determination. I repeat that I consider the faculties proper to man as the basis of religion and morality; that, in my opinion, natural religion consists in the belief in a Supreme Being, and in yielding implicit obedience to his will, that is, to the natural laws; and that such actions only as are in perfect conformity to the whole of the peculiarly human faculties are morally good.

Such an idea of natural religion and natural morality may become universal; it unites every characteristic of a true legislation. Natural religion and natural morality acknowledge all that enters into the constitution of man, and they employ the faculties only to good purposes; that is, to further general happiness.

Origin of Evil.

The origin of evil has been a fertile subject of discussion. Evil seemed incompatible with a perfect Creator. The notion of a malevolent principle, therefore, came to be entertained. This still prevails among those who, personifying evil, speak of a devil. To explain the existence of evil, however, is a simple and easy task. It is only necessary to know that all natural

phenomena depend on certain conditions or circumstances; that things are in relation to each other, and that these relations generally are governed by fixed laws. Now, as soon as the conditions are wanting or their laws violated, proper effects are not elicited, and evil results. In the inanimate as well as in the animated world, the natural laws must still be rigorously followed. The chemist must obey the laws of chemistry to produce chrystals; plants grow well if they be cultivated according to their habits and wants,—it matters not whether the cultivators be Roman Catholics or Heretics, Jews or Mussulmans. Man enjoys good health or suffers from infirmity in proportion as he attends to or neglects the laws of his vegetative functions. Neither prayers, nor offerings, nor any other religious ceremony whatever, suspend these natural laws; their execution is invariably and without distinction rewarded, and their neglect indiscriminately and regularly punished. The infidel who lives moderately and observes all the dietetic rules, has always better health than the orthodox believer who neglects the natural laws of his organization, but prays loudly for soundness of body. The former, if he practice the laws of propagation, will have children preferable to those of the pious man who chooses his wife for her wealth or mere exterior. I suppose, that one without religious faith, even an Atheist, submits to the natural laws of the vegetative functions; that he avoids all noxious influences, is laborious, industrious, and regular in his business, while another is very religious in the common acceptation, sings, prays, fasts, eats no meat on Fridays, recommends his soul to God, &c., but, at the same time, is lazy, intemperate, disorderly in his business; and I ask,

of these two, whose condition in life will be the most flourishing? Thus, physical evil results from the infraction of the physical laws, and moral evil from the infraction of the moral laws of creation.

I pass over in silence the opinion which recognises two creative principles—one good and another bad. Neither do I speak of original sin in the first man, nor of the origin of evil in admitting free-will; for, in this I find no explanation of its existence. It is true, that without liberty there can be no guilt; but its admission gives no idea of the origin of evil. For as soon as free-will is spoken of, good and evil are supposed: or to what purpose free-will, were there not two different things, good and evil, between which the free agent may choose? It is said, that man abuses his liberty; but by what motive does he so, if there be not something within which provokes him to act badly? Therefore liberty is neither sufficient to explain the nature nor the origin of moral evil.

Are there any bad faculties? Dr. Gall is disposed to admit wicked propensities. He says, that man must submit to the laws of creation in regard to moral as in regard to physical evil; that no one can say he is without temptations; and that all thoughts and inclinations are not innocent or virtuous. He even thinks that moral evil enters into the plan of the Creator.

If he say, however, that excessive activity of certain faculties produces illegal actions or moral evil, morality is not yet proved as a natural science; it is at most conventional. I am intimately convinced that no faculty in itself can be bad, and that all the innate powers of man have some aim; that every one is necessary; that none leads inevitably to evil; but that each

may produce abuses. The faculties are no more bad than any other entity in nature. I think with Philo the Jew, Eusebius*, and St. Augustine, that nothing—fire, water, iron, &c., is bad in itself, or a cause of evil; with Augustine† in particular, that evil is not a substance, and that abuses only are ills. Hence, I consider no faculty in itself as either good or bad. Evil results only from infringing the natural laws of morality. The faculties common to man and brutes act in animals in the same way as in man; but they are never said to sin or commit a crime. This is a new proof that liberty has not produced moral evil, for animals modify their conduct and suppress various instincts by other motives; but none of their actions can be considered in relation to morality.

"Man," says Volney‡, "like the whole world, of which he is a part, is ruled by natural laws, which are invariable in their essence, regular in their application, consequent in their effects, and the common cause both of good and evil. They are not written in the stars, nor hidden in mysterious codes, but inherent in human nature, and identified with man's existence. They act on his senses, advertise his intelligence, and bring with every action penalty or reward. Let man learn these laws, let him understand his own, and the nature of the things around him, and he will know the cause of his griefs and the remedy."

Volney believed in the existence of natural laws; but he did not, in my opinion, understand the basis of natural morality, when he conceived that it was self-preservation. In his hypothesis, animals should have a moral nature; but, from

* Præpar. Evang. Lib. vii. n. 22. † Lib. de Verâ Religione, c. 20.

‡ Ruins, chap. v.

what I have said in the first and in this Section, it follows that neither personal interest, nor selfishness of any kind, can be recognised as the foundation of morality.

The Philosophers who maintain man to be born good or bad, are not acquainted with the fundamental powers of his mind, nor with their mutual relations. This knowledge would have guarded them from such an error, by satisfactorily explaining the nature and origin of evil. I repeat once more, that moral evil consists in actions which are not conformable to the whole of the faculties proper to man; and that every action conformable to these is morally good. Animals consequently cannot sin, and no action can be criminal in idiots, they being deprived of the characteristic and distinguishing attributes of humanity.

Practical Reflections.

I firmly believe that it is under the government of the natural laws alone that mankind will ever or can ever become one family; these, however, are still very obscure, and it will be long before they can be thoroughly understood. Mankind, indeed, is not prepared to submit to the precepts of natural morality. The spirit of selfishness, *obscurantism*, and superstition,—these natural enemies of truth, is still too powerful. Yet the only remark to be made is, that the laws of nature are invariable and indispensable to the happiness of man; that he must submit to them or suffer, and that without submission the common weal is impossible; that all partial views must disappear; finally, that arbitrary regulations may last years and centuries, but must come to an end at last, whilst the

empire of creation will endure as long as the human kind remains.

Comparison of Natural Religion and Morality, with the Christian Morality.

The preceding considerations on natural religion and morality, may, I fear, offend the timorous; if they sincerely love truth, however, they may be easy and remain quiet. For if we admit that the author of the universe and the God who gave us a revelation are one and the same Supreme Being, we must also allow that the revelation made in time cannot be at variance with the laws of creation, otherwise God would have been in contradiction with himself. An impostor, like Mahomet, changes his decrees as convenience requires, or as caprice impels; but reason will never admit contradictions in a Divine legislation. To conceive revelation in opposition to natural laws, is either to prove it false, or to advance that the Creator of all things is not the God who revealed the law; or that Supreme intelligence may change its decrees, endow man with natural faculties, and then command these to cease entirely from acting, or to act in opposition to their nature. I am of their opinion who think that the Christian morality is the same as the morality of nature, and that its revealed law is merely a repetition in positive terms of the natural law. With this view present, we conceive why the master of Christianity said, "that light is made to give light." I hope the time will come when Christianity will be purged of all paganism and superstition. The purity and excellence of its moral precepts, indeed, will be more justly appreciated as human nature is

better understood, and the superior feelings become more energetic.

Christian morality, like that of nature, is reduced to a few principles which are simple, invariable, and applicable in all situations, and under all circumstances. It considers our duties towards God and our duties towards our like. The former are called love of God, the latter love of our neighbour.

The meaning of the particular precepts of Christianity still gives rise to many discussions. Various interpretations have been disseminated and even absurdities been substituted for the wise regulations of the Gospel. It was, therefore, a point of some importance to prevent man from reading and reflecting on the scriptures. The result, however, has been, that the Gospel legislation has fallen into discredit; for the arbitrary interpretations of individuals have been confounded with its primitive laws. Every friend of humanity must grieve to see absurdities put into the mouth of the Supreme Being. Were merely rational interpretations of scripture given, there would be less cause to complain of the general want of religious and moral feelings. The human understanding is too much enlightened now to be satisfied with superstitious doctrines, which are useless both to God and to man, or to reject salutary precepts. Let us proceed then, and consider some of the leading points of Christian morality.

Jesus Christ reduced his moral doctrine to two grand heads: the love of God, and the love of our neighbour. "On these two commandments," says he*, "hang all the law and the

* Matt. xxii. 40.

prophets." It is therefore of the highest importance to understand their meaning.

The first admits the existence of a God, the Creator of all. Besides, it commands respect towards him, and obedience to his will. "Thy kingdom come," says Christ*, "thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." "This is the love of God," says St. John†, "that we keep his commandments."

The human understanding cannot but look for the workman, or cause of all that exists. By his powers of reasoning, man arrives at a first cause, which, being personified, is styled God. The Gospel inculcates the same idea. St. Paul says‡: "Every house is builded by some man; but he that built all things is God."

Reason further judges of the qualities of God according to his works. "The invisible things of God," says St. Paul also§, "from the creation of the world are clearly seen; being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead."

Here it is of exceeding importance to be convinced that the natural laws are the will of God. Jesus Christ makes a distinction between things as they were from the beginning and the legislation of Moses‖. He speaks of things which have been kept secret from the foundation of the world¶, and of things which his apostles could not bear**. The first great commandment of Christ, is not, I think, sufficiently understood; it has, indeed, been abused in the most detestable man-

* Matt. vi. 10. † 1st St. John, v. 3. ‡ Heb. iii. 4. § Rom. i. 20.
‖ St. Matt. xix. 8. ¶ St. Matt. xiii. 35. ** St. John xvi. 12.

ner. Arbitrary, contradictory, and absurd interpretations were imposed in the name of God; and dissension was, therefore, unavoidable. Those who governed found it convenient to interdict reflection, and to command blind obedience and prostration of the understanding.

This was an excellent means of securing themselves in personal enjoyments, of concealing selfish intentions, and of enforcing conviction of their infallibility; but it does not prove that the Gospel prohibits us from reasoning, from examining, from believing that which is true, or rejecting that which is palpably false and absurd. Jesus said, many times, "Let them hear, who have ears to hear." "Are ye also," said he to his disciples*, "yet without understanding?" "I speak as to wise men," says St. Paul to the Corinthians†; "judge ye what I say." "Prove all things," says the same apostle to the Thessalonians‡, "and hold fast that which is good." "Beloved," says St. John, "believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God§."

Thus, I believe that all natural laws of the vegetative functions, of intelligence, and of morality, are part of the will of God. If we submit to them, their influence will be more marked and more salutary than any adherence to arbitrary regulations. Man ought to know that he can create nothing, but that he has understanding to recognise whatever is, and the conditions under which it is. He may only imitate the proceeding of nature, that is, obey the will of the Creator, to

* St. Matt. xv. 16.

† 1st Cor. x. 15.

‡ 1st Thess. v. 21.

§ 1st St. John, iv. 1.

elicit what is for his good. "The Son of God can do nothing, if he have not seen it done by the Father," said Jesus.

The first commandment of Christianity embraces all kinds of truth, and ought never to be lost sight of; it explains every thing as happening by the will of God. Fire burns, water extinguishes fire; hemlock kills man, and nourishes the goat; fertile countries, when well cultivated, yield abundant harvests; industrious and orderly individuals and nations prosper; intemperate persons ruin their health; ignorance commits errors, intelligence avoids them; the animal part of man looks for selfish and lowly gratifications; the peculiarly human nature finds satisfaction amid the joys of general happiness; and all this occurs by the will of God. Let us then admit it as the will of God also, that the faculties proper to man are to be the sole guides of human actions.

In examining natural morality, we have seen that we can do nothing to advantage the Supreme Being; that our relations with him consist in respect for, and submission to, his will. Hence, that true religion is summed up in the fulfilment of our duties to ourselves, to our like, and to the other beings that taste along with us the sweets of existence.

The worship prescribed by Christianity is also reasonable and spiritual; it consists not in what we are to eat or drink, nor in any difference to be made between the days lent us to enjoy. The Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath. "The hour comes, and now is, when the true worshippers shall worship the Father in Spirit and in Truth.—God that made the world and all things therein, seeing that

he is Lord of heaven and earth, dwells not in temples made with hands, neither is he worshipped with men's hands, as though he needed any thing; he who gives to all life, and breath, and all things. — When ye pray, use not vain repetitions as the heathen do; for they think that they shall be heard for their much speaking." Finally, prayers are heard if they be conformable to the will of God.

Thus, the first great commandment of Christianity is perfectly agreeable to the experience of all times, and is the basis of all positive regulations; it even includes the second. This, however, on account of its importance, has been announced separately; it is: *Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.*

This precept is very simple; but, like the first, has not escaped manifold abuses. It has always been, and is still eluded by various interpretations. A great number flatter themselves that they are Christians, without ever expending a thought on the happiness of their neighbours.

In combining this second precept with several passages of the Gospel, some have discussed the question whether Christianity abolishes private property and establishes community of goods or not? The early Christians made a trial of a true commonwealth; several religious orders or monasteries did the same; but experience has shown that mankind is not yet in a condition to live in such a state of purity. Nevertheless, it is certain, that if the second commandment were fulfilled, there would be no peculiar property.

To this may be started the objection of there being a fundamental feeling in which inheres the desire to acquire, a feeling

very active in animals and in man. Now, Christianity opposes no natural disposition; on the contrary, it commands acknowledgment of the natural order, and, indeed, is declared to be destined to re-establish things as they were in the beginning. The propensity to acquire certainly exists in man as well as in animals; man is also influenced by attachment to his family and country, and both of these feelings are powerful motives to action; yet they also give rise to many disorders, and occasion a great deal of mischief. They are not interdicted by the second precept of Christianity, but they are placed under the dominion of a superior sentiment, which desires general happiness, and places the well-being of others on a level with our own, our family's, and our country's.

Christianity consequently commands, "Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them; for this is the law and the prophets*". As well as nature, Christianity proclaims original differences among men. It allows that some are more, others less, talented; but it makes each answerable only for the gifts he has received; commanding that those who have received much, give much; that is, contribute largely to the general happiness. Thus, true Christians form a separate society; they receive among them none who are profligate, selfish, ambitious, or who are governed by inferior faculties; but only those who find pleasure in the satisfaction of their peculiarly human powers. They scout idleness with its attendant vices from among them. They have many mem-

* St. Matt. vii. 12.

bers in one body, and all members have not the same office*; there are diversities of gifts, but the same spirit; and the manifestation of the spirit is given to every one to profit withal†. In short, they consider as brothers and sisters those only who do the will of God; who love each other as themselves.

The accomplishment of this precept is extremely difficult, but it is essential to see that it is indispensable to the constitution of a Christian. To maintain that it is not, is to be deceived, or to be a hypocrite. Christ constantly admonished his disciples to love one another‡. "By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one for another §."

Many flatter themselves with being Christians, when they say that they believe in the divinity of Christ, in his mission and miraculous actions; and all the while neglect the moral principles he inculcated. Jesus, however, has loudly declared, that practice of his commandments is indispensable, in order to enter into the kingdom of God. St. Paul also says ‖, "The kingdom of God is not in word, but in power."

It is, indeed, scarcely possible to find a true Christian; but the unbeliever who deems Christian morality merely fanciful, is more excusable than those who call themselves its disciples, but suit Christianity to their own tastes. Such conduct has done incalculable injury to mankind, and by spreading abroad false conceptions of its nature, has greatly lowered the Christian system of morality in general estimation.

The second precept of Christianity is, therefore, also con-

* Rom. xii. 4. † 1st Cor. xii. 7. ‡ St. John, xv. 12.
§ St. John, xiii. 35. ‖ 1st Cor. iv. 20.

formable to natural morality, or to the faculties proper to man. For these look for general happiness, and are satisfied with neighbourly love, without any regard to personal distinctions.

The third precept of Christian morality concerns its propagation. Jesus commands his disciples to preach his doctrine as preferable to all other systems of morality; to be indulgent and forbearing; to give freely, as they have freely received*; and to pardon faults and errors, provided they be corrected. He who does not act according to the law is to be excluded from their society; excommunication, therefore, is the severest punishment it admits.

How lamentable it is that these sublime principles of morality have been so dreadfully disfigured, as now not to be recognisable in social intercourse! Understanding has, from time to time, endeavoured to oppose arbitrary interpretations, and hence divisions arose. Unfortunately, and in direct contradiction to the mild spirit of Christianity, unbelievers in its doctrines have been persecuted. This was the most certain means of confirming dissensions, and is the more to be regretted, as these have always been based upon secondary things, which in themselves never had and never will have any influence on mankind. By degrees the essential was distinguished from the indifferent portion, and in several countries men are now permitted to do whatever they think agreeable to God, provided it do not trouble the order of society. Civil governments are at present superior to the priesthood in

* St. Matt. x. 8.

wisdom. They allow people to believe that God is fond of perfumes, of music, and of various ceremonies, and they tolerate those who shew their love of God by fulfilling their social duties, by esteeming every day alike, and saying with St. Paul*, "the kingdom of God is not meat and drink." Let us hope that religious toleration will become general, and that the aim may be no longer confounded with the means: the aim must be the same everywhere and at all times; the means must vary according to the natural dispositions of individuals, to the education they have received, and to the circumstances in which they are placed, but still be dictated by the faculties proper to man.

It is indispensable to obey the will of God, but it is by no means likely that he is pleased with the errors of his creatures, or that he leads them into temptation by trifling and insignificant commandments. Is it not rather probable that he has given to them, and identified with their being, such laws as are necessary to their happiness? Surely it is. They, therefore, who call themselves the ministers of God, ought to make it a principal business to study his will, especially the laws of nature, and to consider it an imperious duty to teach these, and by submission to them, to give an example of belief in their truth and excellence.

Those who understand the natural morality of man, will approve of several propositions of Christianity, which are sometimes declared to be unnatural and absurd. These they will consider as inherent in man, noble in their application,

* Rom. xiv. 17.

beneficial in their effects, and conformable to the law of nature. They will allow that all the faculties common to man and animals are to be subjected to those proper to man. For clearness' sake, let us call to mind the three kinds of positive legislation in the order of their imperfection or excellence. In the first, there are only absolute masters, who arbitrarily determine what is to be done or omitted, whose pleasure, in fine, is the only reason of their regulations. This administration is the morality of the strongest; it prevails among barbarous nations.

The second, which is established among civilized nations, rejects the right of the strongest, and all sorts of privileges. The animal faculties, however, are permitted full scope for their activity, but without having power to constrain other persons to minister to their desires. This morality abolishes slavery, the rights of feudality, and allows every one to exert his faculties for his own advantage, under the sole restriction, not to take aught that belongs to them from others. It commands us not to do to others what we would *not* that they did to us. Thus, the inferior animal faculties still dictate the law, though they are limited by those which are proper to man. Many are susceptible of living under the reign of this degree of moral perfection. Their selfishness opposes the grant of privileges to others, and their moral feelings reject them as unjust. The desire to acquire, and attachment, that is, commerce and exclusionary patriotism, here exert a very great influence. Nations, therefore, thus far advanced, are united and powerful, and defend their situation vigorously. They use every effort to advantage their community; but,

besides, every one lives for himself, brings up his children for his private ends, and uses all his energies to increase his wealth.

The third, and most perfect legislation, results from the supremacy of the peculiarly human nature. The faculties proper to man guide the aim of every action; all are therefore directed towards the universal good. The animal nature becomes a mere auxiliary to this end. Natural morality even here differs in nothing from that of Christianity. And, if Jesus desire his disciples to abandon their wives and children rather than the doctrine he teaches, he but places man above animals. He does not command abandonment of wives and children, if they love each other as themselves, but of those only who do not the will of God. Animals love their offspring, but parental love is certainly inferior to the love of mankind. Jesus therefore acknowledges as mother, brother, or sister, those only who love their neighbours as themselves. He wished man to be and to act according to the faculties proper to human nature. If this were so, all would work with pleasure for the common happiness; those who engaged with great talents, would require the same recompense as those who were industrious with slender endowments, private property would be at an end, and general peace would reign on earth.

Jesus felt that his doctrine was too difficult for man as he is, but he supported its superiority by its salutary effects and by experience, which shows that it is perfect. Moreover, he attended to the motives of reward an . punishment. He was also prepared for the disputes his teaching occasioned. Whoever proposes a new doctrine brings forth an object of difference. Now the moral principles of Christ being especially

opposed to riches and worldly distinctions, to that, therefore, which man desires most eagerly, necessarily excited adversaries and caused persecutions. He came not on purpose to excite dissensions between brothers, relations, or man and man; but he knew that dissensions were unavoidable in the natural order of things. Now let every one judge for himself, whether it were better to live quietly in error and in injustice, than to suffer and struggle for truth and general happiness. Thus, my conviction is, that the moral precepts of Christianity are those of nature. I cannot, however, believe that such a pure system of morality will be easily, or soon adopted. But this can take nothing away from its perfection. It will ever remain the object all regulations ought to have in view, for its reception is the indispensable condition to universal peace. In my work on Education, I speak of what will avail in procuring the conditions under which man can receive this moral doctrine. Meanwhile, it is certain that they only usurp the name of Christians, who by their enactments prove that their sole aim is individual happiness; or, who strive after riches and worldly distinctions, and other advancement of their merely private estates; or, who live at the expense of others; or, finally, who are apt enough to laud, but ever ready to act in contradiction to the precepts of Christianity. It is, indeed, blasphemous to bear the title of Christian without acting up to the sacred duties it requires. Let us, therefore, in acknowledging the purity of Christian morality, put it in practice, before we dare to arrogate the noble name of Christians.

Of Persons who are naturally Good.

There is, undoubtedly, a great deal of moral evil in the world. Man, it is also certain, is commonly inclined to evil, that is, to follow the activity of the animal faculties, which are, for the most part, very energetic, and submit with difficulty to the guidance of the powers proper to man. I am, nevertheless, astonished to observe so much goodness in the world. Its abundance evidently proves that man is naturally good, and by no means in consequence of his social institutions; these, indeed, are for the most part, calculated to pervert him. The poor are surrounded with temptation and exposed to corruption on all hands, and the lives led by the rich, especially their idleness and luxury, invite them to immorality. All ranks have their superstitions, and all believe in error, as well as in truth; all pay for temporal and also for eternal happiness, and all subscribe to the first dogma proclaimed necessary to secure the good things here, or to purchase the joys of immortality hereafter,—an entire abnegation of reason.

A true picture of society would, indeed, be frightful. Happily, man had received from the Creator so large an infusion of goodness, that it is not to be annihilated. It is lamentable, then, that certain persons attach themselves more to the letter than to the spirit of some symbolic propositions of the gospel, and that mystical, contradictory, and noxious interpretations are rather believed in than simple, reasonable, and salutary views.

There are some naturally good, some who instinctively, so to say, do the things which Christian morality commands. But, have we not all heard religious people say, that this natural disposition to do well profits those who exert it in nowise? Let us, however, examine into the origin of faith and of charity, discuss their comparative excellence, and determine the merit which belongs to natural benevolence.

In regard to the origin of faith and charity, I refer to the Phrenological part of this work. I shall only repeat that they spring not from the same fundamental faculty, that they may exist separately or conjoined, and that they may be active in very different degrees. These propositions are as important as those according to which charity and the disposition to faith are inherent in the nature of man. We may, therefore, proceed to ask which of the two is the more important?

Pious people commonly decide on this question according to their individual feelings. But this manner of judging frequently leads into error, and is apt to deceive. Let us, therefore, make abstraction of ourselves, and consider the subject generally.

We are very ready to believe that which we like; this however, is not always truth. Religious systems, and the various sects of each are all founded on belief. Jews, Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, Inquisitors, Quakers, &c., all fancy they possess the true revelation. Hence, simple faith does not indicate abstract truth. Faith is the result of feelings, and all feelings, without exception, are blind; faith, consequently, may be deceived; and I think it causes error

whenever the faculty on which it depends ceases to act in harmony with the other powers proper to man. Faith has, unquestionably, done a great deal of harm in the world. Some standard, by which its manifestations may be regulated, is therefore extremely desirable.

Christ desired that his disciples might be known by their works, and the excellence of his doctrine by its effects. Such a basis is unobjectionable, it includes its validity in itself, and soon changes faith into conviction. Now as pure charity is the aim of the doctrine, and was the practice of the life of Jesus, charity is evidently the chief of his precepts.

Further, the tendency of charity is solely to do good; but faith may do evil too; it easily finds an excuse for self-love, personal views, and abuses of many complexions.

We may add, that faith without works is dead, and that every hypocrite may say, *I believe*. Faith, therefore, can be considered only as an additional motive to exercise charity; in its inferiority, then, it should never be the basis of any religious doctrine.

"Beware of false prophets," says Christ*, "which come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves. Ye will know them by their fruits."

Finally, even those who have no religious faith, still admit charity and its good effects. Thus, I do not hesitate to place, with St. Paul†, charity above faith.

In regard to the merit of natural benevolence, I think, that the moral laws are as positive and inherent in our

* St. Matt. vii. 15. † 1 Cor. xiii.

nature as are those of vision, and of the harmony of colours and tones; I also conceive that Christ has commanded certain works because they are good in themselves and according to the will of the Creator; and, further, that the truth of religious interpretations is proclaimed by their compatibility with general happiness. Those, therefore, who say that natural human benevolence is worthless, might also say that the goodness of God is without value.

Persons, it is true, who are naturally good, deserve less credit for their beneficent actions than those who do good principally because it is commanded. The former are charitable because they find pleasure in charity, while the others of charity make an act of virtue. In reference to energy and effect, however, natural benevolence is superior to that which results from faith. The faculties which act from internal vigour are rewarded by their indulgence; they persevere with pleasure and constantly tend to action, while those which must be excited by other motives become inactive as soon as these cease to operate. The naturally good do more acts of beneficence without faith than those who, little endowed with primitive charity, take mere faith as their guide and rule of conduct. Those, however, who unite natural charity and faith are the most assiduous in doing good; but, to reject natural benevolence is equivalent to saying that pure and natural gold is not worth such as is extracted from very heterogeneous minerals, and that a swift and willing horse is inferior to one which must be spurred to go quickly.

I finish this section by asking, what individual can determine moral evil and moral good, that is, dictate the moral laws?

I think that it is with moral as with all other principles; a blind man cannot establish the principles of colouring, nor one born deaf those of music; the great painter gives the rules of his art, and the great genius for music indicates the laws of harmony. In the same way, he who possesses the faculties proper to man in the highest perfection, and in whose actions they predominate, he who can challenge the world *to convict him of sin*, has a right to determine moral principles, and to fix rules of moral conduct. Those, therefore, who would make exception and say, Follow my words and not my deeds, have no title to give rules of action to the community, or to superintend their practice. How noble was the saying of Christ in reference to this point*, "*If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not.*"

* St. John, x. 37.

SECTION VI.

Practical Considerations.

In every science the theoretical must be distinguished from the practical part. The former considers principles, the latter applies them. I think with Socrates, that knowing and acting ought to be inseparable, and that useful knowledge is alone worth attending to; no philosophy, therefore, which cannot be applied in social life deserves to have a student. The knowledge of the human mind is interesting to physicians in reference to insanity, and to teachers and legislators in determining the means of perfecting mankind. I have treated these subjects in separate volumes; I shall here add some considerations which concern us in our social intercourse, and which may contribute to further general happiness. This I shall do in four chapters. The first will treat of the modifications of the affective and intellectual functions in individuals; the second, of the difficulty of judging the actions of others; the third, of sympathy and antipathy; and the fourth, of the happiness of man.

CHAPTER I.

On the Modifications of the Affective and Intellectual Functions.

In philosophy it is commonly admitted, that the world is different to every species of animals, and even to every individual of the same species. This is easily understood, when we consider that all the beings of nature are in relation one to another, and that these, endowed with consciousness, recognise this, in other terms, perceive various impressions made on them by other beings. Now, it is evident that each must perceive impressions in proportion to the number and energy of its sentient faculties. Hence it results that the world differs to different species of animals; that it is essentially the same, but modified to individuals of the same kinds; and that man, who unites all the faculties distributed among the other living tribes, and possesses some peculiarly and alone, has, so to speak, the most extended world, though this be still modified to individuals, as it is among animals of the same species.

I shall now investigate the modifications of the faculties more in detail. First then, the manifestations of every faculty are greatly modified in different kinds of beings. This appears from the functions of those faculties, both of vegetative and animal life, which are common to man and animals. The liver secretes bile, the kidneys secrete urine, the salivary glands saliva, &c.; yet these secretions vary in different kinds of animals; and are even modified in individuals of the

same species. The power of motion is modified in different kinds of animals, and the consistence, texture, and taste of its organs, the muscles, also vary. The external senses offer modifications according to species and individuals. Now, are the faculties attached to the brain also modified in different animals?

If we examine their applications, there can remain no doubt of it. The function of the cerebellum must be modified in every species, because the individuals of each prefer others of their own kind. Sometimes also it is quite inordinate. Modifications of philoprogenitiveness are not less certain. Animals love the young of their own more than those of other kinds. Inhabitiveness must be modified in animals which live in the water, on dry land, in the air, and at greater or less elevations. Adhesiveness presents many modifications in solitary and in social animals. Destructiveness and constructiveness are much modified; all animals do not kill in one way, and the nests of all birds are not built in the same manner. The song of birds, and the instinct to migrate, are modified universally. Similar observations might readily be made in regard to the whole of the propensities, sentiments, and intellectual faculties. Thus it is certain that all are modified both in species and in individuals. Nay, it seems to me that there are idiosyncrasies of all the mental functions, as well as of digestion and the external senses. Certain stomachs do not digest some particular substances; some individuals cannot bear certain odours, savours, colours, and sounds; and some cannot endure certain modes of feeling or thinking, certain successions of tones, of ideas, and so on. The same thing is approved or

disapproved of by different people according to the manner in which it is proposed.

Another cause of the modified manifestations of the faculties is their mutual influence. I only consider the human kind at present. It is indubitable that if two or more persons do the same thing, it will be done in a modified way by every one. Inasmuch as the faculties are essentially the same, the same actions are observed in all mankind: nay, in as far as nations have similar predominating faculties, there prevails a certain analogy in their actions and manners, because these are effects of the special faculties and their combinations; it is only their modifications and different combinations that produce varieties in action. Every faculty may act combined with one, or two, or more. The number of binary, ternary, and more multiplied combinations is, therefore, immense, especially if it be remembered that each may be modified in itself, and may be more or less energetic. As this subject, however, is of the highest importance in anthropology, and indispensable to the elucidation of my ideas, I shall treat it somewhat in detail, and choose examples easily understood, and interesting to every one.

Physical love alone, combined with adhesiveness, philoprogenitiveness, benevolence and veneration, or with the propensities to fight and to destroy, acts very differently. Two affectionate mothers, of whom the one has philoprogenitiveness combined with much self-esteem, much firmness, a great propensity to fight, and little benevolence, and the second philoprogenitiveness combined with adhesiveness, benevolence, veneration, and very little self-esteem and propensity to fight, will love

their children in very different manners. Determinate or individual justice varies extremely. Justice gives laws universally, but these are modified according to the particular and combined faculties of legislators. What a difference in the characters of Lycurgus and Solon; but what a difference in their precepts also! Socrates and his disciples looked on happiness as the aim of all action. Socrates placed it in moral and virtuous conduct; his disciple, Aristippus, in agreeable impressions on the senses; Anniceris in pleasant sensations and moral feelings; Antisthenes in self-satisfaction; Hegesias, a disciple of Aristippus, in voluptuousness; Theodorus, another disciple of Aristippus, considered every action which procured pleasure as good in itself and virtuous; Diogenes, a disciple of Antisthenes, raised his mind to an absolute independence of circumstances: he became almost a savage, and respected nothing.

Man universally believes in one or several Gods; but what a difference between the Gods of different nations, and even of different men! The Gods seem to me everywhere represented with faculties conformable to those of the nations by whom they are adored, or of the religious legislators who have commanded in their name. The God of the Jews, particularly of Joshua, and the Deity of the true Christian, are extremely modified. If different individuals, even of the same religion, be asked their opinion about God, we observe great diversities. St. Peter and St. John speak, the former with fear, the latter with meekness and love, of the same Christian Deity. If we examine the opinions of the reformers, Luther, Calvin, Zwingle, and others, do we not always observe the faculties of the individuals? Who, for instance, finds not in the principles of

Melancthon, the mildness and moderation of his character? A person endowed with veneration, combined with charity, attachment, and understanding, without pride, destructiveness, and amativeness, will establish a system of religious observance quite different from his who is endowed with veneration combined with covetiveness, pride, amativeness, and destructiveness, without charity and understanding.

Music is different in every nation. We easily distinguish that of the Italians, Germans, French, Scots, &c. Even the music of each composer offers something particular, and connoisseurs distinguish that of Gluck, Mozart, Haydn, and others. It is the same with painting. All painters are colourists, but there is a difference in their modes of colouring; and every one as regularly prefers certain colours as subjects. Hence the difference in the pictures of Titian, Rembrandt, Paul Veronese, Albano, and others. The canvas of Titian shows reflexion and combination; that of Paul Veronese his fondness for architecture; Albano again betrays his amorous inclination; and so of the rest.

The languages of different nations present fine examples of modifications produced by the mutual influence of the faculties. I even admit as a principle, that the spirit of its language proclaims the predominating faculties of a nation. I have spoken of a faculty which learns and knows the signs invented by the superior intellectual faculties to express the feelings and ideas. It is evident, therefore, that a nation with many feelings or ideas must have many signs, and that the number of any one kind of these indicates the energy of the faculty they represent. Thus, the Greek and French languages have a greater number

of tenses than the German and English. The French, on the contrary, is poor in expressions of reflexion and of sentiment; moreover, it has few that are figurative; while the German is rich in all of these, and has also many more signs of disjunction. Frenchmen have the organs of individuality and eventuality very much developed, and are therefore fond of facts; but their faculties of comparison and causality are commonly smaller. In consequence of this, the French Institute does not admit analogies as proofs; these consist according to it only in facts. The Germans, on the other hand, are fond of analogies, perhaps too much so, for they compare and wish to explain every thing. French expressions are individual, without any comparison; therefore, similar sounds denote many different objects. From this it appears that the discriminating faculties are not very active in Frenchmen. The same deficiency is evident in the very different names they give to very similar objects. The German and English tongues are more systematic than the French. The common language of Germany is even conformable to the system of Linnæus. Whilst the French say, *bouvreuil*, *chardonneret*, *pinçon*, &c., the Germans and English preserve the generic name *fink*, or *finch*, and join to it a sign of distinction. In the same way, while the French say, *rasoir*, *couteau*, *canif*, *serpette*, &c.; in German and English the generic name *messer* or *knife* is retained, and a sign of particular destination affixed, as *feder-messer*, or *pen-knife*; *tafel-messer*, or *table-knife*; &c. For this reason also, the number of roots of the French language is much more considerable, though that of its words be much smaller than those of the German. Another proof that the

French language is very unsystematic, lies in the fact of its very often having a substantive without its derivative adjective, or the contrary, to designate the same idea. These illustrations show the evident influence of the faculties generally, in establishing languages. Thus the number and nature of signs is in relation to the special powers of the mind which invent them. The faculties of individuality and eventuality being the first active in children, we may understand why nouns and verbs are soonest employed, and constitute almost the whole artificial language of infancy; and why all words may be reduced etymologically to these signs. By degrees, as other faculties become active, other significations of signs are discovered, even though their roots remain the same.

The construction of languages proves also the modified manners of thinking of different nations. The French like facts, and direct their attention to them, without first considering causes. It is natural, indeed, to begin with the subject, then to join the action of the subject, and after this to express other circumstances. This the French do regularly. If cause and effect be considered, they always begin with the effect, and relate the cause afterwards. The Germans proceed in a very different manner, and their tongue in this respect requires much more attention than the French. It also ordinarily begins with the subject; then follow expressions of the relation between subject and object, both of which are mentioned; and lastly, the action of the subject upon the object is considered. If an effect and its cause, again, are spoken of, the cause is commonly denoted first and the effect after it. Certain languages are known to admit of a great number of inversions, others of

very few. The former appear to me the more logical; for it seems natural that attention should be given first to the most important object. The French language begins almost always with the fact: hence French understandings consider the fact as the most important.

From these observations upon language, we may conceive that the spirit of no *one* language can become general. I am of opinion that the spirit of the French will never please Germans; and that Frenchmen, on the other hand, will always dislike that of the German; because the manner of thinking, and the enchainment of ideas, are quite dissimilar in the two nations.

I am further convinced that different philosophical systems have resulted from various combinations of faculties in their authors. He who has much of the faculty of eventuality will never neglect facts. He who possesses less of it, and a great deal of the faculties of comparison and causality, will begin to philosophize with causes, and construct the world, instead of observing its existence. He, on the contrary, in whom the faculty of causality is less active, will reject this mode of consideration, and may think it unphilosophical to admit a primitive cause. The philosopher in whom the superior sentiments are very energetic, directs his mind principally to moral principles, and then we have various systems of virtue and morality, according to the predominance of one or other of these. One makes virtue consist in prudence, another in benevolence. One considers all actions as done from love of praise or from vanity; another from self-esteem, from love of self-preservation, and so on. Philosophers as well as other men think differently, and

each is also apt to consider his own manner of thinking and feeling as the best; his consciousness tells him it is so; but I think he errs who assumes himself as a measure of the absolute nature of man. I opine that we ought, in examining human nature, to make abstraction of ourselves entirely; we ought never to admit in man a feeling as the strongest, and a manner of thinking as the best, solely because they are conformable to our own; nor ought we ever to deny in others what we ourselves do not possess. We should observe mental operations, in the conviction that all the essential kinds or particular faculties inhere in human nature; and we should observe how and under what circumstances each faculty can and does act. In this way I think it possible to determine the absolute nature of man, and to become acquainted with the infinity of modifications occurring in individuals.

It would be easy to quote examples in the case of every faculty, to prove the mutual influence of the whole; but I shall only dwell on this principle, in reference to abuses of the faculties, for the sake of showing how peculiarities may be explained which seem inconceivable to those who know nothing of Phrenology.

Suppose, for instance, we are told that of two inveterate thieves presented to us, one has never scrupled to rob churches whilst the other has, the robber of the church may be distinguished from the other: he who has the smallest organ of veneration is the thief of the holy articles. Suppose we see two women in confinement, and are told that one has stolen, and that the other has concealed the stolen things; the former will have the organ of acquisitiveness larger, and that of the pro-

pensity to conceal less, while the second will have the organ of secretiveness much developed. If we would detect the chief of a robber band, we examine the organs of self-esteem and determinateness. We may distinguish an habitual vagabond thief from a coiner of false money by his having, besides the organ of acquisitiveness, the organ of locality larger, and smaller organs of cautiousness and of constructiveness. We may also distinguish dangerous and incorrigible criminals from the less desperate and more easily amended. They who have the organs of the sentiments proper to man and of intellect very small, but those of the propensities to fight, to destroy, to conceal, and to acquire, very much developed, will be corrected with far more difficulty than such as have the organ of acquisitiveness very much developed, but at the same time the organs of the human faculties and of intellect large, who, in short, are susceptible of moral *will*.

CHAPTER II.

On the difficulty of judging others.

HAVING examined the modified manifestations of the faculties of the mind, natural order leads me to consider the difficulty of judging, and of determining the motives and actions of others. From the preceding views it follows, first, that the judgment of every one as well as all his other functions must be modified. If we but attend to the judgments of different individuals upon

the same object, if we note their reflections, and consider what each praises or blames, we may speedily be convinced by experience of the truth of this. It may, indeed, be admitted as a principle, that every one judges according to the natural modifications and the mutual influence of his faculties;—that all judge others by their own nature, or take themselves as the measure of good and evil. Therefore it is that God has at all times been anthropomorphosed; every one has modified the Divinity, and conceived a Creator conformable to his own manner of judging and feeling. And when philosophers, moralists, and the virtuous, regard conscience as the severest judge of malefactors generally, they suppose in these degenerate beings the sentiment they feel themselves;—they judge themselves in the actions of others. In the same way, whatever is conformable to our manner of feeling and thinking is apt to be approved, and the contrary to be disapproved of. To judge well, therefore, we must first distinguish the common nature of man from the modifications of every individual; and then we must know our own nature and the modifications of our faculties to avoid censuring or lauding others according to our own favourite sentiments or ideas. We must, in fact, judge others and ourselves by one and the same standard—absolute good and evil*.

It is also difficult to judge of the actions of others, and to determine their real motives, because the motives of the same action may be quite different. Appearances are proverbially deceitful. I shall quote but a few examples in illustration; a

* See page 116.

very superficial glance, however, will, at all times, shew us many motives for the same act done by different individuals. One gives to the poor from ostentation, another from duty, a third from the hope of gaining heaven, and others again from real charity. One wishes to know the history and situation of the unfortunate,—if he be of his sect or party, *&c.*, before he does good; another relieves as soon as he sees misery, every one is his neighbour, his left-hand knows not what his right-hand does. One goes to church because it is usual; another to see or to be seen; another to obtain the good opinion of the pious; and another from feelings of sincere veneration. One is neat and clean only when he goes into society, while another is so at all times, even in solitude. One cultivates an art or science from vanity; another because he is charmed with it; and a third because he finds it advantageous, *&c.*

It is the same with the abstaining from abuses. One, for instance, from charity does not steal; another steals everywhere except in the house where he lives; another robs churches, but not the poor; another does not steal, for fear of being punished, for fear of injuring his reputation, or from a sense of duty and justice, *&c.* In short, every one knows that the same action he did, or abstained from, has not always followed from the same motive. Thus, if an action or omission is to be judged, it is necessary to consider whether it resulted from the natural energy or inactivity of the respective faculty, or whether other faculties exerted a determinative influence. In judging others, we must remember that every faculty may be active by its own energy or by the excitement of other powers, and, again, may be inactive by its own insufficient

energy, or by the influence of other faculties. Hence it follows, that, on one hand, every function does not suppose large developement of the respective organ; and, on the other, that organs may be greatly developed without producing abuses. The organ of acquisitiveness may be very large without causing theft; the organ of amativeness much developed without occasioning libertinism; and so of the rest. The functions of very large organs may be suppressed, though certainly not without difficulty. The activity of every organ only produces a particular inclination; the faculties mutually influence each other, and regulate their subordination. Thus we cannot judge of other persons from our own sentiments and intellectual endowments, nor by one or several, but by the whole of their faculties together; and then only censure or praise their actions as they disagree or harmonize with the absolute moral nature of man.

The principle that every faculty may be active by its internal energy, answers the question so often proposed in books: What is the origin of the arts and sciences? In examining their source, writers commonly begin from remote antiquity, and endeavour to show how external circumstances have produced and improved them. Without denying the importance of external circumstances as exciting causes, I still think that the most important, the primary cause, indeed, is overlooked, that, namely, which exists in the conate organization; the same, in fact, as that of the instinctive labours of animals. Man invents and cultivates arts and sciences in the same way and for the same reason that the beaver builds its hut, and the nightingale sings. Every sentiment and every intellectual faculty

may act by its internal activity without external excitement; and this is the primitive source of the arts and sciences. Scarcely could Handel speak, before he articulated musical sounds, and his father, grieved at the child's propensity to music, banished all musical instruments from his house; but this sublime genius was not to be extinguished by the caprice of a mistaken parent; for the boy contrived to get a little clavichord into a garret, and applying himself to this after the family retired to rest, he soon learnt to produce both melody and harmony.

Nature, then, invented arts and sciences, and revealed them to man by means of his organization. Arts and sciences are also gradually perfected only in proportion as they who cultivate them are possessed of energetic organs.

Inferences.

The consideration of the two sources of activity of the faculties leads me to the following question: What actions in reference to morality deserve the greatest confidence, those which result from the goodness of nature, or those which are the effect of virtue? Though I think that good is always good in itself, and must ever be approved of, I still allow that there is greater merit in virtue than in natural goodness. I agree with the definition of virtue which all the great ancient and modern philosophers have given, as Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, Seneca, Kant, and others. I admit that those who have vanquished temptations deserve particularly to be rewarded, and that by the possibility

of being either virtuous or viscious, our actions have the greatest merit or demerit*. Nevertheless, I confess that for my own part and guidance in society, I trust more to natural goodness than to virtue. I love goodness and esteem virtue. Guided by early experience, which shows that the greatest number of persons act more from the dictates of their propensities and sentiments than of their understanding and moral will, I never choose for my intimate friends individuals in whom the inferior organs are very large, and the superior very small. In the same way I think, that if the intellectual faculties act by their internal energy, they effect much more than if they be excited by sentiments or motives emanating from any other source.

* Non virtus est, non posse peccare; cum renunciatur improbitati, statim adsciscetur virtus. *St. Ambrosius.*—Nulla sine labore virtus est. Non est gloriosa victoria nisi ubi fuerint gloriosa certamina. *Idem in Ps.* 118, *et De Off.*—Posse peccare datum est primo homini, non ut proinde peccaret, sed ut gloriosior appareat, si non peccaret, dum peccare posset. *St. Bernardus de Lib. Arb.*—Vita nostra in hac peregrinatione non potest esse sine peccato, sine tentatione, quia profectus noster per tentationem nostram fit; nec sibi quisquam innotescit, nisi tentatus; nec potest coronari, nisi vicerit; nec potest vincere, nisi certaverit; nec potest certare, nisi inimicum et tentationes habuerit. *St. Augustinus super Ps.* 60.—Quidam in juventute luxuriosè viventes, in senectute continentes fieri delectantur, et tunc eligunt servire castitati, quando libido eos servos habere contempsit. Nequaquam in senectute continentes vocandi sunt qui in juventute luxuriosè vixerunt; tales non haberint prœmium, quia laboris certamen non habuerunt; eos enim spectat gloria, in quibus fuerunt gloriosa certamina. *Isidor. de Summo Bono, Lib. i. c.* 31.—For there are some eunuchs which were so born from their mother's womb; and there are some eunuchs which were made eunuchs of men; and there be eunuchs which have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven's sake. *Matt.* xix. 12.—Joy shall be in heaven over one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety and nine just persons which need no repentance. *Luke*, xv. 7.

From the modifications of our faculties results still another very important practical rule—indulgence. It is impossible that others should feel and think on every point as we do. Precisely as it is generally admitted, that the functions of the external senses cannot be altogether the same, and without any modification—and as it is proverbially said, *De gustibus non est disputandum*, so also are the internal faculties modified, and no one has a right to desire another to feel and think with him. A certain indulgence is indispensable in society. I do not maintain that every manner of feeling and thinking, and every action, are to be tolerated. There is a common touchstone for all mankind. Feelings, thoughts, and actions, must be conformable to the absolute conscience of man; but all other modifications ought to be permitted. This principle may be applied to both sexes, and to all conditions, and to all ages; no friendship can be permanent without indulgence upon many modifications in the manner of feeling and thinking. It is the same in regard to religious and other opinions. St. Paul said to the Romans, "One believeth that he may eat all things; another, who is weak, eateth herbs; let not him that eateth despise him that eateth not, and let not him that eateth not judge him that eateth. One man esteemeth one day above another, another esteemeth every day alike. Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind. We then that are strong ought to bear the infirmities of the weak, and not to please ourselves. The kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but righteousness and peace."

CHAPTER III.

On Sympathy and Antipathy.

The principle of the universally-modified manifestations of the faculties leads me also to the consideration of sympathy and antipathy. Throughout all nature, beings have relations with each other. As we have seen that there are relations between the faculties of the same individual, so there exist relations between the faculties of different individuals. Indeed it is generally observed, that certain beings cannot exist together in society, while others dwell in harmony and peace. Attraction and repulsion in physics, and affinities in chemistry, are remarkable and well known; and even among vegetables, some species perish in the neighbourhood of certain others, while many species increase and prosper very well together. Among animals, the same law obtains, not only as different species, but also as different individuals of the same kind are concerned. Certain individuals of the same species manifest a particular attachment, while others cannot bear with each other. In a herd of cows, the bull is commonly more attached to one than to any of the rest; birds, too, pair off by choice, &c.

It is the same with mankind. Be it, however, remembered, that I do not speak of sympathy and antipathy in the same sense as many authors do when they discuss the sympathies and antipathies of the stomach and the five senses. They then describe what is called idiosyncrasy. Certain persons, for instance, cannot digest a particular kind of food, cannot

endure certain odours, are disgusted with particular savours, and cannot look at certain figures, or touch certain bodies. I have already said that I admit idiosyncrasies in the internal faculties; but I here speak of the natural relations between the faculties of different individuals. Some are, as it were, born for each other, while others mutually feel an invincible aversion. This may be explained in the following manner: First, certain faculties of man are eminently social, as attachment and charity; others are quite the contrary, for instance, selfishness and pride. Again, according to a general rule, every faculty desires to be satisfied. Hence every one is pleased with whatever is conformable to his manner of feeling and thinking: every one wishes to enjoy; therefore every one likes those who procure or permit him enjoyments. It is consequently evident, that there is no single and invariable combination on which sympathy depends. These vary in the same degree as the faculties of different individuals are modified. Before we can decide whether two individuals will sympathize or not, we must consider all their faculties; and then we can see as certain that understanding must like understanding, and every intellectual faculty manifestations of a similar power in others. The musician is pleased with music; a mathematician with mathematics; a philosopher with philosophical ideas; a philologist with languages, &c. In the same way, the sentiments proper to man look for and sympathize with similar sentiments. A charitable man likes mild and benevolent people; the religious choose the society of the devout, and so on. Thus, the faculties of the understanding and the sentiments proper to man favour sociality.

It is not precisely thus with the faculties common to man and animal. Some of them, however, are social, as attachment, and, in a certain degree, amativeness and philoprogenitiveness; but the greatest number are eminently antisocial. The interested, for instance, do not like the interested, except in as far as their own selfishness is satisfied. Proud persons cannot suffer others endowed with the same feeling. The haughty and interested not only dislike one another, but are also disliked by those who are possessed of the superior sentiments. This is the case, too, with the propensities to fight and to destroy. Thus every one will sympathize with those in whose society his faculties are satisfied; and antipathy will be proportionate to the obstacles in the way of this, that is, to the prevention of enjoyment.

It is the animal nature which causes so many unhappy and ill-assorted marriages. Amativeness or adhesiveness brings husband and wife together; perhaps they have thought of money, beauty, sometimes of health and intelligence, but they have forgotten the other dispositions, which are independent of physical love and of attachment, which cannot be bought, and which no intelligence can give, but which, nevertheless, contribute greatly to the happiness of those who bind themselves by indissoluble ties. All the other numerous faculties which are not satisfied soon change the original sympathy of the couple into indifference or even into antipathy, and then follow disorder and misery.

CHAPTER IV.

On the Happiness of Man.

"I HAVE travelled over the world," says Volney*, "I have visited villages and towns, and perceiving misery and desolation over all, my soul has been deeply afflicted by the ills which weigh heavily upon mankind. With a sigh I have said, And is man then born only to suffer misery and pain? I shall ask the ashes of legislators, how empires rise and fall; in what reside the causes of the prosperity or decay of nations; on what principles the peace of society and the happiness of mankind must be based?"

Reason compels us to think that the Lord of the universe, in his goodness and perfection, destined man to be happy. It is, however, certain, that to whatever side we turn our eyes, we perceive individuals who suffer, who are unhappy, and who lament their lot. Let us first examine in what the happiness of man consists.

I have already mentioned that the expressions happiness and unhappiness are synonymous with pleasure and pain; that every faculty of the mind being active, desires, and that being satisfied, it procures pleasure, or one kind of happiness. This, consequently, cannot be the same in all individuals, since dispositions differ universally. One is amused by fishing or hunting, another is fond of sensual pleasures; one finds his happiness in the study of the arts, another in the examination of metaphysical ques-

* Ruins, c. iv.

tions; and another in religious proselytism. Servile minds despair of supporting existence in a free state, while the truly civilized consider liberty as the greatest good upon earth. Thus, every one individually finds his happiness in the gratification of his peculiar faculties; in the same way as the sheep whilst feeding on grass, and the tiger whilst devouring its prey, are happy, each in its own manner. It is also conceivable that the same thing may give pleasure to one, may be indifferent to another, and insupportable to a third; thence that he is in the wrong who would measure the happiness of others by his own.

The happiness of man may be divided according to his fundamental faculties into *corporeal*, *affective*, and *intellectual*, and according to his two natures into *animal* or inferior, and *human* or superior.

It is a matter of fact, that by far the greater number look for their individual happiness in the satisfaction of the faculties common to man and animals, as of physical love, self-esteem, the love of approbation, the love of acquiring, and so on. In certain countries, inferior pleasures are alone permitted; even religious enjoyments are made to consist in puerile and superstitious ceremonies. Means of subsistence are abundantly provided; the people have plenty to eat and to drink, but intellectual and all pleasures beyond the range of mere animality are interdicted.

Very few cultivate the arts and sciences for the sake of the pleasure alone they derive from them; it is mostly done to satisfy some inferior desire. Finally, those who are happy by the exercise of the faculties proper to man are extremely rare,

They are those who, as St. Paul says, "have the law written in their hearts;" those who in religion are called *chosen;* those who find their happiness in actions of charity, and in the abnegation of selfish desires; those who, in the eyes of common persons, pass for dreamers or fools.

Let us now examine the causes of the unhappiness of mankind. The first depends on the actual state of the fundamental faculties, and on the different degrees of their activity, or on the struggle between the two natures of man, and on the resistance of the inferior to the superior. For, as the moral laws exist, and as few feel naturally disposed to submit to them, the greater number have to combat their animal propensities. Now, as pain is felt each time any inclination is opposed, or any law is obeyed, which would willingly be eluded, or whose necessity is not understood, it is obvious that in the actual state of things the virtuously good must spend a life of suffering.

These ideas are admirably developed in the doctrine of Christianity. Morality is there declared the aim which must be obtained, whether with ease or with difficulty, with pleasure or with pain, through love or through fear. The great difficulty of vanquishing the brute nature is acknowledged, but the necessity of fulfilling the law or will of the Creator is still insisted on. For this, therefore, reward is also in proportion to the pains of success; eternal life is promised to those who gain the victory, and the "joy in Heaven over one sinner that repenteth shall be more than over ninety-and-nine just persons which need not repentance *."

* St. Luke xv. 7.

The second cause of unhappiness is the great activity of the powers common to man and animals, altogether independently of the moral relation of the faculties. Many of those who have no morality, or who neglect its voice without pain, are still very unhappy by reason of the impossibility of satisfying their excessively energetic inferior feelings. Philosophers allude to this unfortunate state when they speak of *wants*, and say, that man, to be happy, ought to have few wants.

The expression *want* is here synonymous with desire, is consequently an effect of every faculty's activity, and is as various in kind as the fundamental faculties; each want individually being proportionate to the activity of the power from which it results. Wants, it follows, like faculties, are either of an inferior or a superior nature. To be just is a *want* for the righteous, as to take nourishment is for him who is hungry. As, however, the animal faculties are the most generally active in man, if wants are spoken of, we commonly think of inferior powers, as of self-esteem, ambition, personal interest, &c. Now, as happiness depends on the gratification of active faculties, and unhappiness on their non-satisfaction, it is obvious why those who are fond of ostentation, luxury, riches, distinctions, &c., are commonly discontented or unhappy: it is impossible to appease their wants or desires.

Thus, wants or desires, or, in other words, the activity of the faculties, are not the immediate cause of happiness or unhappiness. The whole of the mental powers acting with energy, may be sources either of bliss or of misery. This follows on the possibility or impossibility of gratifying their impulses. He who has many faculties active which he can

satisfy, is more happy than the man who has no desire whatever; it is, however, better to be without desire than to possess very active faculties with no means of ministering to their cravings. Even those who are eminently endowed with the superior faculties, and who would see every one happy, find a kind of misery in the injustice of mankind. The unfortunate of this kind, however, are by no means the most numerous.

Those who have studied the doctrine of wants have not distinguished the faculties sufficiently from their satisfaction. This may vary, and produce both good and evil. Religious sentiments are inherent in human nature, but they have been fearfully abused, and done an immensity of mischief to mankind. Philosophers do ill merely to dwell on the absurdities and crimes these feelings have occasioned; they ought also, and rather, to indicate the manner of cultivating and directing these very superior parts of our nature, to the increasing of our own and our neighbour's happiness. Religion itself must never be ridiculed; certain actions, however, called religious, are but too fit butts for mockery. If the vain and ostentatious be prevented from carrying images of saints in procession through the streets, they will still invent new divinities, and show them with pomp in the churches. It would be of essential importance to enlighten the understandings of such men. We can live on many and various sorts of aliments, and credulity may admit reasonable things as well as absurdities.

It is the study of human nature which shows how ignorance, both in governors and the governed, is the principal cause of unhappiness. Our ignorance in regard to the laws of nature is the most to be lamented; for as they are constantly neglected

and infringed, we are continually punished, and never know wherefore. Moreover, the principles of several governments being atrocious, frequently-recurring revolutions were unavoidable, for man naturally desires to be happy; religion too, being superstitious, was of necessity exposed to change in proportion as intellect improved. Many causes of unhappiness were also recognised in their effects, such as ignorance, stupidity, credulity, want of justice, and base passions, but the circumstances or conditions constituting these causes were not known. Selfishness has, in truth, the greatest influence on almost all; all expect rewards for their actions, if not in this world, at least, in that which is to come. Philosophers, however, must avow their ignorance in regard to the cause of this so universal selfishness.

It therefore becomes extremely interesting to examine why mankind are generally dull, credulous, self-interested, full of vanity and pride; in brief, why their brute nature is so active, or why they place happiness in the satisfaction of inferior feelings, and carry in themselves the cause of their own and of others' misery.

Philosophers, moralists, and all religious systems treat of this subject. Religious expositions are always founded on marvellous conceptions, but these, as beyond the reach of observation, and oftentimes unreasonable, requiring to be proposed as articles of belief, do not fall within our province. Philosophers and moralists again have advanced hypotheses which nature and observation did not confirm. Phrenology alone furnishes a palpable explanation, by showing that the organic conditions on which manifestations of the mind depend,

rather favour the exhibition of the animal than of the peculiarly human part of man's nature. I speak here as an observer only; I describe what exists in the world at the present day; I pretend not to know what the cerebral organization was at the beginning, or whether it has suffered any change; but, in the conviction that the manifestation of the mind depends on the brain, I dare to say, that the wickedness of mankind, or the disobedience to the peculiarly human nature, will continue so long as the brain remains such as it is. I dare answer in the most positive manner the following passage of Volney*: "Man who despairest of mankind, hast thou scrutinized the organization of sensibility, in order to determine with precision, whether the motives which dispose man to happiness are essentially weaker than those which remove him from it?" But I still say with him, "If at one time, and in one place, certain individuals become better, why should not the whole mass improve? If partial societies become more perfect, why should it not happen with society at large?" I, however, conclude that it is indispensable to study the nature of man, and to proceed accordingly.

Before we inquire into what is to be done to better the lot of mankind, let us first see why so few find pleasure in cultivating their intellectual faculties, and why almost all seek enjoyment in gratifying some one or other of the sentiments. Our every action, indeed, which relates to others, even to God, and in which individual happiness is found, springs from activity of the affective faculties. We, for the most part,

* Ruins, ch. xiv.

only cultivate our understanding as a means of satisfying certain feelings, especially self-esteem, love of distinctions, and desire of gain.

The cerebral mass devoted to the intellectual operations is, to that destined to the affective functions, scarcely as one finger is to the whole hand; and the feelings act with greater energy than the intellectual faculties, in the same ratio as the will effects more with the whole hand than with a single finger. These observations are founded on the invariable laws of nature, and it is impossible to insist too much on the error of Idealogians, in considering understanding as the chief and fundamental cause of our actions, and of philosophers generally, in overlooking the influence of the brain on the manifestations of the affective powers. Let us now examine the question:

What must be done to better the Lot of Mankind?

The friends of man have at all times been interested in this matter. They have proposed many and various means, natural and supernatural, according to the ideas they had conceived of the cause of human misery. Hitherto, however, there has been nothing effected. From this I infer that the measures employed were insufficient. In my work on Education, I particularly consider all that I deem requisite to improve the species. Here I confine myself to a few general indications which are commonly neglected by those who exercise some influence on society.

It is evident, that to promote human happiness, the causes

which oppose it are to be removed, or, at least, diminished. All that can augment or excite the animal nature is therefore to be avoided, and every condition that may develope the faculties proper to man is to be encouraged. Now, it is obvious that, to effect this, the fundamental powers of the mind must be determined, and the conditions of their manifestations made known. This once done, moralists will see that to preach moral principles, to give alms, to found charity-houses, and to cultivate the arts and sciences, is not sufficient; they will apprehend that the evil is to be attacked at the root, that is, that means are to be employed to improve the natural dispositions. Governments also will be shewn not to be serious in their desire for morality, so long as they encourage lotteries, countenance games of hazard, and keep mercenary soldiers in pay. Whatever may be done, however, the progress will necessarily be slow. Governments must, as a first step, begin by nourishing pure intentions, by giving up all selfish and exclusionary views, and in all their particular regulations, by favouring general happiness. The principal object in working for the universal weal is to strengthen the peculiarly human faculties, and to enfeeble those which are common to man and animals. The importance of the faculties proper to man, in regard to general happiness, is a point that cannot be too strongly nor too often insisted upon. These are satisfied by their own functions: the just, the benevolent, the religious, and the disinterested, need not foreign aid to satisfy their noble feelings. Inferior inclinations, on the contrary, almost always depend on the caprices of others for their gratification. The egotist, for instance, is opposed in his undertakings by those

who, like him, think chiefly of themselves. The ambitious man is unhappy if he be not approved of, or honoured to the extent he thinks he has deserved. He who, prompted by charity, does good, finds his reward in the deed itself; but he who does good to gain approbation, or gratitude, is liable to be deceived, and, in the very act, often prepares himself a source of sorrow. In proportion, therefore, as the animal nature shall lose in energy, and the peculiarly human faculties gain in strength, the sum of human happiness will increase.

As man, in the actual state of things, cannot be left to himself, as his actions must be directed by social institutions, it is much to be wished that these were conformable to the invariable laws of natural morality. I fear, that notwithstanding the sincerest love of truth and the purest intentions, some means which are useless, and even noxious, will be resorted to, on account of human nature not being sufficiently known.

Let those whose duty it is to direct society, reflect on the two natures of man; on the superiority of the one over the other; and, further, on the faculties which compose each; let them be convinced that every fundamental power exists of itself; that charity is not the result of faith, nor faith of charity; and that all the faculties, though existing independently, may be combined, and mutually aid and excite each other.

As the predominance of the animal faculties is the principal cause of human misery, their energy must, by all means, be diminished; no fundamental power, however, can be annihilated. I have explained my ideas sufficiently, not to be

suspected of speaking in favour of any arbitrary regulation; yet I shall always insist on the necessity of restraining the animal faculties by those proper to man. In my opinion, consequently, personal, as well as moral liberty, is limited. I have already treated of moral liberty; I shall here add my views of that which is personal.

Of Personal Liberty.

Man, it is said, is born free. This proposition has been used by some authors in a very extensive signification. Every one, they have said, may do whatever he pleases. This interpretation, however, is incompatible with the constitution of the human mind. Let us observe the order of nature, that we may understand the will of the Creator.

Personal liberty we see is first limited by the laws of nature. Conception, birth, growth, health, and every function of vitality, as subjected to positive circumstances, force us at once to look on man as very dependent. Further, man depends entirely upon others during his long infancy. And, again, as a social being, he has duties to fulfil, and rights to reclaim; now, the idea of mutual obligation is incompatible with unbounded, or that liberty which admits every kind of individual gratification. We must live and permit others to live; we must do our duty as child, as parent, and as citizen. The elucidation of these points belongs to the study of the right or law of nature.

The personal liberty of man is also limited by the reality of his two natures, and by the superiority of the one. The

animal faculties must be subordinate to the powers proper to man, and the true Christian is still the slave of justice. This principle, the touch-stone of the excellence or imperfection of civil laws, bounds at the same time those who govern and those who are governed, and proves clearly that by the will of the Creator the personal liberty of man is limited. It has, indeed, been said repeatedly, that without morality no society can exist, and that liberty is not licentiousness. This is strictly true.

Finally, the faculties proper to man may deviate from their natural destination, and this they do each time they act separately. Benevolence without justice and reflection, may do much evil, and justice without benevolence may be too severe. Thus even the most noble parts of man's nature are limited, and kept in check by each other; all must act in harmony to elicit good.

The truth, that personal liberty is very much circumscribed, is never neglected without great disorders following. We must, however, add that no one has any natural right arbitrarily and from selfish motives to limit the personal liberty of others. Volney says, "Wheresoever I cast my eye, whatever the period of which I think, I find the same principles of increase or of destruction, of elevation and of decline. If ever a nation be powerful, or an empire prosper, its conventional laws are conformable to those of nature. If, on the contrary, a state sink in ruin or be dissolved, the laws are imperfect or vicious, or the government is corrupt and violates the laws." Civil restrictions ought to be the mere application of those of nature; they ought to be the same for every member of the

community, and the aim of their imposition—the general happiness. Nature applies its laws constantly and indiscriminately; nature is incorruptible, and makes no exceptions. Human regulations alone are liable to this reproach. Governors and the governed are subjected to the same laws of propagation, of nutrition, of health, disease, and death. Who can deny that nature is equally constant in the application of its moral laws? Happy period when every one will be obliged to conform his conduct to them!

In order to elucidate my ideas on the necessity of submitting the individual desires to the natural laws of morality, I shall quote physical love, attachment, self-love or covetiveness, and the love of approbation, and whatever I say of them will apply to the other feelings common to man and animals. The subordination of the animal nature to proper humanity seems to me as necessary to the happiness of mankind as is attention to matters used as food to individual preservation. A poisonous substance can never become wholesome aliment, and any action inimical to the happiness of mankind will never lose its essential and immoral character.

Is it permitted to limit physical love in society? The faculties proper to man decide the question. For as these are destined to general happiness, physical love being an animal feeling, must be restrained whenever it acts in opposition to their dictates. Now, there can be no doubt that the number of inhabitants in a country influences their state of being. Too crowded a population unavoidably causes misery and degeneration of the species. Both natural and Christian morality forbid us to exterminate or to forsake such unhappy

beings as exist; society is even bound to take care of them, but their further multiplication, as well as every other cause that militates against general happiness, may be lawfully opposed.

The most enlightened publicists admit that population increases in the ratio of the means of subsistence, in the same way as all living beings multiply or perish, according as they are well or ill supplied with nourishment. Vegetation prospers if the soil be well manured. Birds that live on insects are more or less numerous in districts, according to the quantity of food they afford. Herbivorous animals abound in lands which are rich in forage, and countries are peopled in proportion as they furnish the means of living. It is true that a greater number of sober and temperate than of gluttonous and luxurious persons may live in a given district, but nourishment is still the principal condition influencing population. The equilibrium between aliment and consumers is always preserved; sometimes, however, at the expense of a vast quantity of individual suffering. Were it not more meritorious, therefore, in governments, and more beneficial to the community at large, entirely to prevent the evil which becomes necessary to diminish the number of inhabitants? Since beggars, and those with hereditary dispositions to diseases, only propagate to the detriment of society and to entail misery on their progeny, were it not better to prevent them from marriage altogether?

Let those who think differently reflect on the destination of mankind, and on all that is done, or rather neglected in

society as relates to marriage, and they will not, without distinction, defend personal liberty in regard to propagation.

Both civil and religious regulations have, in some instances, restrained the desire, or even abstracted the power of propagation. Libertinism is interdicted in all countries, and adultery is punished as a crime. Soldiers and sailors are prohibited from marrying; they, however, are the stoutest and best made men; for bodily weakness and disease exempt and exclude from the military and naval service. Now, if society can prevent the choice of its youth from propagating, nay, if it think proper to make them expose their lives for the common welfare, as it is said, why should it not also have the right to interdict the marriages of those who propagate to the common calamity?

Let us further reflect on the celibacy of priests of the Romish Church, and even on the example of Christ's apostles, who were advised against marriage. Now, if the prohibition of marriage be just and necessary as soldiers, sailors, and priests are concerned, and if polygamy in general be inadmissible, why should the propagation of infirmities and vices be endured? I think that marriages ought to be regulated by the rule of natural morality, and that this is an essential condition to general happiness. More details on this subject are given in my work on Education.

Another point conformable to the civil laws of all countries, but contrary to the morality of nature and Christianity, concerns exclusive love of every kind. Love of our family and of our country are natural it is true, but both are common to

man and animals, hence they must be subordinate to universal charity. Further, attachment to those around us is laudable, but justice and truth are to precede every other consideration. The man must always triumph over the animal; hence we must prefer truth and general happiness before our country; we must give up national pride and the innumerable prejudices and evils that result from it for the sake of entire humanity. Let us appreciate things in themselves and independently of occasions or causes. The Samaritan who has compasssion on an unfortunate Israelite, dresses his wounds, and takes care of him, is truly his neighbour, and not the Jew or the Levite who looks at him and passes on. On the score of universal love, man, indeed, generally, and pretended Christians particularly, are very far behind. There is no nation which practises this noble precept of Christianity, and nothing but a perfect knowledge of human nature will ever incline men to follow it, or induce them to change the erroneous and pernicious opinions they entertain on this subject.

I arrive at the third point, which is equally delicate and contested, but indispensable to general happiness; I mean the restriction of selfishness. This feeling is the most formidable of all the enemies of mankind. It particularly induces neglect of the natural laws of morality, and divides society; it excites one individual against another, family against family, and nation against nation; it saps the foundations of empires, for it sells places, justice, and even puts up Heaven and immortality at a price; it concentrates all power in an individual, and establishes absolute governments, &c. We may therefore ask

whether society has the right of restraining the desire to acquire, and how far it may enforce it?

The answer is similar to that given to the questions implicating the other animal faculties. The desire to acquire is a fundamental power, and cannot be annihilated by any enactment; it is a strong motive exciting the other aptitudes and dispositions, and may be most usefully employed; however, to what extent its activity is admissible is a point not yet determined. As an animal feeling, it must necessarily be subordinate to the moral nature; indeed, as all countries have laws against its abuses, the propriety of limiting its desires is evident.

We are, now-a-days, permitted openly to maintain the injustice and the violation of natural morality and of true Christian principles, committed when individuals are secured in the possession of peculiar privileges and immunities. We may now also dare to say that personal merit is preferable to the pride of ancestry; that it is more just to reward talents than incapacity; and that every one should be obliged to exercise his natural powers to add to the common stock of industry, and ought only to reap the fruits of his own exertions.

This, the effect of civilization, is a great step towards natural morality—the only basis of general happiness; but I dare maintain that it is not yet sufficient to render it paramount. The obstacle lies in the inequality of natural talents, and in the weakness of the moral sentiments, in by far the greater number of individuals. So long as every one shall work merely for his own interest, fortunes will necessarily be

unequal. A few will succeed each other in opulence, and many will dwell in poverty and misery. This inconveniency is mentioned in the Christian system; a difference of natural gifts is recognised; but all are commanded to employ their endowments to the common advantage.

In this, as in every discussion having the actions of man for its object, I start from the principle that natural morality ought to govern mankind, and that general happiness is preferable to that of individuals. He then who uses his faculties to the furtherance of the common weal, ought to enjoy full liberty, and to meet encouragement in his noble purposes; while all who think only of their private interest are to be superintended, lest the commonwealth suffer by their undertakings.

Great manufactories, for instance, which are so apt to ruin the body and the mind of those engaged in them, must be overlooked; no one has the right to make others vicious and unhappy, that he may procure enjoyments or amass riches; and if personal morality suffice not to prevent the doing evil, society has a prime right to interfere, and, guided by general morality, to supply all that is defective.

Hence, universal happiness, as it is the aim of legislation in general, must be the basis of all enactments relative to property. So long as individuals shall be suffered to collect riches without limits, the causes of misery and of slavery will endure. The poor will sell themselves to the rich, and the rich will find easy means of imposing their arbitrary will as law upon society.

This, however, is a subject surrounded by innumerable

difficulties. Much has been written upon it, but all has not yet rendered it clear in every one of its points. Property must be respected, otherwise civil wars and the dissolution of society would be unavoidable; but, again, if in the regulations concerning property, general happiness be neglected, the order of things established cannot be permanent. Fortunes get more and more concentrated, the equilibrium is disturbed, and in the end the rich to maintain possession are obliged to repel by force the attacks of the poor, who think themselves strong in their numbers. The division of property is, therefore, a necessary condition to general happiness; hence, primogeniture is inadmissible, and opposed to natural morality, which recognises reward as well-bestowed for personal merit alone. I have already said, that if it be unjust to punish children for the faults of parents, it cannot be just to reward them for the merits of sires; I add—

That to me it seems necessary for the nations which would secure a permanent existence, to fix the maximum of the property that may be acquired, as well as the conditions, viz., natural morality, in conformity with which it may be amassed; or else, as it seems fair that every one should enjoy the fruits of his labour, parents might, under certain conditions, be permitted to acquire to the extent they pleased, but still have the power of transmitting a certain sum only to their children when arrived at the age of maturity, while the rest of their gains should revert to the commonwealth, and be employed in purposes of public usefulness. This would be the best way of doing justice to the community, and of preventing idleness, that foster-parent of vice.

History proves that nations attain the highest prosperity when every one is permitted to work for his peculiar advantage; but history also proves that this prosperity is not permanent; its very causes involve the elements of decline; for luxury, indolence, moral corruption, degeneracy of body, and feebleness of mind, are consequences of its temporary endurance, and these are the sure precursors to the death of empires. I leave this discussion to those who are occupied with politics. I am particularly interested in calling the attention of all thinking people to the necessity of founding society on the broad basis of natural morality, itself the sole, sure, and unalterable foundation of universal welfare. This ground is more stable than that which sensual pleasures or the arts and sciences can supply. The indulgence of inferior appetites degrades, morality ennobles human nature, and is indispensable, whilst the arts and sciences are mere embellishments of existence.

To impress still more deeply the importance of subordinating the animal feelings to the faculties proper to man, I shall speak summarily of the love of approbation. This sentiment exists in animals and in man, and exercises a powerful influence over all our actions in society. Still to permit it, unbounded activity is a very great error. Nations in whom it prevails are scarcely fit for a free government, servility, so to speak, is their natural bent. Blinded by external appearances, they overlook the common welfare. Titles, decorations, encomiums are effectual instruments in the hands of their governors to enslave them.

Two prime errors are to be guarded against; in the first

place, distinction is never to be conferred on account of actions resulting from the animal nature, undirected by the superior faculties, and again, distinction ought never to be the aim of human actions.

From all I have said then, it follows that I consider the practice of natural morality as indispensable to the welfare of mankind at large, and that all social institutions ought to be founded on this natural morality, which has been, is, and will ever be, invariable. Individually I call those happy who, without difficulty, subject their animal nature to the faculties proper to man; who, for instance, are satisfied with such things as are merely necessary—with their daily bread; who desire not superfluities, luxuries, riches, or distinctions; who taste of all pleasures in moderation, enjoying every thing, but abusing nothing; who cultivate art or science for the delights it affords; who in every situation do their duty, and who stand not in need of others' or foreign aid, to satisfy their active faculties. Unhappy, on the other hand, are almost all who look for their personal well-being in things which are opposed to natural morality; who have many and active faculties, the satisfaction of which depends on others; whose inferior faculties, in short, are the most energetic, especially if they injure the health, and if their indulgence be expensive.

SECTION VII.

Explanation of different Philosophical Expressions.

Nothing is more vague than the language of philosophy. Many expressions have several significations, and almost every term in use has been invented to designate actions, and not the faculties which produce them. To make this difference felt, I shall collect several of the most common words, and in one column give their usual signification, in another their explanation according to the fundamental faculties, referring the reader to the passages either in the physiological or in the philosophical part of this work, in which the terms as they occur are more particularly explained.

Common Significations.	Explanation according to the Faculties.
	Absolute.
Unconditional; not relative.	Nothing but God is absolute. In man every thing is relative and conditional.
	Admiration.
A tribute paid by individuals to whatever appears to them good and excellent.	It is an affection of the sense of marvellousness.

Common Significations.	Explanation according to the Faculties.

Adoration.

The external homage paid to the Divinity.	The effect of the sense of veneration.

Affectation.

A singular manner of speaking; the making an external appearance in order to attract the attention of others.	It results from the love of approbation, when not combined with understanding; it increases in combination with secretiveness and ideality.

Affections.

Certain states of the mind.	They are the modes of being affected of the fundamental faculties. Vid. p. 35 of this volume.

Ambition.

Great desire of preferment and distinction.	An effect of great activity of the love of approbation applied to things of importance. Vid. p. 178 of Phrenology.

Anger.

A violent emotion with an inclination to revenge.	A disagreeable affection of combativeness.

Common Significations.	Explanation according to the Faculties.

Apathy.

The quality of not feeling; exemption from passion; freedom from mental excitation.	Inactivity of every fundamental faculty; it is partial, or more or less general.

Ardour.

Heat, or eagerness in action.	Great activity of every fundamental power.

Art.

A word used in opposition to nature; something effected by skill and dexterity.	The result of individual powers of the mind.

Attention.

Application of the mind to any subject.	The result of the individual intellectual faculties. Vid p. 14 of this volume.

Attrition.

Grief of sin arising from the fear of punishment.	A disagreeable affection of the sense of conscientiousness caused by that of veneration, assisted by benevolence and circumspection.

Common Significations.	Explanation according to the Faculties.
Beautiful.	
Each agreeable sensation by means of hearing and seeing.	It designs the harmonious relations between external impressions and the intellectual faculties of the mind, principally the senses of extension, configuration, colouring, tone, and order.
Belief.	
Credit given to something which we know not of ourselves.	Hope disposes to belief; hope and marvellousness produce religious belief.
Benevolence.	
Disposition to do good.	A fundamental faculty. Vid. p. 187 of Phrenology.
Charming.	
Pleasing in the highest degree.	Springs from a high degree of satisfaction of every fundamental faculty.
Compassion.	
Painful sympathy.	A disagreeable affection, or mode of action of benevolence.

Common Significations.	Explanations according to the Faculties.
Confusion.	
Distraction of mind and indistinct combination of ideas.	Defect of order in general, discord among the functions.
Conscience.	
The faculty by which we judge of good and evil.	A mode of action of conscientiousness.
Constancy.	
Unalterable continuance.	The effect of firmness assisted by the activity of the individual faculties.
Consternation.	
Astonishment, accompanied with terror.	An affection of marvellousness and circumspection without hope and courage.
Contempt.	
The act of despising.	A disagreeable affection of self-esteem, produced by various causes.
Contentment.	
Acquiescence without plenary satisfaction.	A degree of satisfaction of every fundamental faculty.

Common Significations.	Explanation according to the Faculties.
	Contrition.
Sorrow for sin.	A disagreeable affection of conscientiousness, caused by benevolence, veneration, and marvellousness.
	Courage.
Active fortitude.	A fundamental power, vid. p. 153 of Phrenology.
	Cruelty.
Delight taken in the pain of others.	It results from the satisfaction of destructiveness without benevolence.
	Cupidity.
Unlawful longing.	Great activity of acquisitiveness.
	Desire.
Wish to enjoy.	A result of every faculty in action. Vid. p. 36 of this vol.
	Desolation.
A sort of mixture of melancholy and despair.	A disagreeable affection of attachment, and of benevolence, or of circumspection without courage, hope, and firmness.

Common Significations.	Explanation according to the Faculties.
	Despair.
Hopelessness.	A disagreeable affection of circumspection without hope.
	Despise.
An act of contempt.	A disagreeable affection of self-esteem.
	Diffidence.
Want of confidence.	The effect of circumspection, combined with secretiveness and intellect.
	Disdain.
A sort of contempt.	A disagreeable affection of self-esteem.
	Disorder.
Irregularity, neglect of rule.	Want of order and time; often also want of justice and benevolence.
	Doubt.
Uncertainty of mind.	The effect of circumspection, combined with intellect.

Common Significations.	Explanation according to the Faculties.
Duty.	
That to which a man is by any natural or legal obligation bound.	The effect of conscientiousness.
Envy.	
Pain felt at the sight of excellence or happiness in another.	The effect of selfishness, combined with various inferior powers, and without benevolence.
Ecstacy.	
Rapture and excessive elevation of the mind.	The faculties of marvellousness, ideality, mirthfulness, and hope, dispose to this state of mind.
Faith.	
Belief in the revealed truths of religion.	The effect of marvellousness and hope.
Friendship.	
The state of minds united by mutual benevolence.	A fundamental feeling. Vid. Phrenology, p. 150.

Common Significations.	Explanation according to the Faculties.
Fright.	
A strong and sudden fear.	A strong and sudden affection of circumspection.
Fury.	
A violent fit of anger.	An affection and strong irritation of courage and destructiveness.
Genius.	
A man endowed with mental powers in a high degree.	The highest degree of activity of the individual faculties.
Grief.	
Sorrow for something past.	A state of dissatisfaction of every fundamental faculty.
Hatred.	
Ill-will.	A compound affection; it results from opposition to our selfish views, whilst benevolence and justice are inactive.

Common Significations.	Explanation according to the Faculties.
	Happiness.
State of satisfaction.	The effect of the satisfaction of every fundamental faculty.
	Haughtiness.
Pride, arrogance.	The effect of self-esteem, sometimes combined with firmness and justice.
	Honour.
Reputation, dignity.	Its basis is the love of approbation. It is often modified by self-love and veneration.
	Hope.
Expectation of something which we desire.	A fundamental power. Vid. Phrenology, p. 205.
	Horror.
Terror, mixed with detestation.	A disagreeable, more or less compound, affection of benevolence, veneration, justice, circumspection, approbation, and configuration.

Common Significations.	Explanation according to the Faculties.
Idea.	
Thought, mental image.	The effect of each intellectual faculty.
Imagination.	
The power of forming ideas, and of representing ideas of absent things.	The spontaneous and great activity of every faculty; activity of ideality. Vid. this vol. p. 21.
Impatience.	
Inability to suffer delay.	Great activity of every fundamental faculty.
Impetuosity.	
Great vivacity in action.	Great and quick activity of the fundamental faculties, principally of ideality, self-love, courage, of the love of approbation and of mirthfulness, without circumspection.
Inattention.	
Want of attention.	Inactivity of every intellectual faculty. Vid. p. 14 of this vol.

Common Significations.	Explanation according to the Faculties
Indifference.	
Unconcernedness.	Little activity of every fundamental faculty.
Indignation.	
Anger, mingled with contempt or disgust.	A compound affection of self-esteem, justice, courage, and the love of approbation.
Indolence.	
Laziness, carelessness.	Little activity of the fundamental faculties.
Insolence.	
Pride, displayed in contemptuous treatment of others.	The effect of great self-esteem, courage, and other inferior feelings, combined with little justice.
Instinct.	
An impulse to act in the mind not determined by deliberation.	The effect of spontaneous activity of every faculty. Vid. this volume, p. 2.

Common Significations.	Explanation according to the Faculties.
Jealousy.	
Suspicious caution, or rivalry.	A compound affection of selfishness, and various fundamental powers.
Joy.	
A lively and agreeable emotion of the mind.	An agreeable affection of every fundamental faculty, particularly of the feelings.
Judgment.	
The power of judging; the determination come to.	A mode of action of the intellectual faculties. Vid. p. 23 of this vol.
Knowledge.	
Cognizance, clear perception.	The effect of the activity of every intellectual faculty.
Love (physical.)	
The passion between the sexes.	A fundamental power. Vid. Phrenology, p. 128.
Lukewarm.	
Indifferent, not ardent.	Little activity of the fundamental faculties.

Common Significations.	Explanation according to the Faculties.
Melancholy.	
A gloomy temper.	A disagreeable affection of the feelings, particularly of circumspection.
Memory.	
The power of recollecting things past.	An internal repetition of its function by every intellectual faculty. Vid. this vol. p. 19.
Moderation.	
Forbearance; not going to extremities.	A moderate activity of every faculty.
Modesty.	
Decency, purity of manners.	Little activity of self-esteem wth benevolence, circumspection, and justice.
Morality.	
Practice of the duties of life.	The effect of the faculties proper to man, particularly of conscientiousness.

Common Significations.	Explanation according to the Faculties.
Negligence.	
The habit of omitting, or of acting carelessly.	Little activity of the individual faculties, particularly of order, of the desire to acquire, &c.
Nobility.	
Persons of high rank.	True nobility results from activity of the superior sentiments.
Pain.	
A disagreeable sensation	A disagreeable affection of every fundamental faculty. Vid. p. 36 of this vol.
Passion.	
Violent emotion of the mind.	The highest degree of activity of every faculty. Vid. p. 38 of this vol.
Patience.	
The power of expecting long, or of suffering without discontent.	Moderate activity of the faculties, supported by circumspection, firmness, and sometimes by benevolence; also, the activity of individual faculties, assisted by firmness.

Common Significations.	Explanation according to the Faculties.
	Perplexity.
Distraction and irresolution of mind.	A compound affection of circumspection, combined with the love of approbation and justice, increased by little courage.
	Pleasure.
Gratification of the mind.	An agreeable affection of every faculty.
	Pretension.
Claim, true or false.	Great activity of self-esteem, increased by the love of approbation.
	Rage.
Violent anger.	Great activity of courage and destructiveness.
	Ravishment.
Violent but pleasing excitement of the mind.	A high degree of pleasure produced by the satisfaction of every faculty very active.

Common Significations.	Explanation according to the Faculties.
	Regret.
Vexation for something past.	A disagreeable affection of every faculty combined with the remembrance of some enjoyment lost.
	Reminiscence.
Recollection.	The peculiar memory of the power of knowing facts (*Eventuality*). Vid. p. 20 of this vol.
	Remorse ; or, Repentance.
Pain of guilt.	A disagreeable affection of conscientiousness.
	Science.
Knowledge built on principles.	It is the effect of the reflective applied to the perceptive faculties.
	Self-esteem.
	A fundamental power. Vid. Phrenology, p. 173.

Common Significations.	Explanation according to the Faculties.

Sensation.

Perception by means of the senses.	The knowledge of every impression either external or internal. Vid. p. 4 of this vol.

Shame.

The passion felt when reputation is supposed to be lost, or when a bad action is detected.	A disagreeable affection of the love of approbation, combined with justice and circumspection.

Sorrowful.

Mournful, grieving.	A disagreeable affection of every faculty.

Spite.

Malice, rancour.	A disagreeable affection of self-esteem and courage.

Stupor.

Great diminution, or suspension of sensibility.	A great degree of inactivity of the faculties.

Common Significations.	Explanation according to the Faculties.
	Sublime.
Exalted, high in excellence.	The effect of ideality, combined with the superior sentiments, and intellectual faculties.
	Temperance.
Moderation and sedateness.	A moderate activity of the inferior feelings.
	Temptation.
The act of tempting, and the state of being tempted.	The effect of every active faculty which incites to action.
	Tranquil.
Quiet.	The effect of little activity.
	Uneasiness.
State of disquiet.	The effect of great activity of every faculty.
	Unhappiness.
Distress.	The state of dissatisfaction of every active faculty.
	Unreasonable.
Want of reason.	Inactivity of the reflecting faculties.

Common Significations.	Explanation according to the Faculties.

Vengeance.

The desire and act of rendering evil for evil.	Self-esteem being offended, combined with courage, destructiveness, and other inferior sentiments, whilst benevolence and justice are inactive, incites to revenge.

Virtue.

Moral goodness, that which gives excellence.	Every action conformable to natural morality; the result of the contest between the two natures of man.

Want.

The state of not having; desire.	Want, in the sense of desire, is the effect of every active faculty.

Will.

A faculty of the mind, and the determination which results from it.	Decision according to motives which are proper to man, and enlightened by the reflecting faculties.—Vid. p. 32 of this vol.

Wisdom.

The power of judging rightly.	The regulation of every action by the rule of natural morality.

Recapitulation and Conclusion.

In this volume I flatter myself with having proved that idealogeans and moralists have confined themselves to general notions of the mind, and have taken mere modes of action for fundamental faculties. I have proposed a new classification of the faculties of the mind, capable of being ascertained by observation. Moreover, I have examined into the origin of the fundamental faculties, and shown that neither outward circumstances, nor education, nor the external senses, nor the will, explains their existence; but that each is innate, and depends on the cerebral organization for its exhibition.

I have particularly insisted on the moral nature of man, and am convinced that the lovers of truth will not now accuse Phrenology of teaching either materialism or fatalism, in the sense that the faculties being innate, act irresistibly in consequence. I have considered the conditions necessary to liberty, the nature of moral liberty, and the origin of evil. I have compared Christianity with the natural morality of man, and am of opinion, that true Christianity will gain by the knowledge of human nature.

I have decided in favour of natural goodness, because it may rather be depended on than the goodness which is prompted by virtue. I have entered into some considerations relative to the practical part of Phrenology, and spoken of the modifications observable in the manifestations of each faculty; of the difficulty of judging of others; of the necessity of mutual indulgence; of natural sympathy and antipathy; and of the happiness of mankind. At the end I have given an explanation of several expressions, according to the fundamental faculties of the mind, and their modes of action.

The object of Phrenology, in its extensive signification, is immense, extremely difficult, but important and interesting in the same proportion. It will still require much exertion to be rendered perfect. I shall be happy if I succeed in calling the attention of others to the study of man, and particularly to the consideration of his moral nature, which is essential to general happiness, and which, I think, has been too much neglected in modern times.

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